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The gap between those who conduct mediation and those 
who study mediation is inexplicably enormous. Complaints about the 
gap come not only from academics who would like to see some 
attention paid to their analysis by practitioners but from as deep into 
the practitioners’ world as the United Nations Secretariat, who would 
like to be useful in training newly selected envoys. The complaints 
from the practitioners’ side frequently cite (when at all) the 
academic’s language, which they find too difficult. Indeed, the 
Department of Political Affairs (DPA) of the U.N. Secretariat has 
recently established an International Academic Advisory Council to 
promote more systematic exchanges linking theory and academic 
analysis with practice and to support the generation and 
dissemination of knowledge for mediation practitioners. This is 
precisely what this issue of the Penn State Journal of Law & International 
Affairs intends to do, and it carries it off with skill and 
knowledge. Without talking down, the articles lay out established 
understandings drawn from mediation practice when it is well done 
and then carry forth the implications of established knowledge into 
new questions. The ball now is in the practitioners’ court, to use and 
test the transmitted knowledge, provide the world with better results 
from mediation, and provide the analysts with new data to turn into 
knowledge.   
 
I. William Zartman 
Jacob Blaustein Professor Emeritus of International  
Organization and Conflict Resolution 
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies  
The Johns Hopkins University 
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TRANSLATING SCHOLARSHIP INTO 
POLICY 
Scott Sigmund Gartner & Amy C. Gaudion* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, there were thirty-seven ongoing intrastate and 
interstate armed conflicts that together resulted in thousands of civil 
and military deaths. During that same year, only one peace agreement 
was signed.1 Clearly there is tremendous room for improvement in 
peacemaking. Mediation represents one of the most commonly used 
mechanisms for preventing and resolving violent, international 
conflict. In mediation, disputants more or less willingly work with a 
third party to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. Mediation is 
voluntary and contractual, as compared to arbitration which is 
binding and judgmental. Mediation involves: two (or more) 
disputants, one (or more) mediators, and one (or more) disputes. 
Mediators can structure the disputants’ discussion (called 
Communications Facilitation), resolution process (called a Procedural 
Mediation Strategy), or agreement (called a Directive Mediation Strategy). 
                                                 
* Scott Sigmund Gartner, Professor of International Affairs, School of 
International Affairs and Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University, 
and Amy C. Gaudion, Associate Director of the School of International Affairs and 
Assistant Dean for Academic Affairs of the Dickinson School of Law, 
Pennsylvania State University. 
1 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND CONFLICT 
RESEARCH, UPPSALA UNIVERSITET, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/. 
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Most disputes require multiple management efforts and most 
mediated disputes eventually end peacefully.2 
Since the end of the Cold War, the incidence of international 
dispute peacemaking—especially third-party mediation of civil 
wars—has skyrocketed. Figure 1 shows the dramatic shift from 
interstate to intrastate (civil) war mediation.3 At the same time, there 
has been a surge in the study of international dispute mediation. Not 
only has the quantity of research on international dispute mediation 
increased, but the research has become increasingly rigorous and 
scientific. Scholars now regularly employ large data sets, state-of-the-
art statistical methods, and sophisticated math modeling techniques 
to examine questions such as: who mediates, which strategies are 
most likely to lead to peace, and why do some agreements last longer 
than others? These recent, innovative approaches have led to a 
massive increase in scholars’ understanding of both interstate and 
civil war peacemaking. 
Filled with jargon and containing steep learning curves, 
however, these new approaches have also significantly impeded the 
ability of practitioners to draw lessons from current research. The 
result is an ever widening gap between conflict resolution 
policymakers and scholars—a tragedy given practitioners’ dire need 
for new ideas to help resolve deadly conflicts and the growing 




                                                 
2 For an introduction to international dispute mediation, see J. MICHAEL 
GREIG & PAUL F. DIEHL. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION (2012). For an 
introduction to recent research on international dispute mediation, see JACOB 
BERCOVITCH & SCOTT SIGMUND GARTNER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 
MEDIATION: NEW APPROACHES AND FINDINGS (2009). 
3 Scott Sigmund Garter, Civil War Peacemaking, in J. JOSEPH HEWITT, 
JONATHAN WILKENFELD & TED ROBERT GURR, PEACE AND CONFLICT 2012, 71, 
73 (2012). 
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Figure 1. Conflict Management Frequency by Dispute Type, 








This lament is not new but scholars and policymakers have 
recently become more vocal in noting the disconnect between 
analysis and policy: “policy making and academic research should be 
in constant, productive conversation, and scholars and researchers 
should be an invaluable resource for policy makers, but they are 
not.”4 Indeed, just this year, the United Nations Department of 
Political Affairs established the Academic Advisory Council on 
Mediation initiative—an entity charged with making research findings 
known and accessible to practitioners.5 
The goal of this issue of the Penn State Journal of Law & 
International Affairs is to narrow the gap between peacemaking 
scholars and practitioners. We have worked together to bridge these 
communities to create a broad, informed and useful understanding of 
                                                 
4 Robert L. Gallucci, How Scholars Can Improve International Relations, 
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 26, 2012, http://chronicle.com/article/How 
-Scholars-Can-Improve/135898/.  
5 U.N. Secretary-General, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. 
Doc. A/66/811 (June 25, 2012), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ 
files/resources/N1234641.pdf.  
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dispute resolution. In the nine essays that follow, scholars translate 
their analytical research into clear policy implications. The result is an 
accessible and comprehensive source of lessons learned from current 
peacemaking research. The essays are fully cited, so that readers may 
continue learning about a research topic. In the conclusion, Dr. 
Dennis Jett, a former Ambassador to Mozambique and Peru and a 
current professor at Penn State’s School of International Affairs, 
provides a framework for how to assess the applicability of policy 
implications and highlights a number of the essays’ most critical 
peacemaking recommendations. 
We have undertaken extensive efforts to make these essays 
relevant to the policy and legal communities, and also grounded in 
current peacemaking scholarship. The research was presented at 
numerous workshops held by the Folke Bernadotte Academy, all of 
which included ambassadors and other peacemaking practitioners in 
addition to well-known peacemaking scholars. The essays were 
anonymously reviewed by a distinguished mediation scholar, well 
known to both the academic and policy peacemaking communities. 
In addition, the essays were vetted by School of International Affairs 
legal and international affairs scholars. Finally, the essays went 
through the Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs editorial 
process. The result of this rigorous review is a unique and innovative 
series of articles that are both analytical and practical; compact essays 
that quickly and accessibly summarize a complex and extensive body 
of research and identify its most salient peacemaking policy 
implications. 
PEACEMAKING TRANSLATIONS 
The essays in this issue address critical aspects of 
international conflict resolution and are framed to initiate a 
conversation with the policymakers tasked with resolving the 
complex real world problems arising out of these conflicts. 
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In the opening essay,6 Birger Heldt, of Sweden’s Folke 
Bernadotte Academy, examines the impact that coordination has on 
peacemaking efforts. He offers recommendations on how to utilize 
regional organizations, a pre-determined division of labor, and 
longer-term peacemaking strategy to achieve more sustainable peace, 
and concludes that closer attention to coordination issues may have 
the synergistic—and positive—effect of building a culture of 
prevention and peacemaking. 
The essay by Isak Svensson,7 of the Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research at Uppsala University, also challenges conventional 
practices in peacemaking.  He contests the proposition that neutral or 
unbiased mediators are the most effective. Recognizing the 
complexities inherent in the process, he proposes that mediator bias 
be viewed as an open explanatory empirical factor rather than a 
barrier to conflict management. He identifies instances and 
circumstances when biased mediators actually may outperform their 
neutral counterparts—and thus, should be the preferred mediator 
type.  Similarly, the essay by Scott Sigmund Gartner,8 of Penn State’s 
School of International Affairs, challenges the common view that 
mediation is the least effective form of dispute resolution.  He shows 
that a process known as “selection effects” distorts the inferences we 
draw from observations of peacemaking, leading us to infer 
erroneously that mediation is ineffective when in reality it is actually 
highly effective in facilitating peaceful outcomes. David E. 
Cunningham,9 of the University of Maryland, continues this thread by 
upending the view that “veto players” —those groups or entities that 
have the ability to block settlement and prolong a conflict—should 
be excluded from settlement talks. Rather, he offers policymakers a 
prescription for including such players in the settlement process to 
achieve a more lasting peace. In addition, Cunningham argues that 
                                                 
6 Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking, 2 PENN. 
ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 9 (2013). 
7 Isak Svensson, Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, 2 PENN. 
ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 17 (2013). 
8 Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to Fail 
but Actually Succeeds, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 27 (2013). 
9 David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace 
Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 38 (2013). 
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settlement talks are most likely to succeed if they exclude other, non-
veto players, from negotiations aimed at ending the war. 
Each essay offers substantive guidance to peacemakers in the 
field; several, however are noteworthy in their ability to specifically 
address ongoing disputes. One of the most daunting and seemingly 
intractable situations confronting policymakers today is the conflict in 
Syria. In a provocative essay, J. Michael Greig10 of the University of 
North Texas, explains why mediation efforts have failed there, and 
offers an unconventional prescription for addressing future conflicts 
with similar characteristics. The disheartening lack of progress 
observed in Syria can also be seen in the ongoing conflicts in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mali, which remain in a 
static yet deadly limbo.  The essay by Kyle Beardsley11 of Emory 
University, offers timely and valuable insights to the policymakers 
tasked with resolving these conflicts. He explores the importance of 
allowing third-party mediators the flexibility to select mediation tools 
and styles suitable to the character and context of the conflict. He 
offers recommendations on how much leverage is needed to stop 
ongoing brutal violence in the short term and the effectiveness of 
“lighter tactics” in helping disputants overcome the final barriers to 
settlement—observations that may be of particular relevance to 
policymakers on the ground in Syria, Mali and the DRC. 
Similarly, two other essays offer insights on the form and 
process for achieving successful mediation results. Stephen Gent,12 of 
the University of North Carolina, explores why states are reluctant to 
use legal mechanisms, most notably arbitration and adjudication, to 
resolve disputes despite the fact that these mechanism have proven 
to be highly effective. He examines political and other dynamics that 
create such hesitancy, and then offers guidance to policymakers on 
helping states overcome their aversion to legal dispute forums.  The 
                                                 
10 J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on 
the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 48 (2013). 
11 Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and 
Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 57 (2013). 
12 Stephen E. Gent, The Politics of International Arbitration and Adjudication, 2 
PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 66 (2013). 
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essay by Molly Melin,13 of Loyola University of Chicago, explores the 
unique role that state mediators can play and the distinct benefits 
offered by state-led mediation. Her essay highlights factors 
policymakers should consider when assessing whether to use state-led 
mediation. Drawing on existing research, she identifies the conflict 
characteristics and other circumstances under which state-led 
mediation efforts will be the most effective and sustainable. 
Finally, an essay by Victor Asal of the University of Albany 
and Jonathan Wilkenfeld14 of the University of Maryland aims its 
criticism at scholars and policymakers alike for failing to recognize 
the tremendous harm caused by generalizing ethnic behavior—i.e., 
attributing negative characteristics (for example violence or terrorism 
tactics) to an entire ethnic group when the characteristics are more 
appropriately attributed to a smaller political entity within that ethnic 
group and maybe even lack accuracy when describing that smaller 
entity. Their analysis and conclusions will have particular relevance as 
states seek to define the threat posed by today’s ethno-political 
groups, most notably Hamas and Al Qaeda—two groups that seem 
to be moving away from violence as a defining characteristic and 
toward more political and social outreach identities. 
A PEACEMAKING TOOL KIT 
These essays identify an extensive number of critical policy 
implications and in some cases, concrete recommendations—
creating, in essence, a peacemaking tool kit. How does one evaluate 
them all? Where should one start? In his concluding essay, 
Ambassador Jett puts forward guidelines for evaluating policy 
implications like those presented. He argues that “mediators are often 
crucial to reaching a peaceful resolution to a conflict” but that 
mediation is not a “silver bullet.”15 For mediation to be successful, 
                                                 
13 Molly M. Melin, When States Mediate, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 78 
(2013). 
14 Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An Organizational 
Perspective, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 91 (2013). 
15 Dennis C. Jett, Mediation—Its Potential and Its Limits: Developing an 
Effective Discourse on the Research and Practice of Peacemaking, 2 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L 
AFF. 103 (2013). 
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policymakers need to be as informed as possible on what works 
when. Using this approach, Jett highlights the policy implications 
especially relevant to peacemakers: (1) mediator bias tends to lead to 
different outcomes; (2) mediators get the toughest cases and the most 
intractable disputes; (3) more may not be better when it comes to 
dispute resolution; (4) assumptions about the nature of ethnic 
conflict can result in bad peacemaking choices; and (5) in some types 
of disputes, arbitration might be more effective than mediation (and 
vice versa). Because these  conclusions are drawn from studies of the 
patterns of past peacemaking events (or incidents) and are informed 
by an understanding of conflict management dynamics and history, 
their applicability to the dispute scenarios facing today’s conflict 
managers (or policymakers) is compelling. 
CONCLUSION 
Research tends to swing like a pendulum between analytic 
and rigorous methods and accessible and relevant approaches. We 
reject this tradeoff. We believe that research can be simultaneously 
rigorous and relevant, and analytic and accessible. Given the 
devastating loss of life associated with armed conflict, the need for 
translating research results into policy prescriptions is especially 
strong in peacemaking. This issue has tackled the translation of nine 
critical research agendas on dispute resolution into a series of policy 
recommendations that peacemakers can employ. As William Zartman 
ambitiously writes in his foreword to this issue: “[t]he ball now is in 
the practitioners’ court, to use and test the transmitted knowledge, 
provide the world with better results from mediation, and provide the 
analysts with new data to turn into knowledge.”16 
 
                                                 
16 I. William Zartman, Foreword, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. i (2013). 
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THE LACK OF COORDINATION IN 
DIPLOMATIC PEACEMAKING 
Birger Heldt* 
As often observed in recent studies on peacemaking, there 
has been a shift from a few high-profile mediators to the present 
situation, characterized by states, ad-hoc groups of states and inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs) (Track I diplomacy) as well as 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local organizations and 
prominent figures (Track II diplomacy). The origin of this shift may 
be traced back to the early 1990s when the United Nations initiated 
efforts to increase and coordinate the contributions of regional 
arrangements for addressing threats to international peace and 
security.1 One alleged impetus for the change was the United 
                                                 
* Birger Heldt, Director of Research, Folke Bernadotte Academy, 
Sweden. 
1 See Jochen Prantl, Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council, 59 
INT’L ORG. 559, 561, 584 (2005); Birger Heldt, Trends from 1948-2005: How to View 
the Relation between the United Nations and Non-UN Entities, in PEACE OPERATIONS: 
TRENDS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS 9 (Donald C.F. Daniel et al. eds., 2008); 
Hikaru Yamashita, Peacekeeping Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional 
Organisations, 38 REV. INT’L STUD. 165, 167, 171 (2010); accord U.N. Secretary-
General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping: Rep. of 
the Secretary-General, U.N. DOC. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992) http://www.un-
documents.net/a47-277.htm (highlighting prevention); U.N. Secretary-General, 
Secretary-General Says Global Effort Against Armed Conflict Needs Change from “Culture of 
Reaction to Culture of Prevention”, U.N. PRESS RELEASE SC/6759 (Nov. 29, 1999) 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19991129.sc6759.doc.html; U.N. 
Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. DOC. 
A/55/985–S/2001/574 (June 7, 2001), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/ 
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CPR%20S%202001 
%20574.pdf, (devotes an entire report, for the first time, to the broad topic of 
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Nation’s perceived inability to cope with the demand for 
peacekeeping and peacemaking in the immediate aftermath of the 
Cold War.2 The increase in peacemaking actors may also be a 
consequence of the expanded space for third-party initiatives as Cold 
War rivalries ended. Regardless of the cause, this development 
conforms with Article 52 of the U.N. Charter, which encourages 
peace initiatives from regional actors as the first resort before cases 
are referred to the U.N., which should be the last resort.3 
The increased number of peacemaking actors coincides with 
“a five-fold increase in the number of diplomatic interventions” in 
conflicts (both protracted and emerging) in the 1990s, as compared 
to the 1980s.4 Similarly, the number of U.N. peacemaking initiatives 
increased by approximately forty percent during 2000-2003 as 
compared with the 1990s, and fivefold between 1989 and 2002.5 
Furthermore, peacemaking initiatives of so-called Groups of Friends 
(small ad-hoc groupings of states and IGOs) increased seven-fold 
between 1991 and 2006.6 Moreover, between 1993 and 2004, there 
were 550 third-party peacemaking initiatives (mediation, third-party-
moderated direct talks, and good offices) in emerging conflicts alone.7 
                                                 
conflict prevention); U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on Enhancing 
Mediation and its Support Activities, U.N. DOC. S/2009/189 (Apr. 8, 2009),  available at 
http://www.un.org/docs/sc/sgrep09.htm, (discussing mediation); U.N. Secretary-
General, Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results: Rep. of the Secretary-General,. U.N. DOC. 
S/2011/552 (Aug. 26, 2011), http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/ 
files/SG Report_PreventiveDiplomacy_S2011552(english)_1.pdf, (summarizing 
the narrower topic of preventive diplomacy); BERTRAND G. RAMCHARAN, 
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AT THE UN (2008) (providing a detailed account of 
preventive diplomacy and peacemaking by the U.N.). 
2 See Prantl, supra note 1, at 561. 
3 U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 2 (“[M]ake every effort to achieve pacific 
settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional 
agencies before referring them to the Security Council.”), http://www.un.org/ 
en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml.  
4   HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT, HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 
2009/2010: THE CAUSES OF PEACE AND THE SHRINKING COSTS OF WAR 6, 63 
(2011) [hereafter SECURITY] http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-
reports/20092010/overview.aspx. 
5   Id. at 67. 
6   Id. 
7   FRIDA MÖLLER, CODEBOOK FOR THE DATASET MANAGING 
INTRASTATE LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT (MILC) (2007) (for data and detailed dataset 
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The increased amount of peacemaking, however, is accompanied by a 
low success rate. On average, there were 31 peacemaking attempts 
for every agreement in emerging civil conflicts from 1993 to 2004, 
and only fifteen percent of these conflicts ended through an 
agreement (as compared to the other outcomes of victory, low 
activity or escalation to war).8 
This article focuses on recent emerging9 conflicts, and 
assesses whether peacemaking has been characterized by 
coordination. The second section examines empirical patterns and 
their consequences. The third section is an attempt to formulate 
policy implications that touch upon the role of regional organisations, 
a pre-determined division of labour, and the importance of having a 
long-term peacemaking strategy. The focus of this analysis should not 
diminish efforts to deal with another problem: the general inaction 
on the part of the international community in responding to the large 
majority of emerging conflicts may be a bigger problem than the 
over-attention suffered by a few cases. 
MUCH PEACEMAKING, BUT LITTLE COORDINATION 
Peacemaking is prevalent, but is often not coordinated with 
regard to choice of tools (mediation, etc.), the agenda or the issues of 
the talks. This lack of coordination has for many years been 
recognized as detrimental. It allows conflict parties to “shop around,” 
wait for better deals, play the third parties against one another in 
search of a better deal, or sabotage peacemaking attempts.10 This 
                                                 
on peacemaking); Birger Heldt, Sequencing of Peacemaking: A Pilot Study (July 17, 
2012) (unpublished paper) (source of the number of peacemaking initiatives, which 
builds on data found in Möller). “Good office” refers to instances where third 
parties facilitate talks by offering conflict parties a venue to meet and communicate 
directly, but do not actively engage in, or moderate, the talks.  
8 Heldt, supra note 7. 
9 As used here “emerging” is defined as a conflict that has resulted in at 
least 25—but less than 1,000—deaths per year. 
10See generally Birger Heldt, Preventive Diplomacy in Emerging Intrastate Conflicts: 
Some Historical Patterns, in THIRD PARTIES AND CONFLICT PREVENTION 210 
(Anders Mellbourn ed., 2008); Tobias Böhmelt, Disaggregating Mediations: The Impact 
of Multiparty Mediation, 41 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 859 (2011); U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. 
of the Secretary-General on Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities, U.N. Doc. 
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insight is corroborated by statistical findings that indicate a negative 
relationship between the number of involved third parties and the 
likelihood of reaching a negotiated agreement in terms of ceasefires, 
partial or full peace agreements that halt the violence.11 A study of the 
size of Group of Friends mechanisms—most of which were applied 
on protracted instead of emerging conflicts—makes a similar 
observation: the larger the size of a Group of Friends, the less 
consistent the action.12 Coordination is thus very difficult, even when 
coordination mechanisms are in place. 
One example, among the worst cases in this regard, is the 
conflict between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the insurgent Croat 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. From October to December of 
1993 a plethora of Track I and Track II actors attempted to resolve 
the conflict. Mediation (M), third-party moderated direct talks (D) 
and good offices (G) were initiated in the following sequence: D, D, 
G, D, G, G, D, M, D, G, D, D, G, G, G, M, D, G, G, M, G, G, 
M.”13 Equally disorderly was the sequence of issues discussed, in 
terms of how the talks moved back and forth between basic 
incompatibility (government power or independence/autonomy), 
behavior (ceasefires, withdrawal of troops, etc.), and other issues 
(refugees, talks about talks, etc.).14 
It is in this particular case difficult to discern a strategy or 
straight trajectory; rather it appears that everything is tried and retried 
at some point. For instance, it may make sense to start off with 
                                                 
S/2009/189 (April 8, 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 
49e6f2880.html; Teresa Whitfield, Orchestrating International Action, 19 ACCORD 18 
(2008), http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2019_4Orchestrating%20 
international%20action_2008_ENG.pdf.  
11 Böhmelt, supra note 10; Heldt, supra note 10; David Cunningham, Veto 
Players and Civil War Duration, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 875, 877, 879 (2006). 
12 TERESA WHITFIELD, FRIENDS INDEED? THE UNITED NATIONS, 
GROUPS OF FRIENDS, AND THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT 270, 280 (2007). 
13 See Heldt, supra note 7, at 6.  
14 According to a private conversation with a high-level diplomat who 
was involved in Balkans peacemaking, this lack of coordination or even 
competition was a huge problem for peacemaking in the Balkans. There is a large 
debate as to the merits of sequencing peacemaking tools and negotiation issues: 
how sequencing should be carried out, what tools to use, what issues to deal with 
and in what order. See Heldt, supra note 7 (providing a brief literature overview). 
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“other issues,” and over time move towards the more difficult or 
core matters instead of moving back and forth again and again.15 This 
disorder and plethora of peacemaking attempts makes it difficult to 
understand how one peacemaking attempt can build on previous 
attempts, or even how the conflict actors themselves can keep up 
with the process. This is especially because peacemaking attempts 
have different start dates, and sometimes overlap. It is not 
implausible that this peacemaking pattern prolonged the conflict, 
which in the end was solved on the battlefield instead of through 
negotiations.  
Other extreme cases for the period of 1993-2004 involving 
many third-parties and different mediation tools include: Burundi 
(late 1997-2003), Croatia (1995), Guinea Bissau (1998), 
Israel/Palestine (2000-2002), and the Ivory Coast (2002-2003).16 It is 
possible to find examples of peacemaking, where the application of 
third-party tools and issues does not appear chaotic or inconsistent, 
even though there are many peacemaking attempts; however, such 
cases are rare. 
An inherent feature of such uncoordinated peacemaking 
processes is not simply a lack of institutional memory and 
consistency, but also an absence of learning. Third-party initiated 
peacemaking should, in theory, move the process forward by 
softening the parties, increasing mutual trust and negotiating skills, 
and providing information on fundamental issues that make parties 
more likely to spot zones of agreements.17 Third parties also stand to 
learn from the process. However, since third parties change and are 
numerous in some cases, learning does not appear feasible: third 
parties usually do not engage for an extended period of time, and 
their lessons learned are not transferred to succeeding or competing 
third parties through debriefings. This may partly explain the lack of 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Heldt, supra note 7, at 7. 
17 See generally Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is There a 
Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of 
Mediation, 32 INT’L INTERACTIONS 329, 330 (2006); J. Michael Greig & Paul F. 
Diehl, Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy, 32 INT’L 
INTERACTIONS 355, 377-378 (2006); Heldt, supra note 7, at 8. 
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peacemaking consistency and continuity in some cases, and the 
general lack of progress. It also illustrates how potentially damaging 
the lack of long-term engagement by lead peacemakers can be in 
individual cases. 
TOWARDS MORE COORDINATION, 
AND MORE PEACEMAKING 
Just as scholars and practitioners think in terms of the steps 
to war, it may be useful to apply a similar concept and think in terms 
of steps to peace. Steps to peace “implies that early efforts may, or 
perhaps even should, fail to generate a breakthrough, but they will 
[ideally] inch the process forward, in a productive way such that the 
next mediation attempt can build upon” earlier efforts.18 It implies 
also that quick breakthroughs—or rapid progress—will be the 
exception rather than the rule, and thus will be time-consuming. 
Meanwhile, during the period 1993-2004, about one third of the 
emerging conflicts escalated to war, and all but five of the cases 
escalating did so within two calendar years.19 The same data also 
shows that if a conflict avoids escalation in the immediate term, it is 
unlikely it will escalate in the future. This pattern may be due to the 
most war-prone cases escalating right away, thereby leaving the less 
war-prone cases behind; or that peacemaking efforts start to bite—or 
are perhaps usually only initiated—after some period of time. 
However, since low-level conflicts that escalate to war almost always 
do so within a 24-month period, time is of the essence. There is no 
time for many cumulative peacemaking attempts or steps to peace, 
not least since peacemaking attempts require time-consuming 
preparations. Coordination must ideally be at hand from the very 
beginning. 
Strategic coordination tools such as ad hoc Groups of 
Friends, contact groups, friends of a country, and implementation 
                                                 
18 Heldt, supra note 7, at 2, 3, 9; Scott Sigmund Gartner, Civil War 
Peacemaking, in PEACE AND CONFLICT 2012: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS, SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS, AND DEMOCRACY 71, 83 (J. 
Joseph Hewitt et al. eds., 2012). 
19 For data see Lotta Harbom, States in Armed Conflict 2006, in UPPSALA 
UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND RESEARCH REPORT 79 (2007). 
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group approaches, have different strengths and weaknesses.20 They 
emerged as novel strategic level peacemaking coordination 
mechanisms in the early 1990s and are now widely used with the goal 
of achieving strategic level coherence and coordination of 
peacemaking in protracted armed conflicts. The focus in this article 
is, however, on emerging cases, where coordination mechanisms such 
as Groups of Friends are rarely used, probably because emerging 
intrastate conflicts do not elicit much international interest. It may 
therefore be necessary to consider other solutions which involve a 
system or template for coordination that will not only work from the 
very first day of an emerging conflict, but also makes peacemaking 
more prevalent. 
One policy implication is that policymakers need to have a 
long-term strategy to address the coordination problem, part of 
which is to limit the number of peacemakers in a given conflict. A 
second policy implication is not to let initial failures (or non-
successes) discourage further peacemaking. Policymakers need to 
have a long-term view of the process, and carry out the process in a 
strategic manner. To paraphrase Sheri Rosenberg,21 peacemaking is a 
process, not an event. Unsuccessful initial mediations build a 
foundation for subsequent peacemaking attempts. Research suggests 
that it is not sufficient to simply do the right thing; it has to be done 
in a certain order, and repeatedly. One far-reaching vision involves 
not only the creation of a predetermined division of labor, but 
preferably also a predetermined third party that (with the support of 
the international community) takes the overall responsibility for an 
individual emerging conflict. The U.N. and some IGOs appear to be 
the only viable and legitimate actors to assume such regional or sub-
regional responsibilities. Admittedly, such ideal planning would in 
practice be difficult to achieve in some regions and sub-regions of the 
world (especially in Africa and Asia) because of (sub-) regional 
rivalries and unresolved disputes, and because of vested interests in 
                                                 
20 See generally Prantl, supra note 1; TERESA WHITFIELD, EXTERNAL 
ACTORS IN MEDIATION: DILEMMAS & OPTIONS FOR MEDIATORS 18 (2010); 
WHITFIELD, supra note 12; Whitfield, supra note 10, at 20-21; TERESA WHITFIELD, 
WORKING WITH GROUPS OF FRIENDS (2010). 
21 Sheri R. Rosenberg, Genocide is a Process, Not an Event, 7 GENOCIDE 
STUD. & PREVENTION 16 (2012). 
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the conflicts among some countries. Moreover, this approach would 
invalidate anything but so-called Track 1 diplomacy, which involves 
official government figures, and thus involves a return to the pattern 
of the centralised peacemaking that existed before the 1990s. At the 
same time this approach would increase the number of overall 
peacemaking attempts. In short, the approach involves fewer but 
more coordinated actors, not less peacemaking. The present pattern 
of peacemaking does not appear to be productive; a change is 
necessary. 
The international community, under the leadership of the 
U.N., has achieved a high degree of coordination in the areas of 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, so there may already be templates 
for how to improve coordination in the area of peacemaking. 
However, peacekeeping is easier to coordinate. Given the high costs 
and manpower required, there are fewer potential peacekeeping 
actors. There is moreover no competition or out-bidding among 
these potential actors, and in those cases where several actors carry 
out peacekeeping simultaneously (e.g., Kosovo), there is close 
coordination and a clear division of labor. Peacemaking is the exact 
opposite of this scenario and a need exists to develop new methods 
to deal with this issue. 
A further policy implication is that efforts to improve 
coordination should not crowd out the fact that most emerging 
conflicts are left totally or partially “orphaned,” in that there are no 
or few outside peacemaking attempts.22 Only a handful of cases 
suffer from over-attention. Efforts to improve coordination should 
thus not lose sight of the need for more peacemaking, which in fact 
may be a bigger problem than the lack of coordination in a few select 
cases.  
On a final policy note, regardless of which is the most 
pressing issue, they all may be closely linked, in that closer attention 
to coordination issues may serve to strengthen the culture of 
prevention and peacemaking. A synergy effect may thus be at hand. 
                                                 
22 Fen O. Hampson, Preventive Diplomacy at the United Nations and Beyond, in 
FROM REACTION TO CONFLICT PREVENTION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UN 
SYSTEM 139, 148-152 (Fen O. Hampson & David Malone eds., 1996). 
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One of the most important and disputed questions within the 
field of international mediation concerns the issue of bias. Can 
mediators be partial, sympathetic and supportive of one but not both 
of the main disputants, or should mediators always be neutral? Is it 
possible to be strictly impartial? Although neutrality is only one 
aspect of the mediators’ characteristics important to bringing about 
peaceful settlement of violent disputes, the question of bias cuts to 
the core of what mediation is and the ways in which mediators can 
help the parties reach peace. It is therefore crucial for academics and 
researchers, as well as policymakers and practitioners, to understand 
the occurrence, function, and effect of mediators’ bias in 
international conflict resolution processes. 
Summarizing the growing field of mediation research, Tom 
Woodhouse states:  
[a]s the literature on mediation has grown, and as 
knowledge has increased from an accumulating base 
of case studies and reflections, one of the most 
significant questions which has emerged is that related 
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to the relative merits . . . between two contrasting 
types of mediation: firstly that of a biased 
mediator . . . and secondly that of the unbiased 
mediator.1 
Yet, the issue of bias in international mediation is a complex 
one: a simple yes-or-no-answer to the question of whether mediators 
should be biased or neutral is not sufficient. It depends on a set of 
circumstances, which are discussed in this article. The question of 
mediation and bias is a core discussion within international mediation 
research.2 This article does not aim to summarize this rich research 
field, nor even explicitly situate my own work within this larger field. 
Its more limited ambition is instead to draw out the policy 
implications of my own empirically-based work on the role of bias in 
the mediation of internal armed conflicts.3 My main contribution to 
mediation research has been to explore the role of neutrality and bias 
in international peace diplomacy in civil wars. 
A first basic question to pose is whether mediators can be 
biased. If they are biased, do they not cease to be mediators? It is a 
common perception that mediation requires unbiased third parties. 
Some scholarly definitions require impartiality of the mediators, and 
hence, mediators are unbiased by definition. For instance, a classical 
                                                 
1 Tom Woodhouse, Adam Curle: Radical Peacemaker and Pioneer of Peace 
Studies, 1 J. OF CONFLICTOLOGY 1, 5-6 (2010). 
2 See generally I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN 
END TO CIVIL WARS 2-29 (1995); I. William Zartman & Saadia Touval, International 
Mediation, in LEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A 
DIVIDED WORLD 437-454 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2007); Saadia Touval, 
Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations, 1 JERUSALEM J. OF INT’L 
REL. 51 (1975); Bernd Beber, International Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of 
Bias, 29 CONFLICT MGMT. AND PEACE SCI. 397 (2012); Andrew Kydd, Which Side 
Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation, 47 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 597 (2003); Burcu 
Savun, Information, Bias, and Mediation Success, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 25 (2008). 
3 For work on bias in international conflicts, see generally Christopher 
Gelpi, Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control, in IMPERFECT UNIONS: SECURITY 
INSTITUTIONS OVER TIME AND SPACE 107 (Helga Haftendorn et al. eds., 1999); 
Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Bias and the Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict 
Management Mechanisms, 28 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 124 (2011). See also 
Stephen E. Gent, The Politics of International Arbitration and Adjudication, 2 PENN ST. 
J.L.& INT’L AFF. 66 (2013). 
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definition of mediation suggests that mediators have a relatively 
“impartial stance with regard to the opposing sides in a crisis.”4 Thus, 
by definition, impartiality is conceptually linked to mediation. Yet, 
with a definitional approach such as this, it is not possible to examine 
the extent to which bias helps or hinders peace processes. A more 
fruitful approach is to leave the question of bias as an open empirical 
question: to use mediator’s bias as an explanatory factor—that is, the 
degree and type of bias—and examine empirically the relationship 
between bias and how the process unfolds and the outcome is 
impacted. 
BIAS—AND ITS DIRECTION—MATTERS 
My research has shown that biased mediators, in some 
situations, outperform neutral mediators. Yet, in order to understand 
the role of bias in mediation, we first need to understand the context 
of contemporary armed conflicts. Most contemporary armed 
conflicts are fought between governments and rebel-groups.5 In other 
words, they are intrastate armed conflicts. Yet, until very recently, 
statistical analysis on mediation focused almost exclusively on 
interstate conflicts. Government and rebel-groups are different types 
of actors, a fact that implies that mediation plays a different type of 
role than in interstate conflicts, for the following basic reason: the 
government is internationally recognized, stronger in terms of 
capabilities and military might, and has many other obligations 
beyond pursuing a conflict with rebel groups. By contrast, rebel-
groups typically are unrecognized (and strive for recognition), 
materially weaker, but exclusively focused on achieving their 
aspirations in the conflict with the government-side. 
This also means that a mediator’s bias plays a different role 
depending on whether it is directed towards rebels or governments. I 
have suggested that there is a rebel-sided commitment problem, meaning 
that governments may fear giving recognition and power to rebels 
due to a belief that they will misuse it and exploit their advantaged 
                                                 
4 ORAN R. YOUNG, THE INTERMEDIARIES: THIRD PARTIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRISES 52 (1967). 
5 See generally PETER WALLENSTEEN, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION (2011). 
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positions. This commitment problem occurs primarily when parties 
are about to conclude negotiated peace deals (as opposed to that 
which occurs primarily in the implementation phase of agreements).6 
A negotiated settlement implies asymmetric opportunities for 
exploitation on the rebel-side, and rebel-groups therefore have 
commitment problems. They can, however, mitigate these problems 
by accepting a mediator that is biased for the other (government) 
side. In support of this reasoning, I found empirically—exploring 
data on mediation in internal armed conflicts during the time-period 
1989-2003—that government-biased mediators are particularly 
effective as peacemakers in bringing about negotiated settlements to 
armed conflicts.7 
Yet, not all peace settlements are the same and therefore 
should not be treated alike. Instead, peace settlements should be 
disaggregated into different peace institutional arrangements. When 
policymakers engage in crafting peace agreements, they need to ask 
themselves what type of peace they aspire to reach. Different types of 
mediators are associated with different types of institutional 
arrangements. I have found that rebel-biased mediators tend, in 
comparison with neutral mediators, to create peace settlements that 
include political-power sharing arrangements and third-party security 
guarantees. In contrast, government-biased mediators are more likely 
to create stipulations for government-sided amnesties, and territorial 
power-sharing arrangements. 
Furthermore, I argue that because biased mediators have 
incentives to protect their protégés, they will ensure that there are 
stronger mechanisms in the peace agreements. Exploring the content 
of all peace agreements since 1989, it becomes evident that biased 
mediators actually outperform neutral mediators in bringing about 
important institutional peace arrangements, such as stipulations for 
power-sharing, repatriation of civilians, and third-party security 
guarantees.8 This insight is important because it shows that biased 
                                                 
6 See BARBARA F. WALTER, COMMITTING TO PEACE: THE SUCCESSFUL 
SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL WARS 67 (2002). 
7 Isak Svensson, Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to 
Peace, 44 J. OF PEACE RES. 177, 183-85 (2007). 
8 Id. at 185, 187. 
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mediators are not only more likely to be successful in bringing about 
settlements, but also in some sense, produce “better” agreements.9 
Finally, it is also important to understand what makes biased 
third parties so effective. In previous work, I have identified four 
mechanisms that help explain the effectiveness of biased mediators: 
biased mediators can act (1) to protect their side, (2) reveal 
information, (3) deliver their side, and (4) counterbalance concession 
cheating.10 
This article calls into question some of the underlying 
assumptions in the contemporary international approach to conflict 
resolution. When it comes to the quality of peace, there is a 
difference between biased and neutral mediators. If we define quality 
in terms of stipulations of institutional arrangements that previous 
research has identified as important for deals to stick and peace to 
become durable, then biased mediators tend to be more effective in 
bringing high-quality agreements about.11 
One important, but insufficiently scrutinized issue regards the 
tension between justice-norms and peace-norms when it comes to 
biased and neutral mediators. Government-biased mediators tend to 
mediate agreements giving the government side freedom from 
persecution. This is good in the sense that it decreases the cost of 
peace for the belligerents—it is easier for decision-makers to agree to 
settle the conflict if they think they will not be punished for their 
wrongdoing during the war—and thereby make peace more likely to 
stick. Yet, it can also have a negative effect in the sense that it creates 
a culture of impunity by letting human-rights abusers go free. Biased 
mediators—under some circumstances—can be effective peace 
brokers, but their intervention may have negative implications for the 
values and protection of human rights. 
                                                 
9 Isak Svensson, Who Brings Which Peace?: Neutral versus Biased Mediation and 
Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars, 53 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 446, 449, 
464-65 (2009). 
10 Id. at 463. 
11 Id. at 461-62. 
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The policy implication of these global, comparative studies is 
that the direction of bias matters. When selecting mediators to 
negotiate a conflict assignment, policymakers must pay attention to 
which side a potential mediator has supported. In general, 
government-sided mediators outperform rebel-sided in terms of 
bringing about negotiated settlement,12 but to some extent (for 
instance, when it comes to political power-sharing and third-party 
security guarantees), it is the rebel-biased mediators that outperform 
government-biased ones.13 
THE ROLE FOR NEUTRAL MEDIATORS 
What then is the role for neutral mediators in peacemaking 
processes? Here four clarifications need to be made. First, although 
biased mediators, on an aggregate level, tend to be more effective 
than neutral ones, this does not necessarily mean that neutral 
mediators are unimportant. As with all social sciences, we are talking 
about probabilistic tendencies rather than general empirical laws. 
Neutral mediators are associated with negotiated settlements and can 
therefore also be important. Although they may bring agreements of 
less quality, they are nevertheless also engaged in bringing about 
negotiated settlements. Nothing we have concluded so far should 
lead us to disregard the role of neutral mediators. 
Second, there are transformations that need to occur in a 
peace process in addition to the peace agreements, and neutral 
mediators may be better positioned to support the creation of such 
transformations. It can be seen as a success to “just” get negotiations 
started.14 
                                                 
12 Svensson, supra note 7 at 181-83. 
13 Svensson, supra note 9 at 463-64; see also Molly M. Melin & Isak 
Svensson, Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars, 35 
INT’L INTERACTIONS 249 passim (2009) (discussing how historical ties also help 
explain the occurrence of mediation, which plays out differently in international 
and intrastate settings). 
14 ISAK SVENSSON & PETER WALLENSTEEN, THE GO BETWEEN: JAN 
ELIASSON AND THE STYLES OF MEDIATION 56, 67-68 (2010). 
 
2013 Svensson 2:1 
23 
Third, coalitions of biased and neutral mediators can be an 
effective design for peacemaking. The presence of third-party bias 
among any of the mediators as the critical value for defining a 
mediator as either biased or neutral implies that neutral mediators 
sometimes work in conjecture with biased ones, and in such 
collaborations might be particularly effective. 
Fourth, an important role for neutral mediators can be to 
bring on board potential mediators that will be biased due to their 
historical ties to one side, during the mediation process. For example, 
most informed observers would agree that peace between Israel and 
Palestine cannot be reached unless the U.S. engages as a peace 
broker. In fact, any progress that has been made in moving the 
parties’ positions towards each other has been made under American 
auspices. Sweden played an important role in the late 1980s in 
bringing about U.S. engagement in the process, by mediating, not 
between the primary parties, but between the secondary supporting 
actors to the government-side (the U.S.) and the rebel-side (the 
Palestine Liberation Organization). The Swedish approach—neutral 
mediation between the main secondary supporting actors—
transformed the U.S. engagement from support to peace-maker and 
thus structurally changed the relationships between the primary 
conflicting parties. This is in contrast to the direct engagement 
approach employed by the Norwegians in the same dispute—the 
Oslo Channel. The Norwegian approach was designed to engage 
directly with the primary parties, and although it reached a 
breakthrough and created a Palestinian Authority, it did not succeed 
in changing the underlying dynamics of the conflict. Rather, and 
perhaps counter-intuitively, many now view the Swedish approach as 
a more long-lasting achievement. 
INSIDER-PARTIAL MEDIATORS 
Another important policy implication to be drawn from the 
empirical research on mediation is the role of internal mediators: 
mediators emerged in the context of the conflicts and that culturally 
and positionally cannot be seen as strictly neutral. Domestic 
resources for peacemaking can be pivotal in peace processes. Most of 
the global, comparative research that has been done in the field of 
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mediation has focused on international mediators. Yet, mediators can 
also be insiders. Although Paul Wehr and John Paul Lederach point 
this out in an important 1991 piece, surprisingly little systematic 
research has heeded their advice and included these types of peace-
actors in their analyses.15 Insiders commonly carry with them certain 
distinct resources, which can provide important advantages in peace 
processes.  
These insiders, I suggest, can be particularly useful in 
mitigating some of the informational problems that arise in conflict 
bargaining situations. Most notably: (1) insiders have access to 
information about the parties’ resolve and capability to an extent that 
outsiders would have difficulty obtaining; and (2) insiders have 
significant reputation concerns as they will continue to interact with 
the conflicting parties after the intervention whereas outsiders often 
leave the scene after their intervention. Given this proximity, insiders 
need to be more protective of their reputations, and can ill-afford to 
lie, bluff or misrepresent information to the parties. Their concern 
for their future reputation incentivizes them to be candid during 
talks.  
These factors should lead us to examine other types of third 
parties than those usually discussed in the literature. In particular, we 
need to explore the role of insiders such as religious representatives 
and civil society leaders in acting as peacemakers. An empirical 
analysis of the role of insiders shows that insiders increase the chance 
of reaching the conclusion of a negotiated settlement—but overall 
they tend to select the “easiest” conflict situations available.16 Studies 
along these lines have important policy ramifications, not least by 
underlining the need for developing domestic resources for 
peacemaking. 
                                                 
15 See generally  Paul Wehr & John Paul Lederach, Mediating Conflict in 
Central America, 28 J. PEACE RES. 85 (1991). 
16 Svensson, supra note 7. 
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PERCEPTIONS OF PARTIALITY 
To this point, bias has been discussed in terms of objective 
criteria: based on previous behavior (secondary support in terms of 
international mediators) or the mediator’s location within the conflict 
(insiders in non-armed conflicts). Yet, there are also subjective 
aspects to bias. How do parties in conflicts perceive the third-party 
mediators? Why are strictly neutral mediators sometimes perceived as 
biased? Intrastate armed conflicts involve parties that are not 
necessarily equally strong or share the same level of international 
recognition. They are, in other words, asymmetric in nature. 
Mediators that try to mediate in such an asymmetric context run the 
risk of becoming trapped in the dynamics and will commonly have 
problems appearing neutral. This is a dilemma that mediators of civil 
wars often face. Trying to act in an even-handed fashion will risk 
undermining the weaker side in the negotiations. On the other hand, 
trying to equalize the parties (thereby enabling a more productive 
peace process) runs the risk of having the mediators be perceived as 
coming out in support of one side of a conflict. Either way, the 
mediator risks being perceived as partial. Norway’s engagement in Sri 
Lanka is illustrative of this problem. By supporting the peace 
infrastructure of the Tamil Tigers organization, which was necessary 
for effective transformation of the conflict, Norway was perceived as 
more partial to the rebel-group than the Sinhalese majority.17 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Given the insights generated by the research on bias in 
mediation, what are the implications for policymakers? What are the 
policy lessons that can be drawn from this research? 
Three basic policy implications stand out. First, mediators 
with ties and a history of support to one side can play a valuable role 
in the process of negotiating peace in intrastate armed conflicts. 
Biased mediators have an important function, particularly when 
                                                 
17 Kristine Höglund & Isak Svensson, ‘Damned if You Do, and Damned if 
You Don’t’: Nordic Involvement and Images of Third-Party Neutrality in Sri Lanka, 13 INT’L 
NEGOTIATION 341, 351 (2008). 
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getting conflicting parties to agree to concessions on the basic 
incompatible issues at the core of the conflict. 
Secondly, and more specifically, the direction of the bias 
matters: rebel-biased and government-biased mediators have 
different functions to play in intrastate peacemaking processes. 
Stipulations of particular peace institutional arrangements are 
associated with different types of biased mediators. 
This point also leads to a last general policy insight: the 
importance of a more disaggregated perspective on mediation 
outcome. Since peace agreements vary considerably in their content, 
policy must go beyond merely trying to get the parties to reach an 
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DECEPTIVE RESULTS: WHY MEDIATION 
APPEARS TO FAIL BUT ACTUALLY 
SUCCEEDS 
Scott Sigmund Gartner* 
INTRODUCTION 
Mediation is one of the most prevalent and commonly touted 
forms of international conflict management.1 Yet, compared to other 
forms of peacemaking such as bilateral negotiation, international 
disputes that receive mediation are less likely to result in peace 
agreements, and mediated agreements are more likely to fail.2 
Furthermore, data seem to suggest the opposite of what is commonly 
believed about specific types of mediation.3 For example, scholars 
and policymakers frequently champion civil war mediation by 
regional governmental organizations.4 Yet, more than half of all civil 
war peace agreements reached through regional governmental 
organization mediation fail in less than a week.5 Assessing a wide array 
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of factors affecting civil war peacemaking, regional organization 
mediation is the best predictor of agreement failure.6 
Why does mediation seem to have such poor results? It is a 
problem of deceptive appearances. A concept called “selection 
effects” exerts powerful negative influences on what we observe; 
ostensibly suggesting that mediation in general—and regional 
governmental organization mediation in particular—produce poor 
conflict management outcomes. In reality, appearances deceive; both 
mediation overall, and regional governmental organization mediation 
in particular, effectively lead to peace. 
MEDIATION 
Two aspects of international dispute mediation are critical for 
understanding these deceptive results: (1) participation in mediation 
and adherence to mediated outcomes is voluntary; and (2) mediation 
is costly. 
A.  Voluntary 
International dispute mediation is a completely voluntary 
process—no judge can order belligerents or a third-party mediator to 
participate. The third-party mediator must be willing to offer 
assistance, and the belligerents must be willing on their own accord 
to accept the third party’s offer to mediate.7 Unlike binding 
arbitration, mediation does not require a commitment in advance to 
accept an outcome. Adherence to a settlement reached through 
mediation requires the voluntary agreement of the disputants. 
B.  Costs 
Mediation costs are “considerable.”8 The costs of mediation 
vary with the type of actor. For example, in a civil war, governments 
                                                 
6 Id. at 387-88. 
7 Molly M. Melin, Scott Sigmund Gartner & Jacob Bercovitch, Fear of 
Rejection: The Puzzle of Unaccepted Mediation Offers in International Conflict, CONFLICT 
MGMT. & PEACE SCI. (forthcoming 2013). 
8 KYLE BEARDSLEY, THE MEDIATION DILEMMA 22 (2011). 
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take a dim view of appearing to increase the stature of insurgents by 
sitting with them as apparent equals at the peacemaking table.9 
Insurgents might be concerned that they lack any control over 
mediation outcomes given their power asymmetry with a standing 
government.10 Mediators’ costs include: (1) forgoing other peace 
efforts; (2) damage to reputation from failure; (3) political costs; and, 
(4) operational expenses.11 Belligerents look at the human, economic, 
and diplomatic costs of additional violence, their likelihood of 
victory, and the various costs of mediation when considering conflict 
resolution.  
The voluntary and costly attributes of mediation combine to 
create powerful process and selection effects—dynamics essential for 
understanding mediation outcomes. 
PROCESS AND SELECTION EFFECTS 
The distinction between process and selection effects 
represents a critical innovation in studies of dispute resolution.12 
Mediators can choose among a wide variety of tools when working to 
resolve disputes.13  
Process Effects. Process effects reflect choices made during 
conflict management that directly influence outcomes, such as mediator 
                                                 
9 Molly M. Melin & Isak Svensson, Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation 
in International and Civil Wars, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 249, 254 (2009). 
10 BEARDSLEY, supra note 8, at 154. 
11 Leslie G. Terris & Zeev Maoz, Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test, 
42 J. PEACE RES. 563, 563-83 (2005). See generally Jacob Bercovitch & Gerald 
Schneider, Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict Management, 37 J. 
PEACE RES. 145, 145-65 (2000). 
12 See Scott Sigmund Gartner & Jacob Bercovitch, Overcoming Obstacles to 
Peace: The Contribution of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict Settlements, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 
819, 820, 822, 835-36 (2006). 
13 See Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and 
Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 57 (2013); Molly M. Melin, When 
States Mediate, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 78 (2013); Stephen E. Gent, The Politics 
of International Arbitration and Adjudication, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 66 (2013) 
(explaining how similar types of choices also affect other dispute resolution 
methods, such as arbitration and adjudication). 
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strategy. For example, during the negotiations with Egyptian 
President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin, U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter guaranteed U.S. funding for military bases to both 
countries, a move that greatly contributed to the successful Camp 
David Peace Accords. Carter’s guaranty is an example of a process 
effect—an action that directly influences the mediation outcome. 
Process effects have a clear, causal effect on conflict management 
results—they shape dispute resolution success and failure. 
Selection Effects. Selection effects identify specific 
populations of cases that have particular conflict management traits. 
For example, imagine there are two types of disputes: hard (difficult 
to resolve) and easy (open to resolution). Difficult to resolve disputes 
typically involve higher levels of violence, greater stakes and more 
intransigent belligerents than easy to resolve disputes. While a great 
mediator might achieve success in a hard dispute and a poor mediator 
may fail to settle an easily resolvable dispute, on average, hard 
disputes are less likely to result in peacemaking success than easy 
ones. Thus, identifying the dispute’s type (hard or easy) helps to 
predict the likely outcome of any conflict resolution. Selection effects 
identify a dispute’s type. They distinguish the population to which 
disputes belong; but unlike process effects, they do not directly affect 
the conflict management process. Rather, selection effects signal the 
conflict’s likely type and thus its odds of a peaceful outcome.14 
The difference between selection and process effects can be 
illustrated by comparing a student clinic and university hospital.15 The 
clinic refers serious cases to the hospital. The hospital treats the high 
risk cases—those with a greater chance of resulting in a fatality 
(selection effect). The hospital has superior medical resources and 
provides better treatment (process effect). Given a serious illnesses, 
students go to the hospital, even if its mortality rates are higher. 
Students thus take into account (likely without thinking about it) 
                                                 
14 Scott Sigmund Gartner & Molly M. Melin, Assessing Outcomes: Conflict 
Management and the Durability of Peace, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK ON CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 564, 564-79 (Jacob Bercovitch et al. eds., 2009). 
15 This example is drawn from Scott Sigmund Gartner & Aimee A. 
Tannehill, Negotiating with the Dragon: The People’s Republic of China and International 
Dispute Settlement Duration, 12 TAMKANG J. INT’L AFF. 69, 69-99 (2008) (Taiwan).  
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selection effects; they recognize that the population of patients at the 
hospital is sicker and more likely to die than the population of 
patients at the clinic. Without consideration of the influence of 
selection, one would erroneously determine that the life-saving 
abilities of the clinic are superior to that of the hospital, when in fact 
the opposite is true.16 
SELECTION EFFECTS AND MEDIATION 
Because mediation is costly, belligerents try to avoid it. 
Disputants who talk between themselves and resolve their differences 
on their own do not have to bear the costs of mediation. Thus, 
bilateral negotiation between disputants represents the most efficient, 
low cost, conflict resolution mechanism. If bilateral negotiations fail 
or their differences make them unwilling to work together (for 
example, Sadat and Begin refused to be together in the same room 
after their first meeting at Camp David), then disputants who want a 
peaceful resolution process can turn to a third-party mediator. As a 
result, mediators work on tougher cases than those bilaterally 
negotiated; disputes that, as a result of the selection process, are less 
likely to result in peace. Mediation itself, however, has positive 
process effects. An identical dispute would be more likely to result in 
peace if it is mediated than if it is not. But in reality, disputes are not 
distributed randomly or evenly, among conflict resolution 
processes—mediators get the hardest cases, which are more likely to 
result in peacemaking failure. 
                                                 
16 Cf. Lori Guevara, Cassia Spohn & Denise Herz, Race, Legal 
Representation, and Juvenile Justice: Issues and Concerns, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 344, 344-
45, 347-48, 366 (2004). Selection effects commonly manifest in legal contexts. For 
example, juvenile defendants who are not defended by a lawyer are more likely to 
have their charges dismissed and less likely to receive a secure confinement 
disposition than youth who retain lawyers. A defendant’s lawyer does not have a 
negative effect on the case’s outcome; rather, declining counsel signals a low 
likelihood of conviction and a low stakes case—selection effects. Id.; see also 
Michael Alexander Roach, Explaining the Outcome Gap between Different Types 
of Indigent Defense Counsel: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Effects Essays 
on Heterogeneous Treatments of Defendants within Legal Institutions (June 2011) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University). 
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When the nature of the dispute is taken into account, analyses 
show that international dispute mediation has a positive process 
effect on reaching durable agreements.17 
SELECTION EFFECTS AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
One way to develop a better understanding of how mediation 
exerts deceptive selection effects is to look at a specific type of 
mediation. For example, consider civil war mediation by regional 
governmental organizations. The Organization of American States, 
The African Union, and The Arab League represent examples of 
regional governmental organizations. Today, “regional organizations 
are the most common type of IOs [International Organizations] in 
the world system.”18 As the number of regional organizations has 
increased, so has their role in conflict management, and specifically as 
mediators. Comparing the periods shortly before and after 1980, the 
frequency of regional mediation almost doubled.19 
This increase is not surprising given widespread beliefs that 
regional organizations represent the ideal mediator type.20 These 
beliefs draw on four core arguments. First, regional organization 
member states frequently share political, economic, social, and 
cultural features with the disputants. Bercovitch and Houston argue 
that regional organizations are more likely to achieve conflict 
resolution outcomes than other types of mediators because they, 
“mediate within the same cultural and value system—and this, it 
seems, promotes agreement more than any other factor.”21 United 
                                                 
17 See Gartner & Bercovitch, supra note 12, at 822-23.  
18 Jon C. Pevehouse, With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional 
Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 611, 616 (2002). 
19 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Civil War Peacemaking, in PEACE AND 
CONFLICT 2012 71-84 (J. Joseph Hewitt et al. eds., 2012). 
20 See T.H.Y. Nguyen, Beyond Good Offices? The Role of Regional Organizations 
in Conflict Resolution, 55 J. INT’L AFF. 463, 484 (2002).  
21 Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, The Study of International Mediation: 
Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 11, 27 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1995) 
(stating a counter to this argument, however, is that regional organizations often 
contain their own super or regional powers with super or regional interests that can 
 
2013 Gartner 2:1 
33 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1809 states, “regional 
organizations are well positioned to understand the root causes of 
armed conflicts owing to their knowledge of the region which can be 
a benefit for their efforts to influence the prevention or resolution of 
these conflicts”22 Second, neighboring states have a greater stake in 
peacemaking than outsider states or the U.N. and “must live with the 
consequences of their work,” which generates higher levels of 
commitment and trust.23 Third, disputants are less likely to view 
mediation offers from regional governmental organizations as stealth 
colonization efforts. Finally, regional governmental organization 
charters frequently encourage third-party peacemaking, making them 
willing mediators. For example, Article 84 of The Charter of the 
Organization of American States directs the Permanent Council to 
assist members in the “peaceful settlement of their disputes.”24 For 
example, the OAS successfully mediated the Belize-Guatemala 
conflict in 2000—a dispute originating from the independence of 
Spain in 1839 and which the U.N. failed to resolve.25 
There are also aspects of regional organization conflict 
mediation that are unattractive to belligerents. Given the inherent 
advantages of a sitting government, insurgent success in civil war 
requires support from neighboring states.26 The comparatively small 
                                                 
skew mediation. For example, consider the roles of: Nigeria in The African Union, 
Egypt in The Arab League, and the U.S. in The Organization of American States). 
22 S.C. Res. 1806, U.N. SCOR, 63rd Year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1809, at 1 
(Apr. 16, 2008), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Coop%20w%20Reg%20Orgs%20SRES 
1809.pdf.   
23 John Paul Lederach & Paul Wehr, Mediating Conflict in Central America, 
28 J. PEACE RES. 85, 97 (1991). See also Marie Olson & Frederic S. Pearson, Civil 
War Characteristics, Mediators, and Resolution, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 421 (2002). 
24 The Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of 
American States, “Protocol of Buenos Aires” art. 84, Feb. 27 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 
721 U.N.T.S. 324, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_ 
Organization_of_American_States.pdf. 
25 MONSTERRAT GORINA-YSERN, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, OAS 
MEDIATES IN BELIZE-GUATEMALA BORDER DISPUTE (2000), 
http://www.asil.org/insigh59.cfm.  
26 Dylan Balch-Lindsey, Andrew J. Enterline & Kyle A. Joyce, Third-Party 
Intervention and the Civil War Process, 45 J. PEACE RES. 345, 345 (2008); Salehyan 
Idean, No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict, 70 J. POL. 54 (2008).  
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size of regional groups ensures all members have influence, 
accentuating concerns over bias.27 As a result, governments fighting 
civil wars abhor including regional organizations in dispute 
negotiations because it provides their insurgent’s benefactors 
influence in the conflict management process. Similarly, rebels 
recognize that the government they threaten likely plays a major role 
in the regional organization. Additionally, some states in the 
organization likely have their own insurgency problems and thus 
want to come down hard on rebel groups in order to deter challenges 
at home.28 
Given these disincentives, civil war belligerents prefer to 
avoid mediation by regional organizations and only select them in the 
most dire circumstances. As a result, regional organizations mediate 
particularly deadly and intractable civil wars—those less likely to 
result in durable peace agreements. When these selection effects are 
controlled for, however, and the intensity of civil wars are taken into 
account, mediation by regional organizations has a positive process 
effect on peacemaking.29 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Just like the best hospitals get the sickest patients and lose the 
most lives, the best peacemakers get the most violent and intractable 
disputes that produce the worst peace outcomes. However, when we 
take into account the deadly nature and known difficulty of resolving 
those international disputes selected for mediation, we see that 
mediation generally, and mediation by regional organizations 
specifically, facilitate the creation of robust peace agreements. 
                                                 
27 See Isak Svensson, Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, 2 
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L. AFF. 17 (2013).  
28 See Navin A. Bapat, The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns, 24 
CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 265 (2007). This problem is complicated further 
by the frequent shifting preference for violence among ethnic groups. See, e.g., 
Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An Organizational Perspective, 2 
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 91 (2013). 
29 See Gartner, supra note 3.  
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Selection effects have two critical policy implications. First, 
selection influences how we should evaluate mediation failure. Some 
ineffective mediation is likely the result of poor mediators and weak 
peacemaking strategies. But other disappointing results, especially 
when generated by mediators and strategies thought to be highly 
effective, are likely misleading and result from selection effects. For 
example, the Camp David Accords mediated by President Carter in 
1978 have led to a peace between Egypt and Israel that has lasted for 
more than thirty years—in contrast to the five wars fought between 
the two countries in the thirty years prior to the Accords. But the 
Accords did not bring comprehensive peace to the region. After 
Camp David, mediators found it difficult to make further progress in 
this dispute. The Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians 
have not operated as effectively as the Camp David Accords. Some 
might claim that these other mediators lacked Carter’s mediation 
skills. It is critical to remember, however, that the Arab-Israeli 
dispute remains extremely intractable. While the dispute’s violence 
and salience help it to attract the best global mediators they also form 
the conditions that make peace elusive. It would be wrong to equate 
failure to obtain peace in these disputes with the failure of mediation 
generally or the ineffectiveness of any specific mediators. Rather, we 
need to keep in mind that the intractable, violent, and globally 
important nature of the Arab-Israeli dispute both attracts mediation 
and makes it difficult to resolve—an apt illustration of selection 
effects. Given that the top mediators get the toughest cases, it is vital 
that we keep selection in mind when evaluating mediation efficacy. 
Second, potential mediators need to recognize that they face a 
trade-off. They can choose to mediate disputes that are likely to be 
resolved—but bilateral negotiations may work equally effectively in 
these disputes. Or, potential mediators can choose persistent disputes 
that are not likely to result in durable peace or civil wars that are 
especially challenging to resolve.30 These are the disputes that most 
require third-party assistance—they are both the most violent and the 
least likely to be resolved through the independent actions of the 
                                                 
30 See David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be At The Table? Veto Players and 
Peace Processes in the Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. INT’L AFF. 38 (2013); J. Michael 
Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 
PENN ST. J.L. INT’L AFF. 48 (2013). 
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disputants—but are also the disputes that are most likely to result in 
failed mediation outcomes. Resolving these more intractable disputes 
requires a frustrating pattern of peacemaking efforts.31 Thus, 
mediators need to assess the value of mediation efforts based on the 
challenge of the task they face, not only on what they can achieve. 
These perspectives should not, however, suggest pessimism 
about mediation and peacemaking. Mediation of previously persistent 
disputes does not necessarily result in failed peacemaking. For 
example, the Colombian government has battled the insurgent group 
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) since 1964. 
On March 1, 2008, Colombia attacked a FARC encampment in 
Ecuador, expanding the war and enflaming a long-simmering regional 
dispute. Viewing the attack as an illegal violation of its sovereignty, 
Ecuador cut diplomatic ties with Colombia. Colombia accused the 
Ecuadorian and Venezuelan governments of financially supporting 
FARC. Tensions intensified when Ecuador and Venezuela sent 
troops to the Colombian border.32 The OAS intervened rapidly to 
diffuse tensions by calling an emergency session and sending a 
commission to visit the countries and investigate the attack. The 
OAS determined that Colombia did in fact violate Ecuador’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Columbia issued an apology and 
the countries resumed diplomatic relations. The OAS launched the 
Mission of Good Offices in Colombia and Ecuador which works to 
maintain peaceful relations between the two countries.33 Thus, 
                                                 
31 Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking, 2 PENN 
ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 9 (2013).  
32 See Neighbors Cut Ties With Colombia, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7276228.stm; Simon Romero, Columbia is 
Flashpoint in Chavez’s Feud with U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/05/world/americas/05venez.html?pagewante
d=all; LAURA CARLSEN, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, THE ANDEAN CRISIS (John 
Feffer ed., 2008), http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_andean_crisis.  
33 See Columbia and Ecuador, OAS PEACE FUND, http://www.oas.org/ 
sap/peacefund/ColombiaAndEcuador/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013); Crisis Deepens as 
Venezuela Closes Columbia Border, AFP, Mar. 4, 2008, http://afp.google.com/ 
article/ALeqM5iWzlEd06o1UoIdZxv17wkp18uz4g; TATIANA WAISBERG, AM. 
SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, COLUMBIA’S USE OF FORCE IN ECUADOR AGAINST A 
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 
AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS (2008), http://www.asil.org/insights080822. 
cfm#_edn1.  
 
2013 Gartner 2:1 
37 
despite an enduring dispute, a non-governmental actor and a 
violation of sovereignty—all factors known to make disputes more 
intractable—mediation worked. 
For those of us who participate in, study, or encourage 
peacemaking efforts, the results frequently seem grim. But we should 
not let mediation’s seemingly poor results dissuade us from 
promoting peacemaking. Rather, using selection effects we need to 
handicap the odds of mediation success and failure. Like many of the 
best hospitals, best conflict management practices may at first appear 
to be hazardous, but an understanding of the process and its 
challenges demonstrates their value and shows that appearances can 
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WHO SHOULD BE AT THE TABLE?: 
VETO PLAYERS AND PEACE PROCESSES 
IN CIVIL WAR 
David E. Cunningham* 
INTRODUCTION 
Civil war often is conceptualized as a conflict between a state 
and a rebel group. In reality, many civil wars, including those 
currently ongoing in Somalia, Darfur, Afghanistan, Iraq, Columbia, 
and Kashmir, contain multiple rebel groups fighting against the state 
at the same time. Within civil wars, there is a sub-set of these groups 
(which could include all of them) that have the ability to block an end 
to the war. These groups can be labeled “veto players” because they 
have the capacity to veto peace and continue the war on their own 
even if the other groups involved sign a peace agreement and stop 
fighting.1 
                                                 
*, David E. Cunningham, Assistant Professor of International Relations, 
University of Maryland and affiliate of the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the 
Peace Research Institute in Oslo. 
1 See, e.g., GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS WORK (2002) (analyzing veto players in governmental bargaining). 
See generally Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Institutional Determinants of 
Economic Policy Outcomes, in PRESIDENTS, PARLIAMENTS, AND POLICY 21-63 
(Stephan Haggard & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2001). Scholars have examined 
how governmental veto players affect conflict. See Michael J. Ireland & Scott 
Sigmund Gartner, Time to Fight: Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary 
Systems, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 547 (2001); George Tsebelis & Seung-Whan Choi, 
The Democratic Peace Revisited: It Is Veto Players, APSA Meeting Paper (2009), 
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Civil wars containing more than two veto players have 
fundamentally different bargaining dynamics. The incentives that 
combatants have to enter negotiations and negotiate in good faith, as 
well as their ability to reach agreements that all parties find 
acceptable, are substantially different when there are more actors 
involved that can block settlement. These barriers to bargaining mean 
that conflicts with more veto players last substantially longer than 
those with fewer.2 
Because these conflicts are so difficult to resolve, 
international efforts are much less successful in conflicts that contain 
more than two combatants. Several years ago, a prominent study 
evaluated the success of all United Nations led peacebuilding 
missions and found that the U.N. was “successful” in 13 out of 27 of 
these missions, slightly under 50%.3 Dividing these cases into two-
party and multi-party wars shows that peacebuilding was successful in 
10 out of 16 two-party wars (63%) and only 3 out of 11 multi-party 
civil wars (27%).4 
This article explores how peacemakers can design peace 
processes in multi-party civil wars with the greatest likelihood of 
resolution. It focuses on the question of participation in peace 
processes and argues that negotiations are most likely to lead to a 
comprehensive settlement if they include all of the veto players in the 
war and exclude everyone else. 
                                                 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450519. See also generally 
David E. Cunningham, Veto Players and Civil War Duration, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 875 
(2006); DAVID E. CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR (2011) 
(examining civil war bargaining through a veto player logic). 
2 See Cunningham, Veto Players and Civil War Duration, supra note 1 at 876, 
881-87 (arguing that civil wars with more veto players last longer and citing 
empirical evidence of this relationship). See also J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? 
Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L 
AFF. 48 (discussing some of the difficulties for mediation presented by a large 
number of combatants and applying this discussion to the civil was in Syria). 
3 MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR & 
BUILDING PEACE: UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 204 (2006). 
4 See CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 1 at 
204. 
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Section I defines what it means to be a veto player in civil 
war. Section II examines why peace processes are prone to fail if they 
do not include all veto players or include actors that are not veto 
players. Section III explores two potential caveats to these rules, and 
the article concludes by illustrating the applicability of the main 
argument in a few cases. 
I. VETO PLAYERS IN CIVIL WAR 
Veto players have the capability to unilaterally block 
settlement of a civil war. The concept of veto players is different 
from that of spoilers. Spoilers, as defined by Stephen John Stedman, 
are “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from 
negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use 
violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”5 Spoilers, then, are 
those actors who have blocked a negotiated settlement to war. Veto 
players are those actors who have the capability to be spoilers, 
whether or not they actually spoil a settlement. At a minimum, all 
civil wars contain two veto players—the government and one rebel 
group—because if either of these actors could not unilaterally 
continue the war it would end. Many civil wars contain more than 
two of these actors, and additional veto players come in a variety of 
types. 
Many civil wars contain multiple rebel group veto players. In 
the 1991-2008 civil war in Burundi, an agreement signed by 19 
groups in Arusha, Tanzania in 2000 failed to end the war because the 
two main rebel groups—the National Council for the Defense of 
Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) 
and Palipehutu-National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL)—did 
not sign and continued fighting. In 2003, CNDD-FDD signed the 
Pretoria Accords and exited the conflict. The war still did not end 
because Palipehutu-FNL was a veto player and continued fighting. 
The Burundian war only ended when Palipehutu-FNL signed a peace 
agreement in 2008 and stopped fighting, meaning that all of the rebel 
group veto players had exited the conflict. 
                                                 
5 Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, 22 INT’L SEC. 5, 
5 (1997). 
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Civil wars can also contain multiple veto players when 
external states are heavily involved in the conflict. During the 
Apartheid era, South Africa used its military to destabilize hostile 
governments such as those in Angola and Mozambique by 
intervening in their civil wars. South Africa was a veto player in these 
wars because it was an actor with independent preferences and an 
ability to prevent full settlement of the conflicts.6 In the Cold War, 
the United States and Soviet Union were veto players in many civil 
wars because they were involved and capable of prolonging the war if 
they did not get the outcome they wanted. 
In general, civil wars contain a set of veto players including 
the government, one or more rebel groups and, potentially, external 
states. Not all of the participants to a civil war, however, are 
necessarily veto players, as some combatants may be so weak that 
they cannot block an end to the war. Identifying veto players is more 
challenging than identifying spoilers. Spoilers are those groups who 
have spoiled an agreement; veto players are those groups who could 
potentially spoil an agreement. In general, the factors that make 
parties veto players are those that make them more of a threat to the 
government, or more able to resist being defeated. So, combatants 
that have greater numbers of troops, more popular support, operate 
in terrain that provides protection from government attacks, have 
more advanced military technology and better trained and equipped 
troops, and have access to funding sources are more likely to be veto 
players. 
II. TWO RULES FOR PARTICIPATION IN PEACE PROCESSES 
Negotiations in civil war can be long processes, often 
dragging on for months or even years. Mediators can affect the 
likelihood for a peaceful resolution to a war by deciding who to invite 
to participate in peace processes. There are two general rules. 
                                                 
6 See David E. Cunningham, Blocking Resolution: How External States Can 
Prolong Civil Wars, J. PEACE RES. 115, 116-17 (2010) (analyzing the effect of external 
state veto players on the duration of civil wars). 
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Rule # 1: Include All Veto Players 
The first rule is that peace processes are more likely to 
succeed that include the entire array of relevant veto players.7 
Because veto players can continue the war unilaterally, if one or more 
of these actors are not included in a peace process then the war will 
continue even if the other veto players sign an agreement and stop 
fighting.8 
This argument may seem obvious, but there are clear cases in 
which mediators proceed with negotiations not involving all veto 
players and expect these processes to succeed. In the 1998-2000 
Arusha negotiations in Burundi, CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL 
did not participate because the facilitator, former Tanzanian 
President Julius Nyerere, barred them from doing so. As those two 
groups were the main anti-government combatants, without their 
inclusion the Arusha process was doomed to fail before it began. 
Another example is the negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinian group Fatah in the late 1990s. Those negotiations failed to 
lead to a comprehensive settlement of that long-running dispute for a 
number of reasons. One important reason was that Fatah was not the 
only Palestinian veto player, it did not control Hamas, and so an 
accord between the Israeli government and only one of the 
Palestinian veto players could not possibly have ended the violence. 
One reason that peace processes often proceed without all 
veto players is that it is difficult to get them to come to the table. In 
ongoing civil wars, many of these actors have incentives to hold out 
from negotiating in hopes of obtaining a better deal later on. 
                                                 
7 See UNITED NATIONS, GUIDANCE FOR EFFECTIVE MEDIATION 11-12 
(2012), http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/UN 
%20Guidance%20for%20Effective%20Mediation.pdf (recognizing the importance 
of inclusivity in peace processes, although this source refers to “stakeholders”: a 
broader range of actors than veto players). 
8 Lakhdar Brahimi & Salman Ahmed, In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The 
Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation, N.Y. UNIV. CTR. ON INT’L COOPERATION 5 (2008) 
(stating that the failure to incorporate all veto players can be the result of 
ignorance—one of the “seven deadly sins of mediation” —and arguing that it is 
important for mediators to identify both the national actors with the power to stop 
or re-start the war, and the source of those actors’ external support). 
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Additionally, some of these groups may be opposed to negotiation as 
a matter of principle. 
In cases where not all veto players will agree to negotiate, 
mediators often try one of two strategies. They may declare that 
negotiations will begin with the parties who are willing to participate 
and that everyone else will be excluded from the peace that follows. 
This strategy was tried in Darfur in 2007 when the main rebel groups 
refused to attend a peace conference in Sirte, Libya. Jan Eliasson, the 
mediator for the conference, stated emphatically: “The train has left 
on the road to peace . . . the question is how many passengers will 
come on.”9 The problem with this strategy is that, if the main 
combatants are not participating, there is no credible threat to 
exclude them from the benefits of peace because no peace is 
possible. Despite Eliasson’s statement, the conference was postponed 
and the conflict continued. 
Alternatively, mediators often try piecemeal negotiations, in 
which governments negotiate with rebel groups individually in 
sequence. This strategy was used in Chad in the 1990s where the 
government signed a series of bilateral agreements with rebel groups. 
While sequenced bilateral negotiations may work in some 
cases, it is a problematic strategy. Every agreement that results in one 
rebel group exiting the conflict also results in a shift in the balance of 
power between the government and the remaining groups. One of 
the difficulties with finding a bargained solution to civil war is that it 
is difficult for actors to tell how strong they are, relative to the 
government. In Burundi, it was clear after the Pretoria Accord that 
Palipehutu-FNL was weaker relative to the combined Burundian 
army/CNDD-FDD forces but it took years to determine how much 
weaker. 
Additionally, every new peace agreement reduces the 
government’s flexibility with the remaining groups. Peace agreements 
often commit specific cabinet ministries and percentages of the 
                                                 
9 Alfred De Montesquiou, Darfur Talks Postponed as Rebels Boycott, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 28, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-
28-2864852227_x.htm. 
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military and government to former rebels. As these positions are 
filled, it becomes harder for the government to use incentives to 
convince the remaining veto players that an agreement is better than 
fighting. Because of these problems, piecemeal negotiations should 
be a last resort for mediators. 
Rule #2: Exclude Non-Veto Players 
The second rule is that peace processes are more likely to 
succeed that exclude actors that are not veto players. Because 
negotiations with more parties are more prone to fail, incorporating 
actors that are not veto players in peace processes make it less likely 
that agreement will be reached by the veto players. Barring this 
agreement, wars continue. 
A number of peace processes in recent years have included 
non-veto players. The 19 parties at the Arusha negotiations in the 
Burundian war included some armed groups but primarily unarmed 
political parties. Negotiations in Paris in January 2003 to resolve the 
Cote D’Ivoire civil war included the government, the three main 
insurgent groups, and delegations from six other political parties.10 
Mediators may include non-veto players in peace processes 
because these processes often play a large role in determining the 
post-conflict political environment, including the design of political 
institutions and timetable for transition to elections. Limiting 
participation to armed groups has the potential to send the dangerous 
signal that the only way to get one’s voice heard is through violence. 
Additionally, civil wars often occur because of deep divisions in 
society, and incorporating civil society and political parties may be 
attempts to overcome these divisions.11 
                                                 
10 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, LINAS-MARCOUSSIS 
AGREEMENT (2003), http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_ 
agreements/cote_divoire_01242003en.pdf. 
11 See generally Desirée Nilsson, Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in 
Peace Accords and Durable Peace, 38 INT’L INTERACTIONS 243 (2012) (arguing that 
incorporating civil society actors into peace agreements increases the durability of 
peace). 
 
2013 Cunningham 2:1 
45 
Each of these justifications has merit. However, including 
non-veto players in peace processes makes them more prone to fail 
for two reasons. First, incorporating these groups may actually create 
additional veto players in the negotiation. Conflicts with many veto 
players are longer and harder to resolve in part because it is hard to 
convince all of the participants that they are better off through peace 
than through continuing to fight. If unarmed groups are brought into 
a peace process and can veto any potential agreement, that increases 
the number of actors that can prevent a settlement that might end the 
war. 
Second, even if non-veto players incorporated into peace 
processes are not allowed to veto potential agreements, their 
participation virtually guarantees that they will be given something in 
a settlement. Any concessions given to these groups, however 
minimal, means there are less concessions available to induce the 
veto players to stop fighting. In a power-sharing government, for 
example, the number of important ministries is finite. Ministries 
given to non-veto players mean less are available to convince veto 
players that peace is more beneficial than war. 
Combining these two rules, peace processes will be most 
likely to succeed in ending civil wars when they include all of the veto 
players involved and no one else. Mediators are most likely to design 
successful peace processes when they analyze conflicts and determine 
who the veto players are and think critically about the effect of 
including and excluding different actors on those processes. 
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULES 
The above discussion presumed that each veto player was 
capable of continuing a war if a peace process did not include them. 
However, mediators could proceed with peace processes excluding 
veto players if international actors were willing to forcibly disarm 
groups that blocked the peace. This may be necessary when veto 
players are completely opposed to negotiation. In Rwanda, for 
example, the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) was a 
clear spoiler that worked to prevent the implementation of the 
Arusha Accords. Had the international community intervened to 
nullify CDR, it is possible that the Arusha Accords would have 
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worked and the genocide would have been prevented.12 In general, 
however, international actors are unwilling to intervene to the degree 
necessary to forcibly disarm veto players. 
The above discussion also assumed that the goal of peace 
processes is to end wars. If that is the goal, then these processes are 
most likely to succeed if they include all, and only, the veto players. 
However, in many cases mediators and others may have interests 
beyond just ending the fighting, such as promoting democratization 
or social justice. To pursue those goals, it is possible that some veto 
players should be excluded or some non-veto players included.13 
Mediators should be cautious about this, however. In many 
cases, goals such as democratization or social justice can only be 
pursued once civil war ends. Prioritizing other important goals can be 
dangerous if it leads to the design of peace processes that are less 
likely to actually end the war. 
IV. CONCLUSION—THE RULES IN ACTION 
The peace process around the 1999 Lusaka Accords in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is one in which mediators 
included all veto players and excluded non-veto players from direct 
negotiation.14 Early rounds of negotiations in the conflict had been 
derailed because they only included the DRC government and 
external state participants (such as Rwanda and Uganda). However, 
Congolese rebel groups were clearly veto players, and the Lusaka 
Peace Process incorporated them. At the same time, the Lusaka 
process left out non-veto players such as political parties and civil 
society organizations. These groups were not completely excluded 
                                                 
12 See CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 1 at 
184, 211, 214. For a more extensive discussion of the Rwandan peace process, see 
id. at ch. 4. 
13 Beardsley discusses how the best strategies for mediators may differ 
depending on whether they aspire to a cessation of hostilities or to build long-term 
peace. See generally Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and 
Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57 (2013). 
14 See CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 1 at 
ch. 6 (describing the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 
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from political discussion, rather, they were incorporated into an 
“Inter-Congolese Dialogue” which was designed to decide the 
political future of the country. 
The DRC civil war ended in 2002, largely along the lines laid 
out by the Lusaka Accords. For the last ten years the DRC has 
certainly not been a peaceful, stable, or democratic place. However, 
the level of violence in Congo is much lower than it was during the 
civil war, at least in part as a result of the Lusaka process. 
Despite this example, mediators often make decisions about 
participation in peace processes that hamper, rather than augment, 
the chances of peace. In Burundi and Darfur, negotiations excluded 
veto players and included non-veto players and failed to produce 
peace. Peace is possible in multi-party conflicts, but only if 
peacemakers understand their unique dynamics and design and 
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INTRACTABLE SYRIA? INSIGHTS FROM 
THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE ON THE 
FAILURE OF MEDIATION 
J. Michael Greig* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its beginning in March 2011, the conflict in Syria has 
produced considerable human suffering and increased the risk of 
greater regional instability. The conflict has produced in excess of 
35,000 fatalities and displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrians.1 
Violence against civilians has brought widespread condemnation 
from across the international community. This violence, in turn, has 
also increased calls for action to stop the fighting in Syria and protect 
its civilian population. 
To this end, a wide array of sanctions has been imposed upon 
the Syrian government by actors including the United States, 
members of the European Union, the Arab League, and regional 
powers such as Turkey. The United Nations Security Council has 
been sharply divided on how to deal with the crisis, with the United 
States, Great Britain, and France calling for tougher language and 
action against the Assad regime, and Russia and China in opposition. 
Despite this lack of unanimity on the Security Council, U.N. 
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1 See CNN Staff, By the Numbers: Syria Deaths, CNN.COM, Jan. 9, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/08/world/meast/syria-civil-war-compare/index.ht 
ml; VDC: CENTER FOR DOCUMENTATION OF VIOLATIONS IN SYRIA, 
http://www.vdc-sy.org/index.php/en/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
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Secretary General Ban Ki Moon appointed former U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan as U.N.-Arab League Joint Special Envoy on 
Syria in February 2012. Efforts to mediate the Syrian conflict are 
consistent with the broader tendency of mediation to be applied to 
the most difficult conflicts in the international system.2 Despite 
Annan’s presentation of a plan to end the conflict and the dispatch in 
April 2012 of a U.N. ceasefire monitoring mission, the Syrian conflict 
has proven difficult to manage. A lasting ceasefire has proven elusive 
among the belligerents, with conflict escalating sufficiently that 
activities by the U.N. monitoring mission were suspended in June 
2012 and its mandate went without renewal following its expiration. 
Deteriorating conditions in August 2012 and the refusal of the Syrian 
regime to negotiate led to the resignation of Kofi Annan, who was 
subsequently replaced as U.N. envoy to Syria by Lakhdar Brahimi. In 
his resignation, Annan laid blame for the failure of mediation at the 
feet of both external powers as well as the warring sides themselves 
stating, “without serious, purposeful and united international 
pressure, including from the powers of the region, it is impossible for 
me, or anyone, to compel the Syrian government in the first place, 
and also the opposition, to take the steps necessary to begin a 
political process.”3 
The inability of the United Nations or any other third party to 
broker an end to the violence in Syria, despite early and frequent 
demands by an array of outside powers for a cease-fire and the 
dispatch of peace envoys and a U.N. monitoring force, raises the 
question of why the Syrian conflict has proven so impervious to 
settlement. Not only have third-party efforts to manage the conflict 
been unsuccessful, but conditions have continued to deteriorate in 
Syria with the level of violence mounting on both sides and civilian 
suffering deepening. In this paper, I explore the ways in which some 
of the insights from the scholarly conflict management literature can 
be brought to bear in understanding the specific challenges faced by 
                                                 
2 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to 
Fail but Actually Succeeds, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 27 (2013). 
3 Rick Gladstone, Annan Steps Down as Peace Envoy and Cites Barriers in Syria 
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third-party efforts to manage the Syrian conflict. I argue that the 
characteristics of the warring sides and the way in which fighting has 
evolved between the Syrian government and rebels each play an 
important role in the failure of conflict management. 
NUMBER OF PARTIES 
The number of parties involved in a conflict plays an 
important role in the prospects for successful mediation. In general, 
as the number of parties in a conflict grows, the chances for 
mediation success dim. Increasing the number of parties involved in 
conflict brings three problems for mediation. First, communications 
become tougher as the number of parties involved in a conflict 
increase.4 A mediator confronting a conflict involving several parties 
faces the difficult task of coordinating communications among each 
side while limiting the chances of miscommunications. Second, 
increasing the number of parties involved in a conflict raises the risk 
of spoilers for the peace process. Increasing the number of warring 
actors also increases the number of interests at stake among the 
parties, increasing the number of veto players5 and raising the risk 
that one or more parties oppose a settlement agreed to by the others. 
This can create spoilers who engage in violence to derail the peace 
process until their own demands are met.6 Third, increasing the 
number of players in a conflict also increases the possibility of 
commitment problems for any settlement. Peace efforts in civil wars 
are inherently susceptible to commitment problems in which, even if 
an agreement can be reached, the lack of enforcement makes neither 
side confident that the other will live up to the terms of the 
agreement.7 Commitment problems are exacerbated as the number of 
actors involved in a conflict grows because agreement monitoring 
becomes more difficult and the chances of spoilers increases. 
                                                 
4 See J. MICHAEL GREIG & PAUL F. DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL 
MEDIATION 104-105 (2012).  
5 See David Cunningham, Who Should Be at the Table? Veto Players and Peace 
Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 38 (2013).  
6 See Desirée Nilsson, Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil 
War Settlements, 45 J. PEACE RES. 479, 481-82 (2008).  
7 See Barbara F. Walter, Bargaining Failures and Civil War, 12 AM. REV. 
POL. SCI. 243, 254 (2009).  
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In this respect, the Syrian conflict presents a difficult 
challenge for third parties seeking to mediate it. Because the rebels 
are divided among a large number of groups, each with different 
goals and backgrounds, it is difficult to simply identify all of the 
actors needed to participate in any potential peace process. Although 
the Free Syrian Army provides a unified name to much of the armed 
Syrian opposition, this unity is limited. The Free Syrian Army is, at 
best, a very loose collection of militia groups with minimal 
coordination among one another.8 Foreign supporters of the Syrian 
opposition have sought to encourage the development of a broad 
coalition group to bring the rebels under one political umbrella. The 
Syrian National Council was an early effort at unity, but it proved 
difficult to coordinate with the Free Syrian Army, and struggled with 
major divisions among constituent groups. The new National 
Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces is another 
effort to unify the Syrian rebels, but its prospects for success remain 
uncertain.9 
INTENSITY AND DURATION OF VIOLENCE 
Just as the characteristics of the warring sides shape the 
chances for effective mediation, a large body of scholarly literature 
points to the way in which a conflict unfolds over time as a key 
influence on the chances that diplomatic efforts will be fruitful.10 
While some civil conflicts at their outset may inherently be more or 
less susceptible to successful conflict management efforts, what takes 
place on the battlefield over the course of the conflict shapes the 
incentives for warring sides to accept mediation and make the 
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concessions for a settlement. As a result, some points in time during 
a conflict present better opportunities for effective third-party 
diplomacy than others. 
One of the challenges in managing a civil conflict is that as 
the level of violence among belligerents grows, it increases hostility 
among the parties, encouraging even more violence in the future.11 
This process, in turn, closes off communication between warring 
sides,12 increases the extent to which the parties see themselves as 
victims of the other,13 and encourages the belligerents to frame their 
goals in terms of punishing the other side.14 Put together, increasing 
levels of violence undermine the likelihood and effectiveness of 
mediation efforts in managing the conflict. 
The intensity of violence in Syria directly cuts against third-
party efforts to manage the conflict and locate a settlement. When 
mediation is applied to a civil war immediately following a spike in 
battle deaths, the chances that talks will produce an agreement among 
the combatants is sharply reduced.15 This is precisely the pattern that 
casualty levels in Syria have followed. From June 2012 to August 
2012, the number of Syrian casualties increased sharply, growing 
from 2204 deaths in June to 5037 killed in August.16 Rising casualty 
levels in Syria have made it harder for third-party efforts to manage 
the conflict. 
                                                 
11 See ZARTMAN, supra note 10, at 263. 
12 See Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson & Donette L. Wille, 
Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in 
International Relations, 28 J. PEACE RES. 7, 13 (1991); THOMAS PRINCEN, 
INTERMEDIARIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 54-59 (1992). 
13 See generally STATHIS N. KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IN CIVIL 
WAR (Cambridge University Press 2006) (1964).   
14 See Dean Pruitt & Paul Olczak, Beyond Hope: Approaches to Resolving 
Seemingly Intractable Conflict, in CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS 
INSPIRED BY THE WORK OF MORTON DEUTSCH 59 (Barbara Bunker & Jeffrey 
Rubin eds., 1995).  
15 J. Michael Greig, Rebels at the Gates: Civil War Battle Locations, Movement, 
and Openings for Mediation, paper presented at the 2012 Meeting of the Folke 
Bernadotte Academy Conflict Prevention Working Group, State College, PA, 2012.  
16 David Kenner, Syria Is More Violent Than Iraq at Its Worst, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Sept. 11, 2012, 10:27AM), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09 
/10/syria_is_more_violent_than_iraq_at_its_worst.  
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Although rising casualty levels diminish the chances for 
mediated agreement, the conflict management literature points to 
another window for effective third-party diplomacy that is relevant to 
Syria. While warring sides build up animosity and become less willing 
to compromise the more they fight, at some point, as the two sides 
build up more conflict costs, belligerents begin to seek an alternative 
to fighting.17 As these costs grow for the belligerents, with neither 
able to overcome the other and suffering increasing for each, a 
hurting stalemate emerges.18 The development of this hurting 
stalemate during a conflict creates a second window of opportunity 
for mediation to end the fighting. Fundamental to the hurting 
stalemate is that both sides must feel unacceptably painful conflict 
costs and each must perceive that it cannot win the conflict and impose 
its own terms of settlement. When a hurting stalemate develops, civil 
war combatants become more open to mediation and grow more 
willing to make the concessions necessary for a settlement. 
What does this mean for Syria? Despite the deepening 
suffering among the Syrian populace and the worsening level of 
violence, there is little indication that Syria has developed sufficiently 
into a hurting stalemate that settlement is likely. Although the level of 
conflict is high, there is no evidence that it is unbearably so for either 
side. At the same time, there is also nothing to suggest that either side 
believes that it cannot ultimately prevail in the conflict and impose its 
own terms without negotiation. Civil war research suggests that the 
chances for mediation success only begin to approach the odds of 
success that exist early in a civil conflict after fighting has continued 
for 130 months and 33,000 battle-deaths have resulted, a level  well 
above where the Syrian conflict is.19 In this respect, Syria finds itself 
in a nether zone of conflict. The warring sides have fought long 
enough to become so hostile that there is little, if any, trust between 
them and dialogue among the belligerents has become virtually 
                                                 
17 See J. Michael Greig & Patrick Regan, When Do They Say Yes? An 
Analysis of the Willingness to Offer & Accept Mediation in Civil Wars, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 
759 (2008).  
18 See I. William Zartman, Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, in 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 225 (Paul C. 
Stern & Daniel Druckman eds., 2000).  
19 Greig, supra note 15.  
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impossible. At the same time, the history of conflict has yet to reach 
a sufficiently painful, stalemated point that the parties become open 
to a settlement. From the perspective of a mediator, Syria finds itself 
in the worst of all possible worlds. 
GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD 
Beyond the intensity and duration of violence, where fighting 
between rebel and government forces occurs also significantly 
impacts the success of mediation. This has direct implications for the 
conflict in Syria. One of the challenges that a rebel force challenging 
a government faces is demonstrating its ability to mount a credible, 
durable threat to the regime. If a government anticipates that the 
rebels can be quickly defeated or doubts the ability of the rebels to 
impose significant costs on the regime, there is little reason for the 
regime to negotiate with the rebels. To push governments to the 
bargaining table, rebels must demonstrate their ability to impose 
unacceptable costs on the regime. One way for rebels to do this is to 
mount a military threat to a country’s major cities. In doing so, rebels 
can disrupt important economic, social, and political activity for the 
country. This can increase pressure from the populace on the 
government to negotiate with the rebels. 
As Syrian rebels increased their ability to threaten the 
government across broader swaths of territory, their ability to impose 
costs on the government also increased. As protests spread from 
Dara’a to Homs and Aleppo, important industrial and financial 
centers, the Syrian government began to signal their willingness to 
make some limited concessions. At this point, however, these 
concessions were not sufficient to stop the violence from deepening 
and appeared more tactical than sincere. This points to a particular 
challenge faced in managing civil conflicts. Conditions that might 
encourage one side to offer concessions can encourage the other to 
resist settlement with the expectation of better terms from fighting 
than talking. As rebels see more success on the battlefield, they tend 
to increase their demands on the government during talks. When 
these increased demands are unacceptable for the regime, diplomatic 
efforts become more likely to fail. 
 
2013 Greig 2:1 
55 
The best example of this tendency for rising expectations of 
victory to influence mediation is the effect that civil war battles 
fought near the capital exert. Rather than increasing the likelihood of 
agreement, the closer civil war battles occur to the capital, the less 
likely mediation is to take place at all and, when it does occur, the less 
likely it is to be successful.20 These diminished prospects for 
mediation are a function of the distinct effects that such battles have 
on both rebels and governments. For rebels, as their ability to sustain 
a challenge near the capital grows, they increasingly see better 
prospects for victories. As a result, rebels tend to increase their 
demands on the regime in any settlement talks.21 A government 
facing rebels near the capital is likely to see continued fighting as 
preferable to agreement. First, such a government may see the 
potential demands from the rebels as likely to be unacceptable to the 
regime, potentially demanding terms such as the complete removal of 
government officials. Second, even a government interested in 
reaching a settlement may conclude that it can get better terms if it is 
able to push the rebels away from the capital. 
The way the dynamics of the Syrian conflict changed in July 
2012 as rebel attacks began on the capital is consistent with this line 
of thinking. The mounting violence in the capital not only imposed 
real costs on the Syrian regime, but also carried important 
psychological costs as well. Neil MacFarquhar argues that keeping 
violence away from Damascus had an important effect on the Syrian 
psyche, suggesting that protecting Damascus from threat “became a 
kind of a psychological yardstick: if Damascus remained under 
control, it meant the Assad government was still in control.”22 As 
these attacks on the capital mounted, rather than offering 
concessions or embracing diplomacy, the Assad regime adopted 
increasingly aggressive measures, using air strikes against rebel 
positions in Aleppo and Damascus and shelling Damascus 
neighborhoods where rebel forces were believed to be located. In this 
                                                 
20 See id.  
21 See Halvard Buhaug & Jan Ketil Rød, Local Determinants of African Civil 
Wars, 1970–2001, 25 POL. GEOGRAPHY 315 (2006).  
22 Neil MacFarquhar, Damascus Confronts New Reality After Attack, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 18, 2012, at A13, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/ 
world/middleeast/bombing-attack-shifts-equation-in-syria-uprising.html?_r=0.  
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respect, Jeffrey White, former senior Middle East analyst for the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, argues that “There will not be any 
negotiations . . . . He [Assad] will go down fighting, and he will 
probably do it in Damascus.”23 
CONCLUSION 
The Syrian conflict has seen a variety of third-party efforts 
from individual states, the Arab League, and the United Nations to 
manage the conflict and find a settlement. Thus far, the conflict has 
proven intractable. Former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 
lament about the lack of purposive and unified action by the 
international community toward Syria explains some of this conflict 
management failure. Others have laid some of the blame at the feet 
of the decisions made by those who have attempted to mediate the 
conflict. Yet, what we know about conflict management points to 
characteristics of the Syrian conflict that make it inherently difficult 
to resolve diplomatically. The characteristics of the parties and how 
they have fought each shape the effectiveness of conflict 
management even before the mediators arrive. 
 
                                                 
23 Joby Warrick & Anne Gearan, For Syria’s Assad Only Exit May Be a Body 
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There is tremendous variation in how third parties conduct 
international mediation.1 Mediation might involve such functions as 
the mere hosting of talks, substantive participation in the negotiation 
process, shuttle diplomacy, or heavy-handed involvement in which 
the third party shapes the incentives of the parties to reach an 
agreement.2 With such possible variation, mediators must especially 
tailor the level of leverage—the extent to which the third party uses 
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positive and negative inducements, either explicit or implicit, to move 
negotiations forward—to the needs of the situation.3 In international 
dispute mediation, a one-size-fits-all view of mediation may actually 
inhibit effective conflict resolution. 
This essay highlights the importance of third parties choosing 
their mediation styles with eyes wide open to the context of the 
conflict. In what follows, this essay first considers existing studies 
that have found both potential benefits and risks of heavy-handed 
third-party involvement—which rely on implicit or explicit threats of 
punishment or promises of assistance—as a conflict-management 
strategy.4 It then considers a few illustrative cases to demonstrate the 
importance of making sure that the tools of mediation fit the context. 
Finally, it concludes with a discussion of how sustained post-conflict 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding can reduce some of the risks of 
leverage in mediation. 
I. THE STRENGTHS AND RISKS OF LEVERAGE IN EXISTING STUDIES 
Starting with the upside of leverage, existing work has found 
that it is often critical that international dispute mediators employ 
positive and negative inducements in a way that creates sufficient 
                                                 
3 The use of leverage matches to the “manipulative” style used in the 
literature referenced above. See, e.g., Peter J. D. Carnevale, Strategic Choice in 
Mediation, 2 NEGOT. J. 41, 44-45 (1986) (characterizing the use of leverage in 
mediation as involving “compensation” and “pressing” tactics). In addition to 
“manipulation,” the use of leverage is also sometimes referred to as a “directive” 
style of mediation. See, e.g., KENNETH KRESSEL, LABOR MEDIATION: AN 
EXPLORATORY SURVEY 13 (1972); Peter J. D. Carnevale & Richard Pegnetter, The 
Selection of Mediation Tactics in Public-Sector Disputes, 41 J. SOC. ISSUES 65, 67 (1985). 
Moreover, the use of leverage can also be termed “power” mediation. See, e.g., 
Loraleigh Keashly & Ronald J. Fisher, A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions: 
Theoretical and Practical Considerations, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 235 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996); 
Isak Svensson, Mediation with Muscles or Minds? Exploring Power Mediators and Pure 
Mediators in Civil Wars, 12 INT’L NEGOT. 229, 230 (2007). But see Robert Rauchhaus, 
Asymmetric Information, Mediation and Conflict Management, 58 WORLD POL. 207, 224-
25, 233 (2006) (terming it “heavy” mediation). 
4 Mediation with leverage can involve both immediate inducements for 
agreement or pledges of future inducements to help guarantee the peace. 
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leverage to incentivize the disputing parties to reach an agreement.5 
Intractable conflicts often need external prodding to create a sense of 
a mutually hurting stalemate when the status quo level of hostilities 
seems more acceptable to the parties than taking political or security 
risks in making substantial concessions.6 The set of tools available to 
intermediaries that do not use leverage is indeed quite limited. Third 
parties that merely serve a role of providing the disputants with 
greater clarity of the relevant parameters often struggle to learn 
information that the disputants themselves do not already know or to 
convey credibly such information, or both.7 Moreover, third parties 
that are unable to use leverage to guarantee settlements reached 
during negotiations will be unable to resolve concerns of mistrust 
between vulnerable actors who might be reluctant to reach a deal that 
obliges them to draw down their security forces.8 Leverage might also 
be needed to shield the disputants from political backlash for 
unpopular concessions.9 
                                                 
5 This relates to work pioneered by Jacob Bercovitch on contingency 
theory. See generally, e.g., Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is There Method 
in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of 
Mediation, 32 INT’L INTERACTIONS 329 (2006); Jacob Bercovitch & Richard 
Jackson, Negotiation or Mediation?: An Exploration of Factors Affecting the Choice of 
Conflict Management in International Conflict, 17 NEGOT. J. 59 (2001); Jacob Bercovitch 
& Jeffrey Langley, The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International 
Mediation, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 670 (1993).  
6 I. William Zartman & Saadia Touval, International Mediation: Conflict 
Resolution and Power Politics, 41 J. SOC. ISSUES 27, 41 (1985); Zartman & Touval, 
International Mediation, supra note 2; Saadia Touval, Why the U.N. Fails, 73 FOREIGN 
AFF. 44, 51 (1994); Moorad Mooradian & Daniel Druckman, Hurting Stalemate or 
Mediation? The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990-95, 36 J. PEACE RES. 709, 712 
(1999); Svensson, Mediation with Muscles or Minds?, supra note 3 at 237. See also Molly 
M. Melin, When States Mediate, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 78 (2013) (offering an 
account of how actors with leverage are deemed more acceptable by disputants).  
7 See Mark Fey & Kristopher W. Ramsay, When is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth 
the Commute? Information Sharing Through Mediation, 62 WORLD POL. 529, 531 (2010); 
Alastair Smith & Allan Stam, Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of 
Civil and Interstate War, 5 INT’L STUD. REV. 115, 117 (2003). 
8 See generally BARBARA F. WALTER, COMMITTING TO PEACE: THE 
SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL WARS (2002). 
9 See Kyle Beardsley & Nigel Lo, Third-Party Conflict Management and the 
Willingness to Make Concessions, J. CONFLICT RESOL. (forthcoming 2013). 
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On the other hand, even though many negotiations critically 
depend on third-party pressure, there are also real risks for using too 
much third-party leverage when less would suffice. Not only is 
leverage more costly to the third party, which often must follow 
through on threats and promises, but it can prove detrimental to 
peace stability in the long term. When third parties are heavy handed 
in their approach, they create artificial incentives for agreements that 
are not likely sustainable over time.10 As a third-party’s interests shift 
and influence wanes, former combatants that had reached an 
agreement primarily because of the third-party’s enticements will be 
more prone to abandon their agreements than former combatants 
that reached an agreement with less incentivizing. The problem of 
attenuated third-party involvement is especially strong when multiple 
third parties are involved heavy-handedly in the peace process 
because of the more difficult coordination needs in the post-conflict 
setting.11 Separately, mediation with leverage can also restrict the 
ability for disputants to walk away from negotiations that their 
opponent is pursuing as a simple stalling tactic or that are otherwise 
destined to fail.12 
The existing work on mediation regarding these tradeoffs 
suggests a basic rule of thumb that mediation with leverage should be 
reserved only to stop ongoing or imminent massive bloodshed, 
especially when the violence endangers non-combatants. That is, the 
                                                 
10 See KYLE BEARDSLEY, THE MEDIATION DILEMMA (2011); Kyle 
Beardsley, Agreement Without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency 
Problems, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 723, 737 (2008); Suzanne Werner & Amy Yuen, 
Making and Keeping Peace, 59 INT’L ORG. 261, 269 (2005); Mehmet Gurses, Patrick 
McLeod & Nicolas Rost, Mediating Civil War Settlements and the Duration of Peace, 34 
INT’L INTERACTIONS 129, 136 (2008); Zartman & Touval, International Mediation, 
supra note 2 at 452 (highlights the dilemma that mediators face in choosing to push 
for an early ceasefire or wait for a durable settlement to emerge). 
11 See BEARDSLEY, THE MEDIATION DILEMMA, supra note 10; Tobias 
Böhmelt, Disaggregating Mediations: The Impact of Multiparty Mediation, 41 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. 859, 860 (2011); Chester A. Crocker, Pamela Aall & Fen Osler Hampson, Is 
More Better?: The Pros and Cons of Multiparty Mediation, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE 
CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 497-513 (Chester A. 
Crocker et al. eds., 2001); Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic 
Peacemaking, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 9 (2013). 
12 See generally Kyle Beardsley, Intervention without Leverage: Explaining the 
Prevalence of Weak Mediators, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 272 (2009). 
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use of strong mediation should be motivated primarily out of short-
term humanitarian goals in order to justify the long-term risks of 
making post-conflict peace more fragile and the lack of patience in 
waiting for a more organic peace to emerge. At the same time, more 
minimal third-party involvement should be used when a long-term, 
self-enforcing peace is the most pressing concern and humanitarian 
responsibilities are not as pressing. Indeed, it is difficult, and in many 
cases impossible, for third parties to successfully attain both an 
immediate reduction in hostilities and a long-term resolution of the 
relevant points of contention. 
II. MATCHING THE TOOL TO THE PROBLEM IN PRACTICE 
It is helpful to consider historical cases in which hindsight 
suggests that third parties used too little or too much leverage, as well 
as cases in which the level of leverage more appropriately matched 
the needs of the situation. The problem of not using sufficient 
leverage when it is needed to stop mass atrocities can be seen recently 
in Syria.13 Kofi Annan’s initiative to facilitate a ceasefire between 
Assad and the rebels never had teeth as long as Russia and China 
blocked passage of U.N. Security Council resolutions that would 
authorize punishment for continued intransigence and as long as a 
coalition of the willing to threaten Assad failed to materialize. During 
the ceasefire, Assad was more or less free to continue direct attacks 
against rebel positions and indirect attacks against sympathizers via 
support for pro-government militias. 
On the flip side, the risk of using too much short-term 
leverage was demonstrated perhaps most dramatically in the lead up 
to the 1994 Rwanda genocide.14 The 1993 Arusha Accords resulted 
from substantial third-party pressure and the promise of a 
peacekeeping force to guarantee the peace. However, once the 
mediator involvement waned upon the signing of the Accords and 
                                                 
13 J. Michael Greig, in this issue, provides a detailed account of why this 
conflict has proven so difficult to manage. J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights 
from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 48 
(2013). 
14 See Alan J. Kuperman, The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes 
Do More Damage than Good, 16 SAIS REV. 221, 222 (1996). 
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the peacekeeping force turned out to be weaker than expected and 
slow to deploy, implementation of the Accords failed and a window 
of opportunity for Hutu extremist militias to establish their 
dominance emerged. Stated more particularly, the leverage of the 
mediating parties, coupled with their inability to follow through on 
their commitments, left much of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu 
populations vulnerable to annihilation perpetrated by Hutu militia 
groups intentionally left out of the peace process. It is also important 
to note that the violence during the Rwandan civil war that preceded 
the Accords was not nearly as threatening to non-combatant 
populations as the genocide that followed. That is, the heavy-handed 
third-party involvement, in retrospect, was not well justified on 
humanitarian grounds. 
More positively, Richard Holbrooke’s role in pushing for the 
Dayton Accords amidst NATO bombings of Serbian positions at the 
end of the Bosnian War presents a compelling example of a case in 
which the use of much needed leverage effectively calmed a 
humanitarian disaster. Prior to the extreme heavy-handed 
intervention, earlier mediation attempts lacking sufficient leverage 
failed to halt the violence. These earlier efforts stand in stark contrast 
to Holbrooke’s role, such that it is often lamented that the 
international community did not act stronger sooner. Note that this 
does not mean that Holbrooke’s role is an appropriate model of how 
third parties can foster long-term, self-enforcing peace, as Bosnia 
continues to sit on a razor’s edge with a real risk of returning to 
interethnic conflict. But it does well demonstrate that strong third-
party involvement is often necessary to stop the killing and force a 
hurting stalemate, and that the risks of long-term instability may very 
well be worth the intervention. 
Another example of a well-matched mediation effort, Marti 
Ahtisaari’s role in the Aceh peace process, which led to the 
transformation of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) from a rebel 
group to a legitimate political actor, demonstrates the promise of 
more hands-off involvement being better able to facilitate long-term 
peace. As the former president of Finland and founder of the Crisis 
Management Initiative, Ahtisaari lacked any ability to manipulate the 
incentives of the disputants, but he was able to shape the momentum 
for peace—generated by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and 
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military gains by Indonesian forces—and help formulate an 
agreement that involved concessions on both sides with an eye 
toward long-term political transformation. This example, however, 
illustrates that while agreements that result from softer forms of 
mediation are more likely to become self-sustaining, the problem is in 
getting to the agreement in the first place. Without leverage, the 
parties already have to be motivated to resolve their dispute 
peacefully, but that is often asking quite a lot. Weak mediation may 
not carry much risk, but it also might not carry much value added 
when a protracted conflict environment needs more third-party 
engagement. That is, weak mediation can perform quite well when 
the conflict is already “ripe” for resolution, but it can struggle to help 
“ripen” the conflict in the first place.15 
III. COMBINING MEDIATION WITH PEACEKEEPING AND 
PEACEBUILDING 
In light of the limitations and risks surrounding the use of 
leverage, single third-party efforts generally fail to produce both 
immediate humanitarian relief to the bloodiest conflicts and long-
term conflict resolution. As such, it is helpful to think more broadly 
about peace processes as potentially involving multiple third-party 
efforts that unfold over time. Post-conflict peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding, when effective, can supplement mediator efforts to 
achieve both short-term and long-term effects.16 If there is sufficient 
international will to sustain leverage and engagement after hostilities 
have attenuated, then mediation is not likely to create a large risk for 
a fragile peace after short-term success in attenuating the hostilities. 
                                                 
15 See I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND 
INTERVENTION IN AFRICA 266 (1985); J. Michael Greig, Moments of Opportunity: 
Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation between Enduring Rivals, 45 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 691, 692 (2001) (overviews what ripeness entails). 
16 Peacekeeping and peacebuilding both entail permissive third-party 
involvement for the purposes of enhancing the stability and duration of peace in a 
post-conflict environment. Peacekeeping implies a military component, and 
peacebuilding implies a political, social or economic component. These terms often 
overlap but need not be provided by the same third parties performing mediation. 
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Turning first to peacekeeping, deploying international forces 
can maintain the outside pressure that existed at the time of 
agreement and keep the parties motivated to uphold their 
commitments. That being said, peacekeeping is expensive—even 
when the costs can be distributed across U.N. or regional 
organization memberships—and the financial and decision-making 
burdens often fall to those third parties in the developed world that 
are fairly insulated from the externalities of recurrent conflict. So, 
peacekeeping cannot be counted on as a solution to the mediation 
attenuation problem because third parties that would be willing to 
step in as peacekeepers and indefinitely remain engaged as guarantors 
of the peace are often hard to find.17 
Peacebuilding missions that follow intrastate conflict provide 
an interesting middle ground, and their increasing prominence is 
perhaps well justified given how they can help resolve the long-term 
issues caused by heavy-handed, third-party involvement. 
Peacebuilding encompasses a number of reforms that can include 
various dimensions of political, economic and security sector 
reform.18 Relevant to the long-term risks related to heavy-handed 
mediation, one of the central goals of peacebuilding is to ensure that 
the key stakeholders are invested in maintaining peace and not 
dependent on third-party inducements. Through the promotion of 
democracy and power sharing, peacebuilding strives to enable the 
voices of each of the key constituent groups to be heard; through the 
promotion of economic development, peacebuilding strives to 
diversify the set of groups that would benefit from sustained peace; 
and through security sector reform, peacebuilding strives to improve 
the capacity of the state to maintain order and reduce the ability for 
one side to threaten others through use of the state security 
apparatus. While peacebuilding that follows strong mediation can 
                                                 
17 See generally VIRGINIA PAGE FORTNA, DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?: 
SHAPING BELLIGERENTS’ CHOICE AFTER CIVIL WAR (2008); MICHAEL W. DOYLE 
& NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE: UNITED NATIONS 
PEACE OPERATIONS (2006). This is not to say that peacekeeping is ineffective 
when it occurs, which would be inconsistent with some of the existing literature. 
The point is that peacekeeping cannot be taken as a given supplement to mediator 
leverage, as it still depends crucially on third-party long-term investment. 
18 See ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL 
CONFLICT 38-39 (2004). 
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help bridge the gap between the incentives at the time of agreement 
and the incentives in the future in the absence of sustained third-
party engagement, an important caveat is that peacebuilding in many 
post-conflict states might be more accurately described as nation 
building and still needs substantial, sustained international 
involvement for self-sustaining peace to adhere. Moreover, a close 
equivalent of peacebuilding does not in practice exist for interstate 
conflicts. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has considered the risks inherent in deciding how 
much leverage a third party should bring to bear in a conflict 
management effort. Too much leverage, especially when the leverage 
is difficult to sustain indefinitely, can risk promoting artificial 
incentives that lead to fragile terms of peace. Too little leverage in the 
face of ongoing and imminent bloodshed carries obvious 
humanitarian risks. The lesson to take away from this analysis is not 
that mediators can do no good. Indeed, mediators can do much good 
when they are able to use leverage to stop ongoing brutal violence in 
the short-term, especially when they can sustain that leverage over 
time. Moreover, mediators can do much good when they use lighter 
tactics to help disputants get over some of the final barriers to 
durable settlements that are not negotiated under duress. In these 
ways, practitioners of mediation can choose the form of their 
involvement with accurate expectations of both the potential merits 




Journal of Law & International Affairs 
2013 VOLUME 2 NO. 1 
66 
 
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND ADJUDICATION 
Stephen E. Gent* 
INTRODUCTION 
Disputing states may select from a variety of resolution 
mechanisms to manage their conflicts—bilateral negotiations, non-
binding third-party mediation,1 or international arbitration and 
adjudication.2 Of these mechanisms, arbitration and adjudication 
have often proven to be the most effective means of producing long-
lasting settlements on contentious issues. Despite this fact, evidence 
indicates that states are generally reluctant to use such legal forms of 
dispute resolution, especially in resolving issues of national security. 
To understand when policymakers can and should promote the use 
of these mechanisms, they need to understand the reasons behind the 
reluctance of states to use arbitral or legal forums. Recent research 
provides insight into the political dynamics underlying the use of 
                                                 
*  Stephen E. Gent, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
1 See Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Leverage and Conflict 
Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57 (2013); Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive 
Results: Why Mediation Appears to Fail but Actually Succeeds, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L 
AFF. 27 (2013); J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature 
on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013); Molly M. Melin, 
When States Mediate, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 78 (2013); Isak Svensson, Research 
on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 17 (2013). 
2 U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1. 
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international arbitration and adjudication—insights that will aid 
policymakers charged with resolving such disputes.3 
International arbitration and adjudication share three general 
characteristics. First, a third party, not the disputants, determines the 
terms of any settlement.4 Second, unlike mediation, states agree to 
honor the ruling before the third party actually hands down a 
decision. Finally, the arbitration or adjudication settlements 
incorporate principles of international law that are not necessarily 
invoked in other types of negotiations.5 The two methods primarily 
differ with respect to the identity of the third party.6 In arbitration, an 
individual, state, NGO, or panel of states hands down a decision. On 
the other hand, adjudication is conducted by an international court, 
such as the International Court of Justice. 
While arbitration and adjudication are often viewed as legal 
instruments, it is important to view the use of such procedures as 
being part of a political process. In disputes over contentious issues, 
states are primarily interested in achieving outcomes that protect their 
                                                 
3 See generally Krista E. Wiegand & Emilia Justyna Powell, Past Experience, 
Quest for the Best Forum, and Peaceful Attempts to Resolve Territorial Disputes, 55 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 33 (2011); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Decision Control 
and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, 55 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 710 (2011); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Bias and the 
Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict Management Mechanisms, 28 CONFLICT MGMT. & 
PEACE SCI. 124 (2011); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, The Effectiveness of 
International Arbitration and Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, 72 J. POL. 366 (2010); 
Richard B. Bilder, Adjudication: International Arbitration Tribunals and Courts, in 
PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 195-
266 (I. William Zartman ed., U.S. Institute of Peace Press rev. ed. 2007); Sara 
McLaughlin Mitchell & Paul R. Hensel, International Institutions, and Compliance with 
Agreements, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 721 (2007); Todd L. Allee, & Paul K. Huth, 
Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover, 100 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 219, 219-234 (2006); Beth Simmons, Capacity, Commitment, and 
Compliance: International Institutions and Territorial Disputes, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 829 
(2002) (describing recent studies in political science on legal dispute resolution of 
territorial and maritime issues).  
4 Franz Cede, The Settlement of International Disputes by Legal Means—
Arbitration and Judicial Settlement, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 358-59 (Jacob Bercovitch et al. eds., 2009).  
5 Id. at 360. 
6 See id. at 358-75. 
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own security and economic interests. Thus, even though decisions of 
arbitration panels or international courts are largely based on legal 
principles, the initial decision to pursue arbitration or adjudication 
represents a voluntary, political commitment. The tension inherent in 
the use of a legal procedure to resolve a political dispute has often 
constrained the use of arbitration and adjudication in the 
international system.7 This article examines how the political frame 
helps policymakers understand when and why states would be willing 
to use international arbitration to resolve disputes over contentious 
issues. 
I. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARBITRATION AND 
ADJUDICATION 
Despite a tendency to compare these processes legally to their 
domestic counterparts, international arbitration and adjudication are 
carried out in a different environment. Without a global police force, 
international courts and arbitration panels do not have the same 
ability to enforce legal rulings as domestic governments. 
Nevertheless, international arbitration and adjudication have proved 
remarkably effective. Studies have shown that these legal dispute 
mechanisms are significantly more successful at resolving 
international territorial, maritime, and river disputes than other 
bilateral and third-party conflict management mechanisms.8 Table 1 
presents historical data on the outcome of attempts to settle 
territorial claims in the Americas and Western Europe collected by 
the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project.9 Sixty-three percent of 
the time, arbitration or adjudication ends the claim between the 
                                                 
7 JOSEPH PRESTON BARATTA, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: 
IMPROVING ITS ROLE IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 26 (1989). See generally F.S. 
NORTHEDGE & MICHAEL D. DONELAN, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE 
POLITICAL ASPECTS (1971). 
8 See Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and 
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 368-69; Gent & Shannon, Bias and the 
Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict Management Mechanisms, supra note 3, at 127-28.  
9 See generally Paul R. Hensel, Contentious Issues and World Politics: The 
Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 81 
(2001); PAUL R. HENSEL & SARA MCLAUGHLN MITCHELL, THE ISSUE 
CORRELATES OF WAR (ICOW) PROJECT, http://www.paulhensel.org/icow.html. 
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disputants. On the other hand, bilateral negotiations and mediation 
have a success rate of less than twenty percent. What drives this 
remarkable difference in success rates? 
Table 1. Effectiveness of Different Conflict Resolution 







    

























Source: Issue Correlates of War; includes all territorial claims in the Americas and 
Western Europe, 1816-2001. Percentages in parentheses. 
There are several reasons why states are often willing to 
comply with international arbitration and adjudication despite the 
lack of traditional law enforcement. First, arbitrators and adjudicators 
usually use principles of international law as the basis for their 
decisions. Thus, when a state rejects such a ruling, it is also rejecting 
well-established legal code. States may respect legal rulings in order to 
help preserve the general legitimacy of international law. Second, the 
legality of arbitration and adjudication generates international 
reputation costs. These rulings are perceived by the rest of the world 
as being legitimate because they are founded in legal provisions 
agreed to by the global community.10 Thus it can damage a country’s 
                                                 
10 See generally Dana D. Fischer, Decisions to Use the International Court of 
Justice: Four Recent Cases. 26 INT’L STUD. Q. 251(1982). 
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reputation when it chooses to break a binding agreement.11 Finally, 
arbitration and adjudication can provide political cover at the 
domestic level. Domestic constituents and voters may perceive 
concessions based on international law as being more legitimate than 
concessions offered in bilateral negotiations.12 Thus, the arbitral and 
adjudicative settlements may be more acceptable to a country’s 
population, and disparate constituencies within the country, in the 
long term than other types of settlements. 
II. THE RELUCTANCE TO USE LEGAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
While arbitration and adjudication have proven to be highly 
effective at resolving disputes, states are reluctant to use these 
procedures. Table 2 presents data on the frequency of different types 
of settlement attempts of territorial, maritime, and river claims. 
Arbitration and adjudication combined only make up about six or 
seven percent of settlement attempts. To understand why methods of 
international legal dispute resolution are rarely used, one must 
consider the unique characteristics of these procedures. Unlike 
bilateral negotiations or other types of third-party diplomatic efforts, 
arbitration and adjudication require states to give up decision control. 
Decision control is the “degree to which any one of the participants 
may unilaterally determine the outcome of the dispute.”13 In binding 
arbitration or adjudication, an international court or arbitration panel 
makes the final determination about the terms of any settlement. 
  
                                                 
11 See Mitchell & Hensel, supra note 3, at 723-25; Simmons, supra note 3, 
at 843-44. 
12 See Allee & Huth, supra note 3, at 222-23; Kyle Beardsley & Nigel Lo, 
Third-Party Conflict Management and the Willingness to Make Concessions, 57 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. (forthcoming 2013); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY 
AMONG NATIONS 61-62 (1990).  
13 John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. 
REV. 541, 546 (1978). 
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Table 2. Conflict Resolution Attempts by Type  
and Disputed Issue 
Source: Issue Correlates of War project. Percentages in parentheses. 
 
The requirement that disputants relinquish decision control 
makes them reluctant to pursue legal dispute resolution. When 
deciding whether to pursue legal dispute resolution, states must 
weigh the trade-off between pursuing an effective conflict 
management strategy and the costs of ceding decision control to a 
third party.14 The following five factors significantly influence the 
willingness of states to relinquish decision control and pursue 
arbitration or adjudication: 
                                                 
14 Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and 
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 368-69.  
 Type of Disputed Issue 
     
Type of Conflict Resolution 
Attempt Territory River Maritime 
Total 
Attempts 
     
Arbitration/Adjudication 38 7 16 61 
 (7.2) (4.9) (6.0) (6.5) 
     
Other Third-Party 
Attempt 144 48 89 281 
 (27.2) (33.3) (3.5) (29.9) 
     
Bilateral Negotiations 348 89 161 598 
 (65.7) (61.8) (60.5) (63.6) 
     
Total Attempts 530 144 266 940 
 (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
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A.  Third-Party Bias 
Each party to a dispute will be reluctant to give up decision 
control to an arbitration panel or court that it believes is biased 
against its interests.15 A state may expect that such a biased third 
party will hand down a ruling that disproportionately favors its 
adversary. Given that one of the disputants would likely reject any 
biased third party, disputants are generally only willing to jointly agree 
to relatively unbiased arbiters or adjudicators.16 
B.  Salience 
States are less willing to cede decision control when 
negotiating over highly salient issues.17 An unfavorable ruling on an 
issue of critical importance would be very costly, as state leaders 
would be faced with the choice between living with an unpalatable 
outcome and bearing the costs of reneging on a legal settlement.18 
Given this, it is not surprising that arbitration and adjudication are 
more commonly used to resolve less salient economic issues such as 
investment disputes than more salient security issues like territorial 
control.19 Moreover, within the universe of territorial and maritime 
claims, states have been less willing to pursue arbitration or 
adjudication on highly salient claims, such as those that involve 
strategically located territory or valuable resources.20 For example, 
despite the fact that Colombia and Venezuela have previously used 
arbitration to resolve a territorial dispute, they have been reluctant to 
do so over their disputed maritime boundary in Gulf of Venezuela 
                                                 
15 Id. at 375.  
16 Id.  
17 Gent & Shannon, Bias and the Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict 
Management Mechanisms, supra note 3, at 134.  
18 Id. at 129.  
19 See Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict 
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 730 n.2. See generally Todd 
Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining 
Over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 124 (2010) (discussing the use of 
arbitration to resolve investment disputes). 
20 See Gent & Shannon, Bias and the Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict 
Management Mechanisms, supra note 3, at 138.  
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after the discovery of oil reserves in the 1960s.21 Similarly, while 
Malaysia was willing to use the International Tribunal of the Law of 
the Seas to resolve a maritime dispute with Singapore over land 
reclamation in 2003, it recently avoided arbitration or adjudication to 
resolve a disputed claim with Brunei over the rights to offshore oil 
reserves.22 
C.  Uncertainty 
Uncertainty about potential legal rulings also influences the 
willingness to pursue arbitration or adjudication.23 A state will be less 
inclined to give up decision control if it is highly uncertain as to the 
terms of the settlement that it should expect from arbitration or 
adjudication.24 As the nineteenth-century international law scholar 
John Bassett Moore noted, “Governments are not in the habit of 
resigning their functions so completely into the hands of arbitrators 
as to say, ‘We have no boundaries; make some for us.’”25 Given this, 
disputants generally only agree to pursue arbitration or adjudication 
after they have successfully reached previous functional, procedural, 
and substantive agreements on the issue at hand that decrease the 
range of outcomes that could result from legal dispute resolution.26 
D.  Bargaining Power 
The decision to pursue arbitration or adjudication is part of a 
bargaining process between disputants.27 On issues of national 
security, such as territorial conflicts, a state’s bargaining power is 
                                                 
21 Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict 
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 714. 
22 Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case Concerning Land 
Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johor (Jan. 14, 2005), 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1154.  
23 Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict 
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 720.  
24 Id.  
25 LARS SCHOULTZ, BENEATH THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY OF U.S. 
POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 117 (1998).  
26 Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict 
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 721. 
27 Id. 
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largely a function of its ability and willingness to pursue its goals 
through military force.28 However, once states enter into arbitration 
or adjudication, this source of power is no longer salient, as the terms 
of any settlement will instead be a function of the strength of each 
state’s legal claim.29 Since states with greater capabilities are better 
able to guarantee favorable outcomes through negotiations or 
military conflicts, they will be reluctant to opt for legal dispute 
resolution unless they expect to receive a favorable ruling.30 For this 
reason, arbitration and adjudication are less likely when there is a 
large power asymmetry between disputants. 
E.  Armed Conflict 
In general, the costs involved with the militarization of 
conflict increase the incentive of states to resolve their disputed 
claims. Thus, it is not surprising that arbitration and adjudication of 
territorial, maritime, and river claims are more likely when there has 
been a militarized interstate dispute on the issue in recent years.31 
However, legal dispute resolution is rarely used as part of the peace 
process of an armed conflict.32 In these situations, there is often a 
lack of trust between the disputants that would be necessary for an 
effective legal procedure.33 In addition, peace processes usually 
revolve around multidimensional issues. Thus, disputants are 
generally reluctant to give up decision control to a legal body during 
peace negotiations because it reduces their ability to use issue linkage 
to find a politically acceptable compromise solution to the conflict. 
III. MOVING RELUCTANT STATES TO THE ARBITRAL 
FORUM 
Systematic analysis has shown that arbitration and 
adjudication can be highly effective methods of resolving contentious 
                                                 
28 Id. at 719. 
29 Id. at 719-20. 
30 Id. at 719. 
31 Id. at 727.   
32 Id. at 713.  
33 See Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and 
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 367.  
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international disputes, but states are often unwilling to pursue such 
legal procedures. Looking at the choice to pursue arbitration or 
adjudication as a political decision provides policymakers with 
concrete strategies to encourage the use of legal dispute resolution. In 
particular, policymakers should focus on reducing the costs of giving 
up decision control without undermining the unique benefits of 
international arbitration and adjudication. 
First, policymakers should find the historical shift from 
arbitration by states to arbitration and adjudication by 
intergovernmental organizations and courts to be a positive trend. 
Disputants will likely perceive such organizations and courts as being 
less biased than state actors, which will decrease the potential costs of 
giving up decision control. For this reason, policymakers should 
encourage the use of international courts and instill confidence in the 
international community that such courts are unbiased. One practical 
step would be to ensure that the methods used by international 
courts to select judges for individual cases minimize the possibility of 
a biased judge, such as a citizen of one of the disputing states.34 
Second, policymakers can help minimize the costs of giving 
up decision control by reducing the stakes and the level of 
uncertainty in arbitration and adjudication. One potential approach to 
doing this would be to encourage disputants to use incremental or 
piecemeal binding negotiations to settle portions of their claim.35 
Submitting to arbitration rulings over a series of smaller issues poses 
less of a risk to disputants than a comprehensive ruling, as it provides 
the ability to back out at various stages. While such an approach 
would extend the negotiation process, if it encourages states that 
would not otherwise do so to enter into a legal dispute resolution 
procedure, it may prove to be a more effective long-term conflict 
resolution strategy. 
Finally, it is also important to emphasize legal dispute 
resolution is not a panacea for all conflicts. States have multiple 
                                                 
34 Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of 
Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, 624 (2005). 
35 See Larry N. George, Realism and Internationalism in the Gulf of Venezuela, 
30 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 139, 162 (1988). 
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avenues—from bilateral negotiations to non-binding mediation to 
military conflict—to reach settlements over disputed issues.36 When 
disputants opt for arbitration or adjudication, they must forgo these 
other options. Since states with greater bargaining power are able to 
guarantee themselves favorable outcomes outside of court, they will 
be reluctant to submit their claims to arbitration or adjudication 
unless they can expect a similarly favorable outcome. In the maritime 
dispute with Brunei, Malaysian leaders recognized that they had a 
weak legal claim and had little chance of a favorable outcome if the 
case was submitted to arbitration or adjudication.37 Instead, Malaysia 
opted for bilateral negotiations in which it was able to use leverage 
and issue linkage to guarantee itself a future share of the oil and gas 
revenues in the disputed maritime area.38 
As mentioned above, a similar desire for flexibility and the 
need to find compromises over complex, multidimensional issues 
also makes states reluctant to give up decision control to a legal body 
during peace negotiations of armed conflicts. The limitations of the 
use of legal dispute resolution to resolve armed conflict were 
apparent in the aftermath of the 2000 Algiers Agreement to end the 
war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in which the disputants agreed to 
allow the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to demarcate their 
border and arbitrate claims of international law violations.39 Ethiopia 
rejected the arbitral decision that awarded the disputed border town 
of Badme to Eritrea,40 and the reparations awarded by the PCA were 
insufficient to resolve the political dispute between the states.41 Given 
this, policymakers should focus on more flexible conflict 
management mechanisms, such as mediation, that allow states to 
maintain decision control in the immediate aftermath of armed 
                                                 
36 See Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and 
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 372.  




39 Ari Dybnis, Note, Was the Eritrea—Ethiopia Claims Commission Merely a 
Zero-Sum Game?: Exposing the Limits of Arbitration in Resolving Violent Transnational 
Conflict, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 255, 259, 263 (2011).  
40 Id. at 263. 
41 Id. at 270-71. 
 
2013 Gent 2:1 
77 
conflict, reserving arbitration and adjudication for situations in which 
there is a reduced level of tension between the disputants. 
In addition, evidence from territorial disputes indicates that 
states are less likely to comply with legal rulings that do not reflect 
the underlying balance of power between the disputants.42 For 
example, a militarily superior Argentina rejected a 1977 arbitration 
settlement of its disputed border with Chile in Beagle Channel.43 
Given its power advantage, the Argentine government found the 
arbitration ruling unacceptable and hoped to achieve a more 
favorable outcome through other means.44 Thus, arbitration and 
adjudication will be most effective when they produce settlements 
that reflect the political realities on the ground. Understanding these 
political factors can help policymakers determine when they should 
promote the use of arbitration and adjudication, as well as when they 
should turn to alternative methods of conflict management. 
 
                                                 
42 See STEPHEN E. GENT & MEGAN SHANNON, BARGAINING POWER 
AND THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND ADJUDICATION 15-16 (Mar. 
13, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with International Studies Association). 
This version of this paper was presented at the 2011 annual meeting of the 
International Studies Association in Montreal, Canada (Mar. 16-19, 2011). 
43 See DAVID R. MARES, VIOLENT PEACE: MILITARIZED INTERSTATE 
BARGAINING IN LATIN AMERICA 136-37 (2001). 
44 See id. at 137-38.  
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WHEN STATES MEDIATE 
Molly M. Melin* 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of mediation for conflict resolution is not a new 
process. The first recorded mediation efforts occurred in 209 B.C., 
when Greek city-states helped the Aetolian League and Macedonia 
produce a truce in the first Macedonian war. Since then, mediation 
has been increasingly employed as a tool for peacefully resolving 
conflict.1 The International Conflict Management Dataset2 reports 
1334 mediation attempts by states in 333 interstate and civil conflicts 
since World War II, with more than half of the mediation efforts 
occurring since the end of the Cold War.3 States represent the most 
                                                 
* Molly M. Melin, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Loyola 
University Chicago. 
1 The benefits of successful mediation are widespread. Consider the case 
of the Northern Irish “Troubles.” Beginning with the Good Friday Accords and 
continuing with the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in mediating 
interpersonal disputes, the relative peace in Northern Ireland today is a testament 
to the power of a well-orchestrated and sustained mediation effort. 
2 JACOB BERCOVITCH, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
DATASET: OFFICIAL CODEBOOK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT DATASET (1999); J. MICHAEL GREIG & PAUL F. DIEHL, 
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION 31 (2012). The International Conflict Management 
dataset was compiled by Professor Jacob Bercovitch in the late 1990s and focuses 
on the mechanisms used in international conflict management. JACOB 
BERCOVITCH, VICTOR KREMENYUK & I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, THE SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 570 (2008) (defining international conflict 
as “organised and continuous militarized conflict, or a demonstration of intention 
to use military force involving at least one state.”). 
3   BERCOVITCH, supra note 2, at 31. 
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common type of political actor willing to serve as a mediator in 
international dispute resolution—a category often referred to as 
“state-led” mediation. Not all states, however, volunteer to serve as 
mediators and not all disputes receive mediator assistance. This essay 
examines the drivers of such choices and suggests factors that 
policymakers should consider when assessing whether to engage in 
state-led mediation. 
An understanding of these factors will help policymakers 
generate expectations about which states are likely to have an interest 
in mediating conflicts (and can be successfully encouraged to do so), 
and which disputants are likely to accept state-led mediation offers 
(thereby avoiding the loss of face associated with rejection). The 
objective of this exercise is to assist the policymaker in identifying the 
circumstances where state-led mediation will have a positive and 
permanent influence on long-term peace. Section I of the paper 
describes the role states play in the mediation process, both in terms 
of the broader spectrum of mediators and in terms of involvement 
frequency. Section II discusses the conditions that facilitate state-led 
mediation efforts, and the conclusion offers recommendations for 
achieving more effective state-led mediation efforts. 
I. THE STATE AS PEACEMAKER—A STRATEGIC CHOICE? 
There are four main types of mediators: international 
organizations (e.g., the United Nations), regional governmental 
organizations (e.g., the Arab League), individuals (e.g., former United 
States President Jimmy Carter), and states (e.g., New Zealand). States 
are the most common mediator and the focus of this paper.4 
Mediation works differently across mediator types. Of particular 
                                                 
4 For work on mediation involving regional organizations, see generally 
Scott Sigmund Gartner, Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization Mediation and Civil War 
Agreement Durability, 73 J. POL. 380 (2011). For work on international organizations, 
see generally Holley E. Hansen, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Stephen C. Nemeth, 
IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global versus Regional Dichotomy, 52 
J.CONFLICT RESOL. 295 (2008); Megan Shannon, Preventing War and Providing the 
Peace? International Organizations and the Management of Territorial Disputes, 26 CONFLICT 
MGMT. & PEACE SCI.144 (2009). 
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note, the motivations of states for offering mediation assistance differ 
from those of the other actors.5 
States carefully consider when and where they mediate, and 
often consider the strategic benefits when deciding whether to take 
on the mediator role. Potential gains include establishing a reputation 
as a peacemaker (as have Norway and Sweden) and enhancing the 
state’s influence in the dispute’s outcome, either by changing an 
unfavorable situation or maintaining a favorable status quo. 
Understandably, states are more likely to take up the role of mediator 
if it will expand their influence, resources, and power. Figure 1 
depicts the number of conflicts and state-led mediation efforts over 
time.6 While the number of mediation efforts per year closely follows 
the number of disputes per year, the two lines never intersect—a 








                                                 
5 For example, international organizations often include peacemaking as 
a part of their charter (e.g., the African Union and Organization of American 
States), but frequently must overcome political struggles between members before 
mediation can occur. Conversely, state mediators often struggle to establish 
impartibility given their significant stake in the outcome of the mediation efforts. 
States also have more policy instruments at their disposal than international 
organizations, allowing for greater variation in reactions to external conflict—most 
notably, joining the conflict in support of one side, an unlikely occurrence when an 
international organization leads mediation. 
6 BERCOVITCH, supra note 2, at 31. 
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Figure 1. The Occurrence of Disputes and State-Led Mediation 
Efforts, 1945-1999 
 
The figure also contains information about state-led 
mediation decisions. There are at least two possible ways to explain 
mediation occurrence. First, it is possible to think of states as a 
population of mediators that indiscriminately mediate any disputes 
that arise. Although this description may seem extreme, it is not far 
from popular beliefs about the obligations of the Great Powers. The 
global community often views states with large capabilities as being 
obligated to respond to instances of extreme violence. The second 
explanation sees mediation as resulting from strategic calculations. In 
this case, states do not indiscriminately mediate, but rather consider 
the costs and benefits before agreeing to do so. 
If the former proposition is correct, the supply of mediators 
would remain relatively constant. And if the supply of mediators was 
constant, we would observe stability in the number of mediation 
efforts. Years with many conflicts would likely experience mediator 
supply problems with a large gap between the number of disputes 
and the number of mediation efforts. In years with fewer disputes, 
most disputes would be mediated. The data, however, does not seem 
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obligations to mediate by virtue of their leadership role in the global 
community. 
Indeed, a further unpacking of the data seems to endorse the 
latter view—that a state’s decision to serve as a mediator is the result 
of strategic calculations. Figure 2 graphs the gap between the two 
lines from Figure 1, showing the variation in the number of disputes 
that go without state-led mediation. There is no year for which all 
disputes are mediated by states (no matter how few disputes are 
observed), and there is variation in the percent mediated—both 
provide evidence that states make strategic mediation choices. 
Figure 2. The Gap Between the Number of Conflicts and 
Mediation Occurrence, 1945-1999 
 
II. IDENTIFYING THE OPTIMAL CONDITIONS FOR STATE-LED 
MEDIATION 
Unlike sanctions or military intervention, a prerequisite to the 
occurrence of mediation is the acceptability of mediation to all 
involved parties. An often cited definition of mediation highlights 
this characteristic, describing mediation as “a reactive process of 
conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept 
an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to change 
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resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.”7 
Generally, political or economic ties between a potential mediator 
and the disputants increase the occurrence of mediation.8 These ties 
generate state interest in conflict resolution, and often translate into 
leverage at the negotiating table.9 The remainder of this essay 
explores the conditions that increase mediation occurrence (both in 
terms of state willingness to mediate and in terms of belligerents 
accepting state-led mediation) and success, as summarized in Table 1. 
  
                                                 
7 Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, The Study of International Mediation: 
Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 11, 13 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996). 
8 Ties that affect mediation offers and acceptance include trading 
partnerships, alliances, physical proximity, and even former colonial ties. For an in-
depth analysis of how ties affect mediation and conflict management behavior, see 
generally Molly M. Melin, The Impact of State Relationship on If, When, and How Conflict 
Management Occurs, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 691 (2011). 
9 For more on mediator leverage see Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool 
for the Job: Mediator Leverage and Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57 
(2013). 
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Table 1. Summary of Factors that Affect Mediation 
Explanatory  
Variable 
Effect on Mediation 
Occurrence 


















































A. Regime Type 
Regime type plays an important role in the frequency and 
likely success of mediation. Regime type, or form of government, can 
encourage mediation and its success at several levels. Mediation and 
accepting offers of mediation are more likely when democracies are 
involved, as these states are accustomed to third-party involvement in 
conflict and garner other states’ trust, making them a more attractive 
option for conflict resolution.10 Democratic third parties are more 
                                                 
10 Mark J.C. Crescenzi, Kelly M. Kadera, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & 
Clayton L. Thyne, A Supply Side Theory of Mediation, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 1069, 1084-
85 (2011). 
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likely to be accepted as mediators, democratic disputants are more 
likely to accept mediation, and a democratic international community 
increases mediation use. Democratic disputants are more accepting of 
mediation because their populace is accustomed to third-party 
involvement in domestic conflicts, thus lowering the political costs of 
mediation acceptance.11 A strong democratic community globally 
encourages even non-democracies to adopt the behavior of 
democracies, such as employing third-party resolution, which 
increases the use of mediation.12 A shared democratic culture 
between disputants and the mediator is more likely to generate an 
agreement, as democracies employ negotiation and compromise in 
disputes with other democracies but distrust the intentions of non-
democratic states and are less willing to rely on techniques of 
peaceful conflict resolution in those conflicts.13 Mediation is therefore 
best encouraged when democracies are involved as disputants and 
mediators. An apt illustration of this principle in action was Turkey’s 
willingness to work with British and American mediators following 
the 2010 Gaza-bound flotilla incident. As democratic norms continue 
to spread, state-led mediation will be increasingly employed to resolve 
disputes. 
B. Third-Party Capabilities 
States (or third parties) with material strength and diplomatic 
prowess are likely to be accepted and successful as mediators because 
these actors have access to resources and negotiating experience that 
makes them attractive as mediators and able to create and sustain 
peace. Before a state can act, however, it must have the capabilities 
necessary to be effective as a mediator.14 Mediation is therefore more 
likely when capable third parties have interests in involvement, as 
these actors have the ability to be involved. While capable third 
parties are certainly not always successful (consider Kofi Annan’s 
                                                 
11 James A. Wall Jr., John B. Stark & Rhetta L. Standifer, Mediation: A 
Current Review and Theory Development, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 370, 372-3 (2001). 
12 See generally Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, A Kantian System? Democracy and 
Third-Party Conflict Resolution, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 749 (2002). 
13 Russell J. Leng & Patrick M. Regan, Social and Political Cultural Effects on 
the Outcomes of Mediation in Militarized Interstate Disputes, 47 INT’L STUD. Q. 431, 435 
(2003). 
14 Melin, supra note 8, at 706. 
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efforts in Syria), their capabilities and reputation mean they are likely 
to be deemed “acceptable” to the disputants.15 Mediators with 
material capabilities can incentivize agreements by using the 
proverbial carrot and stick to increase an agreement’s appeal or 
threaten failed compliance.16 For example, the Great Powers are 
often actively involved in conflict management, as was the case with 
European and Chinese involvement in Darfur. In selecting third 
parties with the assets necessary to create and enforce peace, 
policymakers can encourage mediation and its success. 
C. Conflict Costs 
The more costly a conflict is in terms of violence, the more 
likely it is to be “ripe” for state-led mediation.17 The increased 
international pressure and the disputants’ cost-benefit calculus create 
an appealing climate for state-led mediation efforts. Costly conflicts 
generally attract international interest. The international spotlight 
offers a state mediator the opportunity to gain in terms of reputation 
and influence. For example, New Zealand benefited from an 
enhanced regional role after successfully mediating the Bougainville 
conflict,18 as did Switzerland in bringing peace between the Algerian 
independence movement and the French government.19 Disputants 
also are more likely to accept mediation offers as the cost of conflict 
increases because increasing costs impact the disputants’ assessment 
                                                 
15 For work on the challenges of mediation in Syria, see J. Michael Greig, 
Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN 
ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013).   
16 Kyle C. Beardsley et al., Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes, 50 J. 
CONFLICT RES. 58, 83 (2006). 
17 See generally I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT 
AND INTERVENTION IN AFRICA (1985). 
18 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Civil War Peacemaking, in PEACE AND 
CONFLICT 2012: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS, SELF-
DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS, AND DEMOCRACY 71, 78 (J. Joseph Hewitt et al. 
eds., 2012). See generally REBECCA ADAMS, PEACE ON BOUGAINVILLE: TRUCE 
MONITORING GROUP (2001); BOUGAINVILLE BEFORE THE CONFLICT (Anthony J. 
Regan & Helga M. Griffin eds., 2005); MONICA WEHNER & DONALD DENOON, 
WITHOUT A GUN: AUSTRALIANS’ EXPERIENCES MONITORING PEACE IN 
BOUGAINVILLE, 1997-2001, 43-48 (2001). 
19 See generally JOHN RUEDY, MODERN ALGERIA: THE ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATION (2005). 
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of whether continued death, destruction and expenditures are worth 
achieving their initial objective. Furthermore, state mediators can 
expect fewer actions will be required to resolve costly conflicts, given 
the high cost of continued conflict.20 
Increased costs also increase mediation success rates, as state 
party mediators can provide domestic political cover and enable 
leaders to agree to otherwise unacceptable terms.21 This was the case 
in Sinai (1974), El Salvador (1988), and Mozambique (1992). In 
highlighting the low costs and potential benefits of state-led 
mediation, policymakers can encourage state actors to offer and 
accept mediation. 
D. Rivalries and Reoccurring Conflict 
States may be more likely to accept mediation offers when 
the disputants are strategic rivals or view each other as threatening 
competitors.22 Such conflicts tend to be recurring, and especially 
destabilizing and violent—not only to the disputants but to third-
party state actors either located in the region or with other strong 
relationships to the disputants. These rivalries also tend to gain 
greater international attention. On first blush, these characteristics 
may make an offer to mediate unappealing to a state actor. 
Policymakers, however, should take care to note the considerable 
potential benefits of accepting the offer: the state party’s interest in 
building its reputation and in avoiding the costs associated with a 
regionally destabilizing, violent and drawn-out conflict. Said another 
way, although there is some risk in taking on the mediator role in 
such circumstances, the risks of declining such an invitation may be 
even greater. The illustrations for this factor show both sides of the 
                                                 
20 Lesley G. Terris & Zeev Maoz, Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test, 
42 J. PEACE RES. 563, 579-80 (2005) (arguing “the greater the versatility of the 
conflict, (1) the more likely are disputants to seek mediation, (2) the more likely are 
outside parties to mediate, and (3) the more intrusive the mediation strategies 
employed.”). 
21 Kyle Beardsley, Pain, Pressure and Political Cover: Explaining Mediation 
Incidence, 47 J. PEACE RES. 395, 404 (2010). 
22 Jacob Bercovitch & Paul F. Diehl, Conflict Management of Enduring 
Rivalries: The Frequency, Timing, and Short-Term Impact of Mediation, 22 INT’L 
INTERACTIONS 299, 316 (1997). 
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calculation. While President Jimmy Carter’s efforts between Egypt 
and Israel produced the still-intact Camp David Accords, mediation 
efforts between India and Pakistan and on the Korean Peninsula 
have been less successful. 
E. Mediation History 
States are more likely to agree to serve as mediators, and the 
mediation is more likely to be successful, when the disputants and the 
state have previously engaged in mediation. These prior mediation 
experiences, or mediation history, establish rapport and signal a 
commitment to peaceful conflict management. Mediation efforts are 
not isolated events. Each instance creates a mediation history of the 
state’s experience as a mediator and the disputants’ experiences in 
working with mediators. In this broader process, previous mediation 
encourages future efforts and success.23 Previous disputant 
experiences with mediation signals a disputant’s willingness to work 
with an outsider and encourages mediation offers by states. For 
example, mediation was employed repeatedly in Yugoslavia, because 
the parties had signaled they were willing to meet and negotiate, and 
the mediator established trust and rapport with the belligerents. A 
state’s mediation experience can signal to disputants the mediator’s 
ability, preferred methods, resourcefulness, and objectives.24 To be 
effective, the state mediator must be perceived as having access to 
suitable techniques for encouraging bargaining, and as having 
sufficient authority and experience to be able to utilize them. 
Consider Sweden and Norway’s reputation as purveyors of peace 
based on their history of mediation successes. Policymakers can 
encourage mediation by involving experienced third-party state 
mediators, especially when the disputants have exhibited openness to 
mediation. 
                                                 
23 J. Michael Greig, Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?, 49 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 249, 255 (2005). 
24 Oliver Richmond, Devious Objectives and the Disputants’ View of 
International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework, 35 J. PEACE RES. 707, 713 (1998). 
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F. Conflict Stalemate 
Disputants sensing a conflict stalemate or seeing the 
improbability of winning are likely to accept state-led mediation as it 
offers a viable alternative to continued conflict. “When parties find 
themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to 
victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not 
necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons), they seek a way 
out.”25 Disputants that have reached a hurting stalemate are “ripe” 
for mediation, since they cannot envision a successful outcome or an 
end to unbearable costs if they continue current strategies. Mediation 
offers a “way out” of an increasingly costly conflict. Henry Kissinger 
(under U.S. President Nixon) highlighted the notion of a stalemate in 
the Sinai withdrawal negotiations,26 as did Chester Crocker (under 
U.S. President Reagan) in Angola.27 Similarly, policymakers can 
encourage disputants to accept mediation by highlighting the 
presence of a stalemate and the futility of further escalation. 
G. Nature of the Conflict 
The international or domestic nature of the conflict has 
important implications for the effectiveness of the mediation effort 
as the cost of involving mediators varies between civil and 
international wars. Mediation is less likely in civil wars as it transfers 
legitimacy to the non-state actor and can hinder state sovereignty. In 
effect this means the political costs associated with accepting 
international mediation will be substantially higher in civil wars.28 
States therefore only accept mediation in the most serious civil 
                                                 
25 I. William Zartman, Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, in 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 225, 228 (Daniel 
Druckman & Paul C. Stern eds., 2000). 
26 See Briefing by Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger on Sinai Agreement: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 94th Cong. 5 (1975). 
27 See Angola: Options for American Foreign Policy: Hearing Before the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong. 3-6 (1986). 
28 Molly M. Melin & Isak Svensson, Incentives for Talking: Accepting 
Mediation in International and Civil Wars, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 249, 254 (2009). 
For work on civil wars and the role of veto players, see David E. Cunningham, Who 
Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & 
INT’L AFF. 38 (2013).  
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disputes, or when the benefits of peace outweigh the costs of 
legitimizing an opponent. For example, Swedish opposition leader 
Olof Palme was immediately recognized as a mediator in the war 
between Iran and Iraq, but the Sri Lankan government took 17 years 
to allow outside involvement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE). Given this fear of legitimizing opponents, third-party 
mediation offers are more likely to be accepted in international 
conflicts. States seeking to mediate civil conflicts will need to 
highlight other incentives, such as potential costs, before mediation is 
accepted. 
CONCLUSION 
State mediators can have a significant impact on the creation 
of a stable and sustainable peace. However, states should be selective 
in deciding when and where to mediate—as such, the policymakers 
tasked with this portfolio should be cognizant of the optimal 
circumstances for state-led mediation. Threshold considerations 
include the characteristics of the state, the nature and characteristics 
of the conflict, and the characteristics of the disputants. The ideal 
state mediator will have prior mediation experience, democratic 
governance structures and access to the resources necessary to 
enforce agreements. Democratic third parties and disputants are 
more likely to agree to mediation and to generate an agreement. 
Experienced mediators are more likely to be accepted, as are those 
with greater capabilities and resources. Mediators that lack resources 
and diplomatic experience and those from non-democracies are less 
likely to be accepted or generate lasting peace. While policymakers 
have less ability to influence the conflict characteristics, they can 
encourage mediation by highlighting the presence of a stalemate, the 
potential for escalation, and the costly nature of the conflict. By 
carefully considering the appropriateness of mediation and 
highlighting its benefits, states and disputants are more likely to 
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ETHNIC CONFLICT: AN 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld* 
INTRODUCTION 
To talk about the behavior of others is to generalize1 
especially if that behavior is perceived to be negative.2 As researchers 
who have studied ethnic discrimination and ethnic conflict for close 
to two decades, we have noticed, anecdotally at least, that this 
penchant for generalization is rampant in discussions of ethnic 
politics. Newspapers are not the only forum in which one will find 
articles that talk about one or another ethnic group’s involvement in 
violence without specifying a political organizational agent—by 
which we mean groups with a set of political goals along with an 
organizational structure. If an organization is mentioned, the article 
often offers a generalization about the use of violence or the 
                                                 
  * Victor Asal is an Associate Professor at Rockefeller College of Public 
Affairs & Policy, University at Albany, State University of New York; and Jonathan 
Wilkenfeld is a Professor of Government and Politics and Director of the ICONS 
Project at the University of Maryland. Support for this research was provided by 
the National Science Foundation through Award #0826886 and by the Science and 
Technology Directorate of the United States Department of Homeland Security 
(grant number 2008ST061ST0004) through the National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). All views expressed in this 
article are those of the authors and not of the agencies supporting the research. 
  1 See generally Eric Hoyle, The Professionalization of Teachers: A Paradox, 30 
BRIT. J. EDUC. STUD. 161 (1982). 
  2 See generally Wouter Vanhouche & Joseph W. Alba, Generalizing from 
Negative Experiences, 26 INT’L J. RES. MARKETING 238 (2009). 
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behavior of an entire ethnic group based solely on the characteristics 
of one organization within that ethnic group. This problematic type 
of analysis is too often present in policy and academic journals as 
well. 
The problem of generalizing ethnic behavior becomes more 
pronounced when one examines the attribution of a particular 
behavior to a group over time. For example, take the statement that 
the “Kurds have always rebelled against Turkey,”3 which is 
problematic for many reasons since not all Kurds have ever rebelled 
—as many Kurds would tell you. Certain organizations that claim to 
represent the Kurds have rebelled for extended periods of time while 
others have not. Generalizations about the Palestinians provide a 
more extreme example: “Historical circumstances have changed over 
the years, but the Palestinians have always seemed to prefer the hopes of 
annihilating Israel in concert with Arab states, or the romance of 
violent struggle, to constructive accommodation”4 (emphasis added). 
Is this the desire of some Palestinians? Yes, disturbingly so, as some 
surveys suggest.5 Is this the desire of all Palestinians? No, and polls 
continuously provide evidence that this is not the case. For example, 
consider the polls from the Oslo process where “monthly CPRS polls 
show an increase in general public support for the ‘peace camp,’ from 
thirty-nine percent in January 1994 to fifty-five percent in October 
1995.”6 
This kind of generalization is a serious obstacle to 
understanding conflicts and identifying solutions because it prevents 
policymakers and academics from getting at the messy reality of 
ethnic politics—especially when they become contentious or violent. 
Generalizations are even more problematic when the goal is to 
identify the implications of different policies. Although the Kurds, 
                                                 
  3 Dilara Sezgin & Melissa A. Wall, Constructing the Kurds in the Turkish 
Press: A Case Study of Hürriyet Newspaper, 27 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 787, 788 
(2005). 
  4 Saul Smilansky, Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion, 114 ETHICS 790, 796 
(2004). 
  5 See generally Stuart J. Kaufman, Narratives and Symbols in Violent 
Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case, 18 SEC. STUD. 400 (2009). 
  6 Khalil Shikaki, The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the 
Transition to Democracy in Palestine, 25 J. PALESTINE STUD. 5, 7 (1996). 
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Palestinians, Druze and other ethnic groups each have a shared 
identity, “ethnic groups” do not make policy decisions and are not 
monolithic wholes. Rather, it is the individuals and organizations 
within the ethnic groups that initiate political behavior. Accordingly, 
we must recognize that organizations are much more flexible about 
the behaviors they are willing to embrace than generalizations permit. 
Using a dataset of 118 ethnopolitical organizations in the 
Middle East and North Africa spanning the period 1980-2004, this 
article analyzes the enormous variance in behavior among and 
between organizations claiming to represent the same ethnic group. It 
also will show how such organizations often change their policies and 
shift back and forth between violent and nonviolent strategies, 
occasionally adopting both at the same time. While this article does 
not focus on the larger question of which policies make organizations 
more likely to move in one direction or another, it illustrates the 
importance of avoiding over aggregation when studying contentious 
politics. In the process, this article provides a counter-balance to 
generally accepted wisdom concerning the relationship between 
ethnicity and conflict. 
I. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR CAN CHANGE: 
THE MAROB DATASET 
            The Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) 
dataset7 examines organizations that represent Minorities at Risk 
groups.8 The 118 organizations included in the MAROB dataset 
include twenty two ethnopolitical groups in sixteen countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa, operating between 1980 and 2004.9 
                                                 
  7 Victor Asal, Amy Pate & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Minorities at Risk 
Organizational Behavior Data and Codebook, MINORITIES AT RISK PROJECT (Sept. 
2008),  http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/marob/me_marob_sept08_code 
book.pdf.  
  8 Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 
Minorities at Risk Dataset, MINORITIES AT RISK PROJECT (Nov. 2010),  
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp.   
  9 Data collection is currently underway on the Terrorism and 
Extremist Organizations (TEO) Database, which will update much of the MAROB 
Middle East dataset through 2010. Victor Asal, R. Karl Rethemeyer & Jonathan 
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To be included in the dataset, the organization must not have been 
created by a government, must claim to represent an ethnic group, 
must be active at least at the regional level and exist for at least three 
years.10 Table 1 provides a breakdown from 2004 of the number of 
Middle Eastern and Northern African organizations in the dataset by 
ethnic group.11 
Table 1. Organizations in the MAROB Dataset 
in 2004 by Ethnic Group 
 
  Highly different organizations frequently claim to represent 
the same ethnic group. Table 2 lists two ethnic groups, Kurds in 
Turkey and Palestinians in Jordan, and a sample of the organizations 
                                                 
Wilkenfeld, Terrorist and Extremist Organizations (2012) (data collection will be 
completed by 2015). 
  10 See Asal et al., supra note 7. 
  11 Other contributions to this issue of the Penn State Journal of Law & 
International Affairs also focus on the challenges presented by multiple organizations’ 
participation in conflict and violence. See, e.g., David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be 
at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 
38 (2013); J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the 
Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013). 
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that claim to represent them. For example the Partiya Karkari 
Kurdistan, which claims to represent the Kurds, has used violence 
for every year in the dataset while the Halkin Emek Partisi and the 
Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Partisi never used violence during this 
time period. The same diverse strategic picture can be seen if we look 
at the Palestinian organizations in Jordan. The Jordanian People’s 
Democratic Party, which was a spinoff of the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine, has not used violence since its founding 
in 1989, while the Black September Organization used violence for all 
but one year of its existence in Jordan between 1984 and 1988. To 
uniformly label the Kurdish or the Palestinian ethnic groups as 
violent represents a gross distortion of reality. 
Table 2. Examples of Minority at Risk Groups and MAROB 
Organizations 
Minority at Risk Group MAROB Organizations 
Kurds in Turkey 
Partiya Karkari Kurdistan (PKK) 
Halkin Emek Partisi 
Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Partisi 
Palestinians in Jordan 
Jordanian People’s Democratic Party 
Black September Organization 
 
           An examination of general behavior trends for the region over 
time reveals several observations about the ethnopolitical 
organizations claiming to represent MAR groups in the Middle East. 
First, a very large proportion of the organizations used violence in 
any given year (Table 3). That is, for an extended period of time 
more than twenty percent of the organizations in the dataset used 
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Table 3. Strategies of Ethnopolitical Organizations 1980-2004 
 
           
 
Of course, organizations can engage in more than one activity 
at the same time. If terrorism is defined as the intentional targeting of 
civilians, then clearly Hamas is a terrorist organization. If insurgency 
is defined as an organization that shoots soldiers, then Hamas is not 
only a terrorist organization but also an insurgency. But as Table 4 
illustrates, Hamas is not solely a violent organization. It also spent 
some of its time involved in electoral politics, and by 1994 was active 
in education, propaganda and in providing social services. This is not 
to say that Hamas is not a terrorist organization but it does show that 
Hamas is complex and acts as more than just a terrorist organization. 
Understanding that Hamas has a larger presence is a starting point 
for gaining a better understanding of why part of the Palestinian 
public might have very strong concrete reasons for being loyal to 
Hamas beyond its policies as they relate to Israel. 
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1987 no no not used not used not used 
1988 no yes not used infrequent not used 
1989 yes yes unclear infrequent frequent 
1990 yes yes unclear infrequent not used 
1991 yes yes unclear frequent frequent 
1992 yes yes infrequent frequent infrequent 
1993 yes yes infrequent frequent infrequent 
1994 yes yes frequent frequent infrequent 
1995 yes yes frequent frequent infrequent 
1996 yes yes frequent frequent frequent 
1997 yes yes frequent frequent not used 
1998 yes yes frequent frequent not used 
1999 yes yes frequent frequent not used 
2000 yes yes frequent frequent not used 
2001 yes yes frequent frequent not used 
2002 yes yes frequent frequent not Used 
2003 yes yes frequent frequent not used 
2004 yes yes frequent frequent infrequent 
 
              Despite its other efforts, Hamas has clearly made a choice to 
embrace violence in general and target civilians specifically as a 
central part of its policy, as shown by the organization’s involvement 
in attacks against civilians every year since 1989. There is in this chart, 
though, a hint of the fact that organizations make choices about their 
strategies and that those choices can change or be influenced. In 1987 
Hamas did not use violence at all. In 1988 they moved into the realm 
of violent politics but the organization did not target civilians. 
Something happened in 1988 and the organization embraced the 
targeting of civilians. This change over three years suggests that 
organizations make strategic choices about violence and those 
choices can change over time. One might argue that it is not so 
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complicated and is simply an escalation of violence—but that 
reasoning would be a mistake. Terrorism is called the “weapon of the 
weak” not only because some people are trying to validate 
reprehensible behavior. Shooting a civilian without a weapon is a lot 
easier than shooting a soldier with one. As Martha Crenshaw so 
trenchantly pointed out: 
 
The observation that terrorism is a weapon of the 
weak is hackneyed but apt. At least when initially 
adopted, terrorism is the strategy of a minority that by 
its own judgment lacks other means. When the group 
perceives its options as limited, terrorism is attractive 
because it is a relatively inexpensive and simple 
alternative, and because its potential reward is high.12 
This remark suggests that Hamas’s move to begin attacking 
civilians was not simply an escalation but a choice about what it was 
willing to do, and a statement that it reached a point where 
intentionally killing unarmed civilians was acceptable; collateral 
damage is a different issue. If an organization chooses to move 
toward killing civilians, this suggests that an organization can choose 
to move away from such behavior as well.13 For example, Amal in 
Lebanon fits this category. Before 1989 Amal regularly engaged in 
terrorist tactics. From 1989 on, it did not engage in intentional 
attacks against civilians, but it continued to engage in attacks against 
military personnel during the entire time period. Some organizations 
flip back and forth on a regular basis. As Table 5 shows, the 
Palestinian Fatah Revolutionary Council based in Lebanon went back 
and forth repeatedly between using terrorist tactics to not using such 
tactics, to ending the use of violence entirely, to then going back to 
its use. 
  
                                                 
  12 Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, 13 COMP. POL. 379, 387 
(1981). 
  13 For a discussion of Hamas as well as other extremist organizations 
use of mixed tactics (violent and non-violent), see Kristine Höglund, Tactics in 
Negotiations between States and Extremists: The Role of Cease-Fires and Counterterrorist 
Measures, in ENGAGING EXTREMISTS: TRADE-OFFS, TIMING, AND DIPLOMACY, 
221, 236-39 (I. William Zartman & Guy Olivier Faure eds., 2011). 
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Table 5. Violent Behavior of the  
Fatah Revolutionary Council Based in Lebanon 
 
 
Year Civilian Security 
1980 0 0 
1981 0 0 
1982 1 0 
1983 0 0 
1984 1 0 
1985 1 0 
1986 1 0 
1987 1 0 
1988 1 1 
1989 1 1 
1990 0 1 
1991 1 1 
1992 0 1 
1993 0 1 
1994 0 0 
1995 0 0 
1996 0 0 
1997 0 0 
1998 0 0 
1999 0 0 
2000 0 0 
2001 0 0 
2002 0 1 
2003 0 0 
2004 0 0 
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II. STATE BEHAVIOR CAN CHANGE TOO 
These case studies suggest that generalizing about an ethnic 
group is a mistake and a potentially serious one, and that we need to 
be open to the possibility of change even at the organizational level. 
The same is true for the behavior of the state toward an organization.  
Table 6 provides yearly observations of Israel’s behavior toward 
Fatah in the West Bank and Gaza and Fatah’s behavior in the West 
Bank and Gaza as it relates to attacks against civilians and security 
forces from the beginning of the Oslo process in 1993 to 2004. This 
table illustrates how state and organizational behavior can change and 
strongly suggests the possibility of a delayed feedback between the 
behavior of one actor and the behavior of the other actor. 
 
Table 6. Select Years for Israel and Fatah  
Negotiation and Violence  













1993 some concessions yes yes yes 
1994 some concessions yes yes yes 
1995 some concessions yes yes yes 
1996 negotiation no no yes 
1997 some concessions no no no 
1998 some concessions no no yes 
1999 some concessions no no no 
2000 negotiation yes yes yes 
2001 negotiation yes yes yes 
2002 no negotiation yes yes yes 
2003 negotiation yes yes yes 
2004 no negotiation yes yes yes 
 
Organizations clearly choose from a menu of various 
strategies but they rarely choose or commit to one strategy alone. 
Many organizations in the Middle East will often switch between 
violent and nonviolent contentious strategies as well as traditional 
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political activity. Moreover, the choice of strategies can be impacted 
by the type of regime and the behavior of the government as well as 
by the ideologies of the organizations themselves. 
 
III. GENERALIZATION LEADS TO BAD POLICY—AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA CAN HELP GROUND ANALYSIS 
 
Policymakers need to realize that the structure of the 
government and the way governments treat organizations and the 
populations they claim to represent will often have a direct impact on 
how those organizations behave. This brief overview examining 
examples of Middle Eastern ethnopolitical organizations is of equal 
importance, as it highlights the importance of disaggregating the 
behavior of organizations from the groups they claim to represent 
and the importance of not assuming that what is now true in terms of 
an organization’s behavior was always true—or always will be. The 
MAROB data allows us to underline the importance of specificity in 
policy making and the need to check general assumptions. It also 
facilitates analysis that can allow policymakers to get a handle on the 
various factors that will impact outcomes not just based on one case 
or anecdotal evidence, but on data that can be used to accept or 




Ethnopolitical organizational behavior in the Middle East is 
complex, and our ability to understand such behavior and identify the 
right policy choices is often ill-served by generalizations expounded 
by scholars and journalists. Often multiple organizations claim to 
represent the same ethnic group, and while some will engage in 
violence and even terrorism to achieve their goals, others will persist 
in more traditional avenues for addressing grievances such as 
electoral politics (and arguably, this is something to be encouraged). 
Furthermore, organizations will change their tactics over time, or 
                                                 
  14 See generally, e.g., Victor Asal, Richard Legault, Ora Szekely & 
Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Gender Ideologies and Forms of Contentious Mobilization in Middle 
East, J. PEACE RES. (forthcoming 2013); Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown & Angela 
Dalton, Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle 
East, 56 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 94 (2012). 
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adopt more than one tactic at the same time. While ethnopolitical 
violence is a continuing problem as the headlines from Iraq, Israel 
and various other countries in the Middle East illustrate all too often, 
our ability to understand and address these problems are hampered 
by over aggregation and simplification. The international 
community’s ability to better understand ongoing conflicts and the 
potential avenues for solutions would be best served by taking a 
more nuanced and rigorous approach to collecting and analyzing data 
at the organizational level where important distinctions between 
organizations can be identified and key shifts in tactics can be 
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MEDIATION—ITS POTENTIAL AND ITS 
LIMITS: DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE 
DISCOURSE ON THE RESEARCH AND 
PRACTICE OF PEACEMAKING 
Dennis C. Jett* 
The articles in this issue of the Penn State Journal of Law & 
International Affairs summarize analytic research relevant to conflict 
situations and offer recommendations for how conflicts can more 
effectively be brought to an end. It is therefore worth considering 
how policymakers might employ these recommendations as they 
pursue the often elusive goal of peace. 
THE “POLICYMAKER” DEFINED 
One difficulty with that task is that “policymaker” is a title 
that can be applied to many different people playing many different 
roles in a conflict situation. The policymakers within a national 
government will be comprised of politicians elected to office, officials 
appointed by those politicians, and career bureaucrats. Each of them 
will approach the problem with different perspectives and priorities 
though they are nominally on the same team. 
                                                 
* Dennis C. Jett, Professor of International Affairs, School of 
International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University. 
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Policymakers can come from the governments that are party 
to the conflict, neighboring states, regional and global powers, and 
any other nation that believes it has a dog in a particular fight. 
In a civil war, in addition to the policymakers of the regime in 
power, there are those who have some degree of control over the 
group or groups trying to overthrow that regime in order to take 
power themselves. In any country in conflict, there are also the 
noncombatants who make up the elements of civil society that are 
trying to bring it to an end. They may not make policy, but the 
decisions they do make can place pressure on the combatants and 
help the cause of peace. 
And then there are international organizations, where the 
representatives of member states provide instructions to international 
civil servants on how those organizations are to be involved. Even 
with clear guidance, there is much policy to be made in implementing 
a mandate including how to interpret it in the field and how 
forcefully to pursue it. Whether any of that can be done competently 
with the resources made available to these organizations by their 
members is another question. 
That does not exhaust the list of players of course. 
Nongovernmental organizations are often instrumental in peace 
accords, once they are reached, as they can have the capacity to 
implement programs that bring into being many of the elements of 
such accords. 
When the official representatives of the governments and 
rebel groups that are parties to the conflict fail to end it, a potential 
role for a mediator is created. Representatives of many of the 
organizations can attempt to serve in that capacity along with 
virtually anyone else who wants to engage in what is known as Track 
II diplomacy.1 The only real requirement is that the parties to the 
conflict accept them as mediators. There is usually no shortage of 
elder statesmen and retired politicians willing to serve as mediators, 
                                                 
1 A discussion of Track II diplomacy and its use in the case of U.S.-
Iranian relations can be found at: http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/track-ii-
diplomacy. 
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especially if visions of a Nobel Peace Prize nomination are dancing in 
their heads. 
Even though all will agree that peace is the goal, each 
policymaker will approach it from his or her perspective and be 
encumbered by some limitations, which affect just how much policy 
they are willing and able to make. With so many potential players, and 
so many violent conflicts, it is therefore important to consider to 
whom the policy recommendations are being made and what 
constraints they may be operating under. It is with that preliminary 
consideration in mind that I offer an evaluation as to whether the 
recommendations contained in this journal issue are realistic and 
useful. 
MEDIATION RESEARCH IN PRACTICE 
A.  Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to 
Fail but Actually Succeeds2 
Improving mediation is important, but even the best 
mediation is not a silver bullet solution. Wars can end in one of four 
ways—through a military victory, when a halt to the fighting is 
imposed by outside powers, when the parties to the conflict negotiate 
a cessation of hostilities in good faith, and when they negotiate one in 
bad faith. 
When one side wins outright, there is no need for mediation. 
A clear military victory is difficult in a civil war, however, as it usually 
pits a government with a weak army against rebel forces that are even 
weaker. Both sides will have the power to terrorize civilians, but 
rarely enough to defeat each other. 
When the international community steps in and forces an end 
to the conflict, it does not remove the underlying reasons for why the 
war started in the first place. That can imply a long-term commitment 
to creating a solution and that, plus a general reluctance to use force 
                                                 
2 Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to Fail 
but Actually Succeeds, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 27 (2013). 
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to end the use of force, means there is rarely any enthusiasm for that 
outcome among other countries. 
A negotiated end to conflict can often involve and be 
facilitated by mediation. But as Scott Sigmund Gartner points out in 
his article, success is not as elusive as it seems because the conflicts in 
which mediators are involved are also the ones least likely to succeed. 
If a peace accord were easy, the parties could reach it themselves. 
This point is worth remembering, and the international community 
and potential mediators should not avoid making the effort simply 
because the chances for success are not good.  While mediation can 
be costly in many ways, they pale in comparison to the likely costs of 
continued war. The parties to the conflict will measure the cost of 
mediation as the potential it has for diminishing their chances to 
obtain more power, often without much regard for the toll on 
noncombatants should the war continue. Human suffering aside, the 
costs of relief efforts for refugees and people displaced by the 
fighting can easily and quickly amount to hundreds of millions of 
dollars. 
The need for local expertise is one of the reasons that 
regional governmental organizations, with close ties, in-depth 
knowledge, and shared regional identities, are becoming increasingly 
utilized as mediators.3 On the other hand, while the countries in the 
region are the ones most directly affected by the spillover when a 
conflict’s impact starts to cross borders, they may not be the best 
choice. 
Regional organizations are often given the task of dealing 
with a conflict because the wider international community wants to 
avoid getting further involved rather than because they make ideal 
mediators. There is a strong correlation between conflict and poverty; 
civil wars occur more frequently in the least developed countries. The 
neighbors of countries in conflict are also likely to be poor and 
therefore the least able to support the cost of mediation and 
intervention. The neighboring states may also profit from the chaos 
by exploiting the resources of the country at war. And they will likely 
have an opinion as to which side they would like to see win. This may 
                                                 
3 Id. 
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be due to ethnic linkages, which can serve to make the conflict more 
difficult to resolve. So the decision to rely on a regional organization 
should be considered carefully and not assumed to be the best 
outcome. 
B.  Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator 
     Leverage and Conflict Resolution4 
Kyle Beardsley’s discussion of the use of leverage by 
mediators in attempting to end conflicts is a useful reminder that 
mediators can try to use too much leverage as well as too little 
leverage. Using too little will not resolve the conflict and using too 
much might only result in a short-term cessation of hostilities and not 
address the root causes of the conflict. 
By using just the right amount of leverage, the mediator can 
in theory achieve an end to the bloodshed and the humanitarian 
disaster it has caused and, at the same time, set the stage for a lasting 
peace.  That is easier said than done, however, and it seems to 
assume mediators have a range of tools to use and the ability and 
willingness to use them. That is rarely the case. 
Mediators are almost always in an inherently weak position.5 
Their role has to be accepted by the parties to the conflict and those 
parties do not see such efforts as an opportunity to negotiate their 
own demise. They will limit what the mediator can accomplish and 
choose a mediator precisely because that person is weak. They are 
generally unwilling to concede much power to the mediator and will 
resist any efforts to force them to do things that they calculate are 
not in their interests. Thus, it is hard to identify too much or too little 
leverage ex ante facto, before its use, although the appropriate degree 
of leverage might be more clear ex post facto, after the mediation. 
A mediator can have significant leverage if there is a 
willingness on the part of the international community to use military 
force or economic pressure to end a particular conflict. In his choice 
                                                 
4 Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and 
Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57 (2013). 
5 See generally id.  
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of examples, Beardsley mentions the recent case of Syria where, as he 
notes, Russia and China have blocked any U.N. Security Council 
resolutions that might have teeth. Given the absence of any real 
leverage, Kofi Annan’s efforts at mediation were doomed from the 
start. Since the Assad regime was not about to negotiate its own 
removal from power and is indifferent to the number of civilians 
killed, the only tool in Annan’s toolbox was his ability to persuade 
both sides to stop fighting, and that obviously proved insufficient. 
Beardsley uses the case of Rwanda as one where mediators 
used too much leverage He believes this only resulted in a short-term 
cessation of hostilities, which was then followed by genocide after 
they resumed. A lower level of leverage implies less international 
involvement. It seems unlikely that would have made the outcome 
better and resulted in fewer deaths. In retrospect, most have 
concluded that a much more forceful intervention by the 
international community was required instead of an attempt at 
mediation that was too weak to prevent mass murder. 
The problem for any mediator, and the international 
community as a whole, is that it is never clear whether hostilities are 
going to get worse or better. Even when there is some indication 
which direction the conflict is headed, unforeseen events—like the 
shooting down of the plane carrying Rwandan President 
Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart—can be a catalyst for 
catastrophe. Habyarimana, had he lived, might have successfully 
implemented the Arusha accords. 
The international reaction to conflict situations is often based 
on hope and the desire to avoid being drawn into the conflict. The 
biggest problem in Rwanda, as Beardsley points out, was the 
international community followed up the signing of the peace 
accords with a tiny peacekeeping force and a weak mandate that only 
allowed them to become bystanders, and at times victims, when the 
violence resumed. 
The role of Richard Holbrooke in ending the war in Bosnia is 
cited by Beardsley as a compelling case in which the use of leverage 
calmed a humanitarian disaster. Holbrooke had a very forceful 
personality, however, and the military might of NATO to draw upon 
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if he chose to use it. There is no greater source of leverage than the 
ability to use force to punish an uncooperative party. 
Having that power at the ready is not going to typically be the 
case. The international community is rarely willing to use such force. 
The fighting in Libya ended because the international community was 
willing to use such force in that instance. The fighting in Syria 
continues, however, because the international community is not 
willing to use force, at least not as of the time this is being written. 
Another problem is that some mediators are life-long U.N. 
bureaucrats. One of the unwritten rules for a successful career at the 
U.N. seems to be “never alienate anyone.” With 193 member states 
as their bosses, those that work at the U.N. do not like to stick their 
necks out. A U.N. mediator therefore may not be enthusiastic about 
using leverage since it is bound to displease someone. Even 
mediators who are not U.N. officials are unlikely to have as strong a 
personality type as Holbrooke. 
Beardsley’s fundamental point, however, is important for any 
mediator to consider. It is always essential to look into the toolbox 
and see what instruments of leverage it contains. Unfortunately, in 
many real world instances, there may not be much in the toolbox and 
the mediator may not be able or willing to use the tools available. 
Given Beardsley’s argument, additional research might examine how 
to expand the options available to mediators. 
C.  Molly M. Melin, When States Mediate6 
In her essay on when states mediate, Molly Melin concludes 
that states should offer to mediate “only in optimal circumstances” 
and policymakers should “first consider the characteristics of the 
third party, the conflict, and the disputants.” Both recommendations 
may seem obvious but are they easily achieved? 
States seek to act as mediators when their interests are at 
stake or when they feel they have to become involved. A 
                                                 
6 Molly M. Melin, When States Mediate, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 78 
(2013). 
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humanitarian crisis can create pressure for international action as it 
did for Bosnia and Darfur even when the national interests of the 
major powers are not directly threatened. If the suffering largely 
escapes the media’s attention and the public’s concern, as it has in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the pressure and the resulting 
action will be much less however. 
Another reason states want to mediate is prestige. When a 
conflict is somehow identified with a potential mediator, because of 
colonial ties or other linkages, there will again be pressure, often from 
the public and the media, to play such a role. Having an interest in a 
conflict implies the mediator is not indifferent to the outcome, 
however, and that can lessen the acceptability of the mediator to the 
parties to the dispute. As Melin points out, in cases where the 
decision to attempt to mediate stems from domestic politics, public 
pressure, national interests, or politicians’ search for prestige, the 
decision to get involved may have little to do with whether the 
situation is optimal for mediation. 
If the conditions are not optimal, but the pressure to do 
something to end the conflict is significant, states will often look for 
non-state actors like international organizations or prominent former 
statesmen willing to play the role.  That way any blame for failure, 
when it comes, can be shifted to the mediator and the damage to 
national pride and political risk can be minimized. 
As Melin points out, nation states are the most frequent 
mediators of international disputes.  Thus it is critical to understand 
the factors affecting their involvement. As she suggests, it is the 
parties involved in a conflict that decide whether there is to be a 
mediator and they will do that only when they think it serves their 
interests. The problem is that the disputants may not reach the stage 
until what I. William Zartman has characterized as a “hurting 
stalemate”7 has been achieved.  The combatants will then see further 
military efforts as impossible or unproductive. Arriving at that point 
may take years and is why there are more conflicts every year than 
                                                 
7 See I. William Zartman, Conflict and Resolution: Contest, Cost, and Change, 
518 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 11, 16 (1991). 
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there are mediation efforts and not because states considering 
becoming mediators are pondering their strategic choices. 
D.  Stephen E. Gent, The Politics of International Arbitration and 
Adjudication8 
 
Wars come in two flavors—the international kind where the 
opposing sides are nation states (interstate conflicts), and internal 
ones, where the regime in power is pitted against those who seek to 
overthrow it (intrastate conflicts). Wars between countries are usually 
over territory, though there are usually other factors involved as well. 
Wars within countries are almost always about political power. In the 
former, if the parties are willing to accept the outcome, those 
imaginary lines on maps called borders can easily be drawn to divide 
territory. Resolving the latter type of conflict is harder, however, 
because political power is not as easily divided, especially in a poor 
country where elites are either in power or out of luck. When a 
faction does take control of the government, even through legitimate 
elections, the majority tends to rule with little regard for the rights of 
minorities. And there is no Heritage Foundation or American 
Enterprise Institute where ideologues can hang out until their side 
can return to power. 
The difference between interstate wars over territory and 
intrastate wars over political power also has implications for 
alternatives to mediation. As Gent points out in his essay, 
international arbitration and adjudication is often the most effective 
means of producing long-lasting settlements and certainly should be 
considered as an alternative means of dispute resolution. 
Such a binding mechanism, however, is unlikely to be used 
when the challenge is dividing political power in a country where that 
has never been achieved before. Dividing territory is something 
international arbitrators are good at because there is usually some 
legal basis on which to proceed, but it does not always end the 
problem. Having an international body mandate a solution provides 
cover to political elites who have to defend against charges that they 
                                                 
8 Stephen E. Gent, The Politics of International Arbitration and Adjudication, 2 
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 66 (2013).  
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have given up too much. Even that may not be enough to ease the 
pain of wounded national pride, as Gent demonstrates in his 
description of how Ethiopia rejected an international boundary 
commission’s demarcation of its frontier with Eritrea. 
Gent also points out that the losing side in the finding of an 
arbitration panel is more likely to reject the decision if it possesses a 
clear power advantage. That means either other, more flexible 
mechanisms should be considered as he suggests, or at a minimum, 
the international community needs to throw its weight behind 
supporting the outcome and provide incentives for both sides to 
respect it. One advantage of having elections as part of the process 
that brings a civil war to end is that it confers legitimacy on the 
winner. The loser will have an easy excuse for rejecting the result if 
the winner is chosen by an international arbitrator and not by the 
voters. To avoid that tendency, the international community must use 
the carrots and sticks at its disposal to ensure the outcome is 
accepted if the parties agree to arbitration. 
Interestingly, international arbitration has increasingly 
become the rule in international commercial disputes. While its use is 
growing in non-commercial international disputes, it is still not 
common. So while policymakers should certainly look carefully at all 
aspects of the conflict—including who should mediate and when—
decisions are often made not on the basis of an objective and 
detached assessment of what can be achieved.  Rather decisions are 
made on the basis of what is necessary and what is possible given the 
political pressures they are operating under.  In order for 
international arbitration to expand from economic to political 
disputes actors will have to address these types of political pressures. 
E.  Isak Svensson, Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications9 
Isak Svensson discusses the policy implications of bias in 
mediators and concludes that even biased ones can play a useful role. 
He notes that rebel-biased mediators tend to create peace settlements 
that include power-sharing arrangements while government-biased 
                                                 
9 Isak Svensson, Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, 2 PENN ST. 
J.L. & INT’L AFF. 17 (2013). 
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mediators opt for amnesties. Both the mediators and the outcomes 
that are deemed acceptable are up to the parties in the conflict. The 
bias in play may therefore result from the selection process rather 
than a preference toward a particular solution on the part of the 
mediator. Mediators “create” only those solutions that the 
combatants will agree to and are able to consider solutions that might 
be accepted by both sides. 
Svensson’s central premise—that bias is not an inherent 
disqualifying feature of mediation—is an important one. However, 
and as Svensson points out, a little bias may not be a bad thing. The 
real test is whether the mediator is capable of guiding the parties to 
an agreement and not whether he or she is absolutely neutral.  This 
also represents a major distinction between domestic mediation—
which seeks neutrality among mediators—and international 
mediation. For example, it not only took Begin and Sadat to create 
peace between Israel and Egypt but it also took Carter, the leader of a 
pro-Israel state, to convince Israel to give up territory in exchange for 
a U.S. assurance of security. Mediators will often be charged with 
bias, especially by the side playing the weaker hand, whether it exists 
or not. The parties to the conflict have to have some sense that the 
mediator will act fairly even if not necessarily impartially. The bias 
may even help get the stronger side to a deal as it probably did at 
Camp David. 
F.  Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking10 
Birger Heldt, of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, examines the 
growth in the number of efforts at peacemaking in emerging conflicts 
and in particular the lack of coordination that results from so many 
different actors becoming involved. To address this problem, he 
suggests policymakers adopt a long-term strategy focused on 
coordination. In addition, he urges policymakers not to be 
discouraged by the failures of initial peacemaking attempts. He 
cautions that the need for coordination should not crowd out 
attempts at further peacemaking. He also emphasizes that if violence 
                                                 
10 Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking, 2 PENN 
ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 9 (2013). 
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is going to escalate dramatically, it normally does so in the first two 
years of the conflict. 
That two-year window when effective peacemaking has a 
chance to prevent a significant expansion of hostilities is critical for 
policymakers to acknowledge and incorporate into planning efforts. 
The problem, of course, is that senior officials in any busy capitol or 
international body are almost always consumed by the crisis of the 
moment and long-term planning rarely gets beyond next week. The 
paradox and the tragedy is that until the violence does escalate, the 
conflict is likely to fail to grab the attention of the media and the 
policymakers. 
The International Crisis Group and other organizations have 
long tried to direct the attention of officials to crises in need of 
attention and alert policymakers before the conflicts escalate. The 
U.N. has discussed ways to improve crisis management and to take 
advantage of constantly evolving information and communications 
technology.11 It would be useful if each government and international 
organization had an internal group that was designed to prioritize 
mediation needs. And those groups should try and stay ahead of the 
curve by engaging in a continuing dialogue with those who make the 
study of mediation efforts their academic specialty. 
The coordination of peacemaking efforts is made difficult by 
the fact that there are no barriers to entry, especially to potential 
Track II mediators. That may account for the growth in such efforts 
as much as any other factor. It is still worthwhile to attempt to bring 
coordination, as well as long-term planning, to peacemaking. The 
biggest obstacle is perhaps a lack of time and attention to the 
problem by policymakers as much as anything else. Heldt’s policy 
recommendations offer an important reminder of the value of 
preventative measures and of the critical timeframe for such action. 
  
                                                 
11 See generally Daniel Stauffacher, Strengthening Crisis Information 
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G.  Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An 
Organizational Perspective12 
Victor Asal and Jonathan Wilkenfeld provide a convincing 
argument that assumptions about a conflict always need to be 
checked and that generalizations expounded by scholars and 
journalists can lead to the wrong policy choices. True experts in a 
region need to convey the complexity of each situation to 
policymakers without making it seem so difficult that any 
involvement is unwise. Academics and other analysts need to keep in 
mind that no data set can substitute for in-depth knowledge when it 
comes to a particular conflict. Some humility is required in making 
assessments of conflicts and policy recommendations regarding 
them. If they are made simply on the basis of number crunching of 
past conflicts, ideology or a lack of knowledge about the motivations 
of the combatants, an illusion of understanding will be created and 
could lead to poor decisions.13 
H.  David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and 
Peace Processes in Civil War14 
David Cunningham cautions that too many players can spoil 
the peace process and urges that those without a veto be excluded 
from it. It will not be only the mediator that decides who gets a seat 
at the table, but to the extent that this recommendation can be 
followed, it should be. While civil society may not participate in the 
actual negotiations, it would also be useful to think of ways to help 
them pressure the parties to come to an agreement. Leymah Gbowee, 
the Liberian activist who won the Nobel Peace Prize, is one example 
of how such pressure can be used to encourage politicians to 
negotiate seriously. 
                                                 
12 Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An Organizational 
Perspective, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 91 (2013). 
13 Richard Synge’s book “Mozambique” is a good example of bad 
analysis and the U.S. Institute of Peace should be embarrassed by its publication. 
See RICHARD SYNGE, MOZAMBIQUE: UN PEACEKEEPING IN ACTION, 1992-94 
(1997).  
14 David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace 
Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 38 (2013). 
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Cunningham notes the problem with a strategy of threatening 
to exclude the main combatants from the negotiations is not 
effective. If they are not included there are no benefits from peace, 
because peace won’t be possible. The parties must always reach a 
decision that their interests are better served by peace than by 
continued war for any talks to begin. And there must be some 
common ground that is reachable, which it is not when the aims of 
those doing the fighting are diametrically opposed and nonnegotiable. 
I.  J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature 
on  the Failure of Mediation15 
J. Michael Greig is the co-author of one of the most 
comprehensive books on international mediation.16  Here, Greig 
applies his strong analytical understanding of mediation not to one 
issue, but to one case.  In his assessment of Syria, he quotes one 
Middle Eastern analyst as saying that President Assad will go down 
fighting. If that is the case, there is little that can be done by the 
international community. If active military engagement is ruled out, 
the international community can do little more than encourage 
opposition forces to discuss and coordinate what will happen after 
the fighting stops. Efforts have been made and conferences held to 
try to avoid the post-conflict chaos that has been seen in Libya. It is 
unfortunate that more was not done to help Libya make the difficult 
transition from dictatorship to democracy, but it is hard to anticipate 
if and when regime change is going succeed and therefore hard for 
the international community to know what to do and the best timing 
for doing it. And if, as in the case of Syria, those in power have 
strong allies like Russia and Iran encouraging them to fight on, a 
mediator will have little chance of success as Kofi Annan finally 
admitted. Whether his successor, Lakhdar Brahimi, will do any better 
will depend on circumstances beyond his control more than his 
ability to mediate. 
                                                 
15 J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on 
the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013). 
16 J. MICHAEL GREIG & PAUL DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION 
(2012). 
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CONCLUSIONS - MEDIATORS AND THE REALITIES THEY FACE 
Mediators almost always play a weak hand unless, like 
Richard Holbrooke in the case of Bosnia, they represent an entity 
that is willing to take an active part in the conflict. Whether dealt a 
weak hand or a strong one, mediators play a crucial role in reaching a 
peaceful resolution to a conflict and have a significant effect on the 
durability of the settlement that ends the fighting. Mediators do not 
simply add “grease” to the “squeaky wheel” but can redefine issues, 
reshape debates, and restructure negotiations in ways that lead to 
successful and peaceful outcomes.  It is therefore important that 
mediators carry out their responsibilities with the utmost skill and 
access to the relevant research, as that will enhance the chances for 
success. 
At the same time, mediation often occurs in a crises situation 
where it is virtually impossible to reach out and learn about past 
patterns, new theories and innovative approaches. In that regard it is 
useful for policymakers, to draw on the cumulative knowledge of 
mediation scholars, both represented here and throughout the 
research community before they get to the work of mediating. Even 
if such general learning is not possible, whatever their relationship to 
the situation and their power to affect it, mediators and policymakers 
should consider the research-based recommendations outlined in this 
collection of essays. 
The journal’s goal in constructing this issue—to develop a 
more robust and interactive dialogue between researchers and 
practitioners—should be received as a call to the members of both 
communities. It is important for researchers, who have the time to 
study these matters in depth without being forced to rapidly turn 
their attention to the next crisis, to share their findings on what 
works and what does not with more than other academics. And those 
who have served as mediators need to share with researchers their 
views on the constraints they face in the field. There are a number of 
ways to accomplish this kind of direct dialogue on peacemaking, 
which will draw the communities together and produce mutually 
beneficial results—and this issue serves as an important launch point 
to begin that discussion. 
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WE CAN WORK IT OUT: PUTTING OUR 
BEST FOOT FORWARD IN 




Student movement across national borders is increasing 
rapidly as a result of globalization, marketplace competition, and 
programs aimed at student mobility.1 International higher education 
can be described as “the conscious effort to integrate and infuse 
international, intercultural, and global dimensions into the ethos and 
outcomes of postsecondary education.”2 For the U.S., this broad 
description encompasses a variety of actors and programs: American 
students and professors at universities abroad, foreign students and 
professors at American universities, American universities’ branch 
campuses abroad, efforts to incorporate cosmopolitan and global 
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      1 About Project Atlas, PROJECT ATLAS, http://www.iie.org/Research-and-
Publications/Project-Atlas/About (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
2 About NAFSA, NAFSA, http://nafsa.org/about/default.aspx?id= 
23912 (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
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dimensions into university curriculum, joint curriculum and degrees 
between universities, and more.3 
Most scholars agree that two significant historical events in 
world history, World War II and the Cold War, contributed 
significantly to American policymakers’ interest in issues of 
international education.4 American interest in international and 
comparative education can be viewed as a corollary to the more 
pressing concern of U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace.5 
In particular, “Sputnik Shock” ignited concern for the quality and 
competitiveness of the American education system mid-century.6 The 
1983 publication of A Nation at Risk,7 an extremely influential report 
detailing the failure of American schools to produce globally 
competitive students, further compounded public awareness of 
competition from abroad.8 The report declared that America’s failing 
education system was “eroding the economy,”9 creating a perceived 
                                                 
3 Brian J. Garavalia, International Education: How It Is Defined by U.S. 
Students and Foreign Students, 70 CLEARING HOUSE 215, 217-18 (1997); Anneke 
Luijten-Lub et al., On Cooperation and Competition: A Comparative Analysis of National 
Policies for Internationalisation of Higher Education in Seven Western European Countries, 9 J. 
STUD. IN INT’L EDUC. 147, 153, 157 (2005).   
4 HANS DEWIT, INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND EUROPE: A HISTORICAL, COMPARATIVE, 
AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 19 (Philip G. Altbach, ed., 2002).  
5 FRANK NEWMAN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE AMERICAN 
RESURGENCE: A CARNEGIE FOUNDATION SPECIAL REPORT 13-15 (1985).   
6 Michael Dobbins & Kerstin Martens, A Contrasting Case—The U.S.A. 
and Its Weak Response to Internationalization Processes in Education Policy, in 
TRANSFORMATION OF EDUCATION POLICY 179, 182 (Kerstin Martens et al. eds., 
2010) (defining “Sputnik Shock” as occurring when “the Soviet Union launched 
the first satellite in 1957,” which demonstrated to American policymakers “the 
Soviet Union’s technological superiority or at least its equality with the U.S.A. in 
this area”). 
7 NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE 
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), http://datacenter.spps.org/ 
uploads/SOTW_A_Nation_at_Risk_1983.pdf. 
8 DAVID TYACK & LARRY CUBAN, TINKERING TOWARD UTOPIA: A 
CENTURY OF PUBLIC SCHOOL REFORM 13-14 (1995); but see MICHAEL B. KATZ, 
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN EDUCATION 130 (1987) (explaining the 
controversial nature of A Nation at Risk).  
9 TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 8, at 34. 
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crisis in American education.10 In light of growing global 
competition, policymakers viewed the education crisis as a “national 
security risk.”11 Education in the U.S. is largely a state issue, but a 
national security risk required a federal government response. Faced 
with opposition from state policymakers, the Reagan administration 
made a strategic decision to elevate the crisis to an international 
level.12 The administration pushed the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to compile comparative 
statistical data on student achievement,13 allowing the U.S. to focus 
education policy decisions on competition with other nations.  This 
event marked the beginning of the education system’s use as an 
important tool for maintaining America’s global competitive edge.  
Today, the Obama administration’s education policy programs 
continue to reflect an awareness of international competition, 
especially competition as demonstrated by international test scores.14 
The U.S.’s uncertain position in the global education 
competition has led to reform movements in compulsory education, 
such as the No Child Left Behind Act.15 Over the past several 
decades, the comparative data generated through the OECD’s 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)16 has 
pushed other nations to make significant improvements in their 
                                                 
10  Id. at 78. 
11  Kerstin Martens & Stephan Leibfried, The PISA Story: How Educational 
Policy Went International: A Lesson in Politics Beyond the Nation-state, ATLANTIC TIMES 
(GER.) Jan. 2008, http://www.atlantic-times.com/archive_detail.php?recordID= 
1132. 
12 Id. 
13 Martens & Leibfried, supra note 11.  
14 Tonia Bieber & Kerstin Martens, The OECD PISA Study as a Soft Power 
in Education? Lessons from Switzerland and the US, 46 EUR. J. EDUC. 102, 109-10 
(2011); but see TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 8, at 34-37 (exploring the controversy 
around sources of comparative education data).  
15 Id. at 109. 
16 OECD Programme for International Student Assessment, AUSTL. COUNCIL 
FOR EDUC. RESEARCH (2012), http://www.acer.edu.au/ozpisa/assessment/ 
(“PISA assesses the extent to which students near the end of compulsory education 
have acquired some of the knowledge and skills that are essential for full 
participation in society. In all cycles, the domains of reading, mathematical and 
scientific literacy are covered not only in terms of mastery of the school curriculum, 
but in terms of important knowledge and skills needed in adult life.”). 
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education systems to remain globally competitive.17 In the realm of 
higher education, the U.S. has consistently been a leader in attracting 
foreign talent.18 Since 9/11,19 however, the international dimension of 
U.S. higher education has contracted.20 At the same time, many other 
nations have rapidly expanded the international dimension of their 
higher education through participation in international initiatives.21 
These initiatives seek to increase student mobility by harmonizing 
higher education systems.22 
To demonstrate how the U.S. can become more involved in 
international higher education initiatives, this comment will first give 
an overview of the history of these initiatives globally.23 Section III 
will explore the legal and soft governance mechanisms involved and 
their feasibility of application to the U.S.24 A description of the 
structures of these initiatives and the difficulties associated with each 
will follow, aiding in the understanding of how the U.S. can fit into 
the international picture.25 Section IV will examine examples of 
harmonization in the U.S. to demonstrate the feasibility of U.S. 
participation in international initiatives.26 This comment will conclude 
by considering possible courses of action for U.S. in this area.27 
                                                 
17 Bieber & Martens, supra note 14, at 108. 
18 ACE CTR. FOR INT’L INITIATIVES, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., 
STUDENTS ON THE MOVE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (Oct. 2006) http://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Documents/ 
IssueBrief-2006-Students-on-the-Move-The-Future-of-International-Students-in-
the-United-States.pdf. 
19 Rodolfo Altamirano, Viewpoint: The Impact of 9/11 on International 
Education, MICH. DAILY, Sept. 8, 2004, http://www.michigandaily.com/content/ 
viewpoint-impact-911-international-education (explaining how the Student and 
Exchange Visitor Information System database, additional border security, and the 
difficulty of obtaining visas impact international student mobility); see also David A. 
Urias & Card Camp Yeakey, International Students and U.S. Border Security, NEA 
HIGHER EDUC. J. 187, 187 (Fall 2005).  
20 Dobbins & Martens, supra note 6, at 189. 
21 Id. at 188-89. 
22 See infra Section II. 
23 See infra Section II.   
24 See infra Section III.  
25 See infra Sections IIIB - D.   
26 See infra Section IV.  
27 See infra Section V.  
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American education policy remains largely decentralized and 
focused on local control.28 Politicians consistently address global 
education competitiveness, but the U.S. has yet to respond 
significantly to international initiatives.29 This is in part because the 
U.S.’s decentralized education system makes policy-making on a 
national level challenging.30 While individual higher education 
institutions can and do participate in international mobility efforts by 
accepting and sending students across borders, a unified and 
consistent policy does not currently exist in the U.S.31 
Participation in international initiatives to increase student 
mobility is said to have a significant impact on the competitive edge 
of nations.32 These mobility enhancing initiatives can increase 
economic cooperation, the prestige of a nation’s institutions, 
goodwill between nations, and the quantity and quality of data 
available to comparative education researchers.33 However, 
international initiatives in education would likely require cooperation 
on all governance levels—state, federal, and international. Initiatives 
by international organizations such as the European Union (E.U.) 
affect not only national governments, but also regional or state 
entities and individual higher education institutions.34 Individual 
                                                 
28 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW 6 (2005), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ous/international/ 
edus/index.html; Dobbins & Martens, supra note 6, at 180. 
29 Dobbins & Martens, supra note 6, at 180. 
30 Id.  
31 HUM. RES. DEV. WORKING GRP., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF HIGHER 
EDUC. AT THE UNIV. OF MELBOURNE, HIGHER EDUCATION DIPLOMA 
SUPPLEMENTS AMONG APEC MEMBER ECONOMIES 7 (2010) [hereinafter APEC 
DIPLOMA SUPPLEMENT REPORT], http://hrd.apec.org/images/c/cc/APEC _ 
Higher_Education_Diploma_Supplement_-_Final_Report.pdf.  
32 Luijten-Lub et al., supra note 3, at 150; Laurel S. Terry, The Bologna 
Process and its Impact in Europe: Much More than Degree Changes, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 107, 210 (2008) [hereinafter Terry 2008]. 
33 MINISTERS ATTENDING THE ASIA-PACIFIC EDUC. MINISTERS’ 
MEETING, THE BRISBANE COMMUNIQUE (2006), http://shelbycearley.files. 
wordpress.com/2010/06/thebrisbanecommunique.pdf; Alexander W. Wiseman & 
David P. Baker, The Worldwide Explosion of Internationalized Education Policy, in 
GLOBAL TRENDS IN EDUCATION POLICY 10-11 (Alexander W. Wiseman & David 
P. Baker, eds., 2005).  
34 APEC DIPLOMA SUPPLEMENT REPORT, supra note 31, at v-vi, 27.   
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higher education institutions, acting through unifying organizations 
such as the Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) or 
the Association of American Colleges and Universities (AACU), can 
affect the policies made by national and international actors.35 
Additionally, national policymakers may use international 
organizations’ initiatives as way of legitimizing their own national 
goals or promoting particular approaches to international policy in 
general.36 International higher education initiatives, in short, require 
significant coordination and transparency among a variety of entities 
with sometimes greatly differing motivations.37 
The U.S. is capable of this level of cooperation and 
coordination internationally.38 Current domestic programs 
demonstrate this capability by slowly harmonizing the qualification 
frameworks of higher education among states.39 For the purposes of 
this comment, qualification frameworks refer to the systems that 
classify higher education by “level, workload, quality, profile and 
learning outcomes.”40 The common framework in the U.S., for 
example, allows students to transfer from one institution to another 
while retaining many of their credits because the institutions 
recognize curricular similarities and account for the differences. 
In harmonizing qualification frameworks across nations, 
international initiatives seek to make key connections between 
frameworks so that qualifications are treated relatively equally in all 
                                                 
35 Barbara Brittingham, Accreditation in the United States: How Did We Get to 
Where We Are?, in  NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON INST’L QUALITY & INTEGRITY, 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REPORT OF THE FEBRUARY 3-4, 2011 MEETING 14, 14 (Feb. 
3, 2011),  http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/naciqi-dir/2-11-presenters. 
html. 
36 SACHA GARBEN, EU HIGHER EDUCATION LAW: THE BOLOGNA 
PROCESS AND HARMONIZATION BY STEALTH 213 (2011). 
37 Id. at 212.  
38 Wiseman & Baker, supra note 33, at 4 (“Being open to external forces, 
like common worldwide understanding about how sectors like education should 
work in all nations, makes national policymaking ripe for internationalizing.”).  
39 See infra Section III.  
40 DANIELA ULICNA ET AL., EUR. COMM’N & AUSTL. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
STUDY ON THE (POTENTIAL) ROLE OF QUALIFICATIONS FRAMEWORKS IN 
SUPPORTING MOBILITY OF WORKERS AND LEARNERS 57 (Oct. 2011), http:// 
ec.europa.eu/education/more-information/doc/2011/australia_en.pdf.   
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nations.41 The U.S. has slowly moved toward coordination with other 
nations by continuing international harmonization but thus far has 
refused to be bound by international initiatives.42 Unlike the U.S., 
many of the member nations of the Asian-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) and the E.U. have begun processes of 
international harmonization through their respective international 
organizations.43 
In the U.S., higher education policy is moving toward a more 
internally centralized and harmonized system on several fronts.44 
While the U.S. has not yet engaged significantly with current 
international higher education initiatives, it has employed similar 
harmonization programs internally among states and across North 
American borders.45 These programs have come both from 
grassroots organizations and agencies (the ground-up approach) and 
from the Department of Education and other national policy making 
entities (a top-down approach).46 The U.S. has yet to take significant 
steps toward cooperation with international initiatives. As a global 
leader, it is time for the U.S. to seriously consider further 
international harmonization in the increasingly globalized world of 
higher education. 
I. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION 
INITIATIVES 
To create international higher education initiatives, member 
nations of international organizations may enter into formal 
agreements.47 Many of these agreements are not legally binding in the 
                                                 
41 OLUSOLA OYEWOLE, HARMONISATION OF DEGREE STRUCTURES, 
AND REGIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FRAMEWORKS IN THE AFRICAN HIGHER 
EDUCATION SPACE 1 (2011).  
42 Laurel S. Terry, International Initiatives that Facilitate Global Mobility in 
Higher Education, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 305, 329 (2011) [hereinafter Terry 2011]. 
43 Id. at 318, 330.  
44 See infra Section III.  
45 DEWIT, supra note 4, at 30-31, 39; see also Program for North American 
Mobility in Higher Education, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed. 
gov/programs/fipsenortham/index.html (last modified June 16, 2011).   
46 See infra Section III.  
47 GARBEN, supra note 36, at 5-7.  
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ordinary sense.48 The purposes of these agreements are to coordinate 
institutions to facilitate increased student mobility and to encourage 
participation in international education projects and programs.49 
Initiatives include the European Community Action Scheme for the 
Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS), the European Credit 
and Transfer System (ECTS), the Bologna Process, and various 
efforts of APEC.50 The U.S. has also been peripherally involved in 
international higher education initiatives and has strengthened its 
student mobility framework.51 The selected initiatives below are a 
sampling of key programs and do not represent an exhaustive list of 
the programs around the world. 
A. ERASMUS 
The ERASMUS program, initiated in 1987 by the E.U.’s 
European Commission,52 has been moderately successful at its goal 
of promoting student mobility across higher education institutions in 
Europe.53 To participate in ERASMUS, institutions are required to 
have an ERASMUS University Charter.54 This charter helps the 
institution coordinate with the European Commission by providing 
the basic framework, principles, and requirements for participation.55 
ERASMUS uses both centralized and decentralized efforts to 
coordinate institutions with the E.U.56 After its establishment, 
                                                 
48 Id. at 174.   
49 Id.   
50 Terry 2011, supra note 42, at 305.  
51 DEWIT, supra note 4, at 30-31; see also U.S. Network for Education 
Information, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/ 
list/ous/international/usnei/edlite-index.html (last modified Dec. 22, 2007).  
52 The European Commission is the European Union’s executive body. 
See About the European Commission, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
about/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2012).  
53 Heather Field, Higher Education in the Twenty-First Century: Integrating 
Tertiary Education in Europe, 585 ANNALS 182, 187 (2003). 
54 The ERASMUS Programme – Studying in Europe and More, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-programme/doc80_en. htm (last 
updated Jan. 9, 2013). 
55 Id.  
56 Id. (“[S]o called ‘decentralised actions’ that promote individual mobility 
are run by national agencies in the 33 participating countries and ‘centralised’ 
actions, such as networks, multilateral projects and the award of the ERASMUS 
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ERASMUS expanded to encompass countries outside Europe, 
including the U.S. via the Atlantis program.57 Through competitive 
grants, the Atlantis program promotes mobility and a “transatlantic 
dimension” to higher education.58 The Atlantis grant competition was 
cancelled for fiscal year 2011 due to Congressional budget 
reductions.59 
B. The European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS) 
ECTS was created in response to the needs of newly mobile 
students in the ERASMUS program.60 As a system promoting cross-
institution degree and credit recognition, ECTS marks the first of 
several mechanisms developed to harmonize higher education 
institutions across Europe.61 A recent report, Problems of 
Recognition in Making Erasmus (PRIME), showed that fifty-nine 
percent of European higher education institutions surveyed use 
ECTS as their only credit system, and thirty-seven percent use ECTS 
with a national credit system.62 In addition to ECTS, the European 
                                                 
University Charter, are managed by the EU’s Education, Audiovisual and Culture 
Executive Agency.”).   
57 Terry 2011, supra note 42, at 314.  
58 European Union-United States Atlantis Program, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/fipseec/ index.html (last modified June 16, 2011). 
59 Id. 
60 Terry 2011, supra note 42, at 315 (explaining that “the needs of the 
ERASMUS programme led directly to the creation of another EU initiative that has 
been highly influential,” ECTS).  
61 EUR.COMM’N, ECTS USER’S GUIDE 7 (2009) [hereinafter ECTS 
USER’S GUIDE], http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-policy/doc/ects/ 
guide_en.pdf (describing ECTS as “a tool that helps to design, describe, and deliver 
programmes and award higher education qualifications. The use of ECTS, in 
conjunction with outcomes-based qualifications frameworks, makes programmes 
and qualifications more transparent and facilitates the recognition of qualifications. 
ECTS can be applied to all types of programmes, whatever their mode of delivery 
(school-based, work-based), the learners’ status (full-time, part-time) and to all 
kinds of learning (formal, non-formal and informal).”).  
62 EREN DICLE ET AL., PRIME REPORT 2010 16 (2010), 
http://prime.esn.org/sites/prime.esn.org/files/PRIME20Report%202010_0.pdf 
(“In order to facilitate recognition of degrees and study achievements; a clear 
system of accreditation, the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System 
(ECTS) has been introduced to replace various local systems.”); Key Results, 
PRIME, http://prime.esn.org/content/key-results (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
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Commission, the Council of Europe and UNESCO collectively 
created the Diploma Supplement.63 This supplement provides a 
“standardised[sic] description of the nature, level, context, content 
and status of the studies” completed by each graduate.64 ERASMUS 
and ECTS are implemented through national agencies equivalent to 
the U.S. Department of Education.65 ECTS exemplifies a 
classification framework implemented through an international 
initiative, ERASMUS. 
C. The Bologna Process 
The Bologna Process was not initiated by a centralized 
authority like the European Union. Rather, through the Bologna 
Declaration of 1999, twenty-nine countries agreed to facilitate 
mobility for students, graduates, and higher education faculty.66 
Essentially, the process of the Bologna Agreement consists of 
creating the European Higher Education Area by “ironing out” 
national idiosyncrasies and slowly “Europeanizing” higher 
education.67 Key areas of attempted harmonization are both 
substantive, as with the Europeanization of curriculum,68 and 
procedural, as demonstrated by the creation of a framework for 
comparable or uniform credits and degrees.69 The Bologna Process 
uses the ECTS framework as one mechanism of harmonization.70 
                                                 
63 Terry 2008, supra note 32, at 136.  
64 The Diploma Supplement, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/education 
/lifelong-learning-policy/doc1239_en.htm (last updated Feb. 7, 2013). 
65 DICLE ET AL., supra note 62, at 23 (“The National Agencies (NAs) are 
the link between the European Commission and Higher Education Institutions.”).   
66 Field, supra note 53, at 183.  
67 Id.  
68 See generally EUR. COMM’N, EU RESEARCH ON SOCIAL SCIENCES AND 
HUMANITIES: HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS’ RESPONSES TO 
EUROPEANISATION, INTERNATIONALISATION AND GLOBALISATION. 
DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN A MULTI-LEVEL POLICY CONTEXT 
(June 2005). 
69 Id. at 184, 186.   
70 ECTS USER’S GUIDE, supra note 61, at 9.  
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The Bologna Process is entirely voluntary,71 and participating 
countries include all E.U. member nations and twenty non-E.U. 
countries.72 The U.S. is not presently a participant, though 
policymakers are closely monitoring its progress.73 Scholars view the 
Bologna Process as a response to the view that European universities 
could not compete in a “global ‘knowledge-based economy’” because 
of “brain-drain, the poor international reputation of national 
universities, low graduate outputs and success rates, rising academic 
unemployment, [and] insufficient financial resources.”74 This 
description could easily describe the motivation behind the initiatives 
of the E.U. and APEC as well. 
D. APEC’s Efforts 
APEC is an organization of twenty-one member economies 
including the U.S., Canada, Mexico, China, Singapore, Japan, Korea, 
and Russia.75 According to the White House, the total U.S.-APEC 
trade has reached at least $2.3 trillion in goods and services since 
APEC’s inception.76 A 2010 study by the University of Melbourne 
explains that APEC member economies are increasingly 
incorporating their own Diploma Supplement into their higher 
education systems.77 The structure and content of supplements in 
APEC economies are highly influenced by those of Europe, 
Australia, and New Zealand.78 The study also reports “widespread 
support” for an APEC-developed Diploma Supplement.79 Currently, 
                                                 
71 Eva M. Voegtle et al., To What Extent Does Transnational Communication 
Drive Cross-national Policy Convergence? The impact of the Bologna-process on Domestic Higher 
Education Policies, 61 HIGHER EDUC. 77, 78 (2010). 
72 Terry 2011, supra note 42, at 318. 
73 Terry 2008, supra note 32, at 111. 
74 Voegtle et al., supra note 71, at 77-78. 
75 Member Economies, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOP., http://www.apec.org 
/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Economies.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
76 Office of the Press Sec’y, APEC: Fact Sheet on 19th Annual Leaders 
Meeting Outcomes Creating Jobs, Growth, and Economic Opportunity with AELM Declaration 
& Annexes, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.whitehouse. gov/the-
press-office/2011/11/13/apec-fact-sheet-19th-annual-leaders-meeting-outcomes-
creating-jobs-growt. 
77 APEC DIPLOMA SUPPLEMENT REPORT, supra note 31, at 6-7.  
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
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member economies may also use Memoranda of Understanding—
government-to-government agreements—to assure that higher 
education meets mutual standards of quality.80 
E. U.S. Movement 
In 1995 the U.S., in collaboration with Canada and Mexico, 
created the Program for North American Mobility in Higher 
Education, a competitive grant program designed to encourage 
mobility and a “North American dimension” to higher education.81 A 
byproduct of this program has been a movement toward 
development of mutual credit recognition and joint curricula and 
degrees across Mexico, the U.S., and Canada.82 However, the grant 
competition was cancelled for fiscal year 2011 due to Congressional 
budget reductions.83 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the U.S. is engaging with 
the higher education initiatives of international organizations on its 
own terms. For example, the U.S. and Canada, two APEC member 
economies, signed the Council of Europe’s Convention on the 
Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the 
European Region (Lisbon Convention).84 The Council of Europe is 
an organization of forty-seven countries that focuses on promoting 
human rights and the rule of law in Europe.85 The Lisbon 
Convention promotes the use of the Council of Europe/UNESCO 
                                                 
80 Id.; AUSTL. UNIVS. QUALITY AGENCY, ENHANCEMENT OF QUALITY 
ASSURANCE SYSTEMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN APEC MEMBER ECONOMIES 37-
38 (2006), http://m.apec.org/Press/Features/2007/~/media/Files/Press/Feat 
ures/2007/2007Par0001Filev2.ashx.  
81 Program for North American Mobility in Higher Education, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/fipsenortham/index.html (last modified 
June 16, 2011). 
82 Id.  
83 Id. 
84 See Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education 
in the European Region, CETS No.: 165, COUNCIL OF EUR. [hereinafter, CETS No. 
165], http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=165&CM 
=&DF=&CL=ENG (last updated Nov. 18, 2012). 
85 Who We Are, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/ 
index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
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Diploma Supplement.86 Russia and Australia have signed and ratified 
the Lisbon Convention.87 The U.S., as a non-member with observer 
status, signed without accession, i.e. agreeing to be legally bound.88 In 
conjunction with signing the Lisbon Convention, the U.S. 
Department of Education initiated the U.S. Network for Education 
Information (USNEI) purportedly as a response to requests from 
within the federal government and from education associations.89 The 
USNEI provides information for U.S. students or workers seeking 
education abroad and to foreign students or workers seeking U.S. 
education.90 
II. SOFT GOVERNANCE 
A. Definition 
The international higher education initiatives discussed above 
are forms of soft governance. Soft governance is typical of 
international agreements because of the absence of a centralized 
authority.91 The definition and significance of soft governance, and its 
accompanying term “soft law,” are debated and elusive. However, 
soft law can be identified by distinguishing it from hard law, or what 
is commonly thought of as binding law in domestic legal systems.92 
Soft law typically lacks some element of “obligation, precision, [or] 
delegation.”93 A more flexible form of governance, soft law may 
more readily facilitate cooperation between distinct, autonomous 
entities, but it is criticized for the ambiguity it leaves in its wake.94 
Typical instruments of soft governance include: “norm setting, 
opinion formation, financial means, coordinative activities, [and] 
                                                 
86 The Lisbon Recognition Convention, COUNCIL OF EUR. http://www.coe. 
int/t/dg4/highereducation/recognition/lrc_EN.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
87 APEC DIPLOMA SUPPLEMENT REPORT, supra note 31, at 7.  
88 CETS No. 165, supra note 84.   
89 About USNEI, ED.GOV, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ 
ous/international/usnei/edlite-about.html (last modified Feb. 11, 2008). 
90 Id.  
91 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 423 (2000).  
92 Id. at 422-23. 
93 Id. at 422. 
94 Id.  
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consulting services.”95 The international education initiatives 
described above typically consist of declarations of intended action, 
rather than treaties that can bind the signatory nations.96 
B. Feasibility of an Initiative 
If the U.S. seeks to participate in international higher 
education initiatives, it is necessary to examine the feasibility of soft 
governance in the U.S. context. In general, the degree to which a 
nation participates in a soft governance initiative can be examined 
using two different approaches: 1) the veto players in the state and 
national governments; and 2) the nation’s guiding principles.97 
First, veto players include people or institutional components 
within a national government that have the ability to hinder the 
progress of an initiative.98 Essentially, the greater the number of 
players who agree with or are somehow advantaged by the initiative’s 
policy, the greater the likelihood that the nation will successfully 
harmonize with the international initiative. In the U.S., potential veto 
players at the national level—Congress, the President, leaders in the 
Department of Education—must contend with potential veto players 
at the state and local level, both public and private, because of the 
decentralized nature of U.S. education.99 Therefore, any discussion of 
the U.S.’s international dimension to higher education must always 
include an examination of the multiple players involved. This 
complexity may explain U.S. policymakers’ hesitance to address an 
American approach to international higher education. However, 
because of the decentralized nature of American education, a veto 
                                                 
95 Alexander-Kenneth Nagel et al., Introduction—Education Policy in 
Transformation, in TRANSFORMATION OF EDUCATION POLICY 3, 10-12 (Kerstin 
Martens et al. eds., 2010). 
96 GARBEN, supra note 36, at 90.  
97 Nagel et al., supra note 95, at 13-14. 
98 Id.  
99 PETER D. ECKEL & JACQUELINE E. KING, AN OVERVIEW OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DIVERSITY, ACCESS, AND THE ROLE OF THE 
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player in the U.S. is not likely to impede efforts to cooperate with 
international organizations.100 
Instead, the U.S.’s guiding principles are likely to determine 
its willingness to engage in international higher education initiatives. 
Important guiding principles in the context of this discussion may 
include beliefs about the purposes, significance, and expected 
outcomes of higher education and international cooperation.101 In the 
U.S., state and federal policymakers consistently link education with 
economic success on a personal and national level.102 However, 
organizations like the Association of American Colleges and 
Universities (AACU) promote the ideals of a liberal education.103 The 
AACU defines a liberal education as one in which “students develop 
a sense of social responsibility” and which promotes “broad learning 
in multiple disciplines and ways of knowing.”104 The philosophy of 
American education has historically alternated between an emphasis 
on liberal and vocational styles of education.105 
International scholars have identified a positive correlation 
between the cultural, institutional, and socioeconomic similarities 
among nations and the similarity of policymakers’ interpretation and 
                                                 
100 Nagel et al., supra note 95, at 265.   
101 Id. at 14-15. 
102 Matt Compton, The Blueprint for an America Built to Last,  WHITE 
HOUSE (Jan. 24, 2012, 11:19 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012 
/01/24/blueprint-america-built-last (“We need to promote new skills and better 
education so that all Americans are prepared to compete in a global economy.”); 
Regional Economic Development Councils, N.Y. ST., http://regionalcouncils. ny.gov/faq 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (“Public and private higher education institutions are 
essential components of the State’s economic engine, serving as centers of 
innovation and research, teaching the business leaders of tomorrow, anchoring our 
communities, and creating jobs.”). 
103 Liberal Education, ASS’N OF AM. COLLS. & UNIVS., 
http://www.aacu.org/resources/liberaleducation/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 28, 
2013). 
104 What is a 21st Century Liberal Education?, ASS’N OF AM. COLLS. & UNIS., 
http://www.aacu.org/leap/what_is_liberal_education.cfm (last visited Mar. 28, 
2013).  
105 See generally DIANE RAVITCH, LEFT BACK: A CENTURY OF BATTLES 
OVER SCHOOL REFORM (2000); KATZ, supra note 8; TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 8. 
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implementation of international policies.106 In other words, similar 
participating nations are more likely to participate in an initiative in 
similar ways. Because cultural, institutional, and socioeconomic 
considerations shape how a nation addresses welfare issues such as 
education, these factors may dramatically influence how a nation 
filters the international initiative down through national, state or 
regional, and local government. 
C. Structuring an Initiative 
International soft governance measures can be initiated by 
international organizations, such as the E.U.’s ERASMUS program, 
or they can be initiated outside of one formal body, such as the 
Bologna Process. The E.U.’s initiative can be characterized as a top-
down effort to harmonize higher education institutions. The E.U.’s 
powers, called competences, are set forth in treaties such as the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).107 
Member nations grant competences and give legitimacy to the E.U., 
and treaties take effect only with the consent of the signatory 
nations.108 The E.U. holds only the power granted to it, explicitly or 
implicitly, and the remaining powers are retained by member 
nations.109 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has interpreted the 
E.U.’s competences broadly to include education as it relates to the 
internal market.110 Additionally, Article 165 TFEU delineates the 
E.U.’s education competence.111 
In addition to the flexible and ambiguous powers of 
international organizations in the E.U. and the national government 
in the U.S., education is also affected by the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS).112 The U.S. and E.U., as well Japan, New 
                                                 
106 Torben Heinze & Christoph Knill, Analysing Differential Impact of the 
Bologna Process: Theoretical Considerations on National Conditions for International Policy 
Convergence, 56 HIGHER EDUC. 493, 495, 506 (2008). 
107 GARBEN, supra note 36, at 57-59. 
108 Id. at 58.  
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 100. 
111 Id. at 59.  
112 KEMAL GÜRÜZ, HIGHER EDUCATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
STUDENT MOBILITY IN THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 189 (2011). 
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Zealand, and Australia, voluntarily participate in GATS to “expand 
the opportunities for global trade in services by removing barriers.”113 
GATS has raised controversy because it may supersede national and 
institutional authority, leaving academic autonomy vulnerable to 
future repercussions of the agreement.114 Additionally, some higher 
education institutions balk at the valuation of higher education as 
good to be traded rather than a beneficial social service.115 A tension 
exists between the economic and socio-cultural values of 
education.116 While globalizing education advances a nation’s place in 
the knowledge economy, nations tend to protect national education 
strategies because of their socio-cultural value.117 
In contrast to E.U. initiatives, the Bologna Process can be 
characterized as a ground-up initiative in the sense that no single 
international organization coordinates and guides the process.118 The 
participating nations have proceeded in a purposefully ground-up 
manner to avoid granting control to any international organization.119 
Nevertheless, many would argue that national education agencies 
compelled individual institutions to comply with the Bologna 
Process’s changes without soliciting views from those most affected, 
i.e., the institutions themselves.120 The distinction between top-down 
and ground-up initiatives is further complicated by the increasing 
reliance of both public and private institutions on funds from 
students and corporate partners.121 Increased reliance on the private 
sector leads to increased demand for accountability, often through 
quality assurance measures.122 Additionally, many Bologna Process 
changes intersect with other initiatives of international organizations 
                                                 
113 Id. 
114 Id.   
115 Id.  
116 GARBEN, supra note 36, at 137. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 211. 
119 Id.  
120 Id.  
121 DEWIT, supra note 4, at 153.  
122 Id.   
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like the E.U., causing confusion for those charged with implementing 
changes.123 
D. Difficulties Encountered by Initiatives 
Scholars have criticized both the top-down and ground-up 
approaches to international higher education initiatives. The E.U.’s 
higher education initiatives are controversial because the E.U.’s legal 
authority in education issues is attenuated and unclear.124 
Additionally, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has repeatedly 
expanded E.U. authority in education to an unprecedented degree.125 
In this way, the E.U.’s influence on higher education may be said to 
lack democratic legitimacy, as well as transparency and openness.126 
Similarly, the Bologna Process lacks transparency and the checks and 
balances inherent in formal organizations’ structures.127 Some 
scholars have noted that the “not-so-hidden agenda” of the Bologna 
Process participant nations is to mold European higher education 
institutions to resemble American higher education institutions.128 
Others claim that Bologna has contributed to European higher 
education outpacing American higher education in attractiveness to 
foreign students because of its greater transparency of degrees and 
qualifications.129 
Beyond these broader governance issues, harmonization 
efforts have encountered implementation problems as well. A 2010 
report identified the following difficulties with implementing the 
ERASMUS program: incompatibility of study programs, problems 
with credit calculation, problems with grade transfer, bureaucratic 
issues, attitude of professors who refuse to recognize courses, and a 
lack of information exchange.130 While the Diploma Supplement has 
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been a popular harmonization mechanism, only half of participating 
European countries had fully implemented it as of 2009.131 
A 2010 APEC report noted similar problems with 
implementing its own international initiative.132 The report lists as key 
issues the need to convince institutions of the value of additional 
documentation and the difficulty of providing diploma supplements 
to nations with different qualifications frameworks.133 These issues 
highlight how diploma supplements that make mobility more feasible 
are distinct from qualifications frameworks, which aim to harmonize 
levels of education, content of levels, and learning outcomes.134 
Diploma supplements may be better suited for individual institutions 
that want to add an international dimension. On the other hand, the 
structures and classifications provided by qualifications frameworks 
are meant to be grafted onto national systems.135 By interfering with 
the national structure of higher education—for example, by changing 
the number of years necessary for bachelor’s degree equivalent— 
qualification frameworks can have consequences for a nation’s 
economy and culture.136 Despite governance and implementation 
difficulties, and despite the differences in culture and language 
involved, these harmonization efforts are inspiring nations around 
the world to discuss, plan, and implement new strategies to join the 
harmonized higher education of the future.137 
                                                 
131 APEC DIPLOMA SUPPLEMENT REPORT, supra note 31, at 25 (“Despite 
the commitment to issuing the [Diploma Supplement] to all graduates . . . by 2005, 
only half of the countries have managed to implement it fully by 2009.”). 
132 Id. at 15.  
133 Id.  
134 DANIELA ULICNA ET AL., supra note 40, at 5.   
135 Id.  
136 Wiseman & Baker, supra note 33, at 5. The economic and cultural 
consequences of implementing a qualifications framework are beyond the scope of 
this comment. 
137 Dobbins & Martens, supra note 6, at 188 (“Bologna has proven to be 
more than just a voluntary declaration, but has also created a platform for policy 
exchange and the emulation of best practice.”).  
 
2013 Comment 2:1 
137 
III. ON THE GROUND IN THE U.S. 
A. Accreditation 
The debate over whether higher education should become 
increasingly centralized is similar in the U.S and the E.U.. Looking 
specifically at accreditation provides an example of the issues 
surrounding centralization. In the U.S., hundreds of billions of 
taxpayer dollars are tied up in the accreditation of higher education 
institutions.138 Accreditation is a key area affected by international 
initiatives to harmonize higher education because of its relation to the 
structure and content of higher education. Leaders in higher 
education organizations recently began to debate the merits of 
domestic harmonization, which could lead to participation in 
international harmonization.139 Education scholar Philip Altbach 
explains that the “accreditation process is becoming internationalized 
and commercialized,” making it easier and more acceptable for an 
accreditation agency in, for example, the U.S. to offer its services to a 
higher education institution abroad.140 
American accreditation is defined by the Council for Higher 
Education Accreditation (CHEA) as “a collegial process of self-
review and peer review for improvement of academic quality and 
public accountability of institutions and programs.”141 The 
distribution of power in accreditation in the U.S. is often referred to 
as “the triad” because power is divided relatively evenly between the 
state governments, federal government, and private accrediting 
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agencies.142 The triad is a unique approach that requires the 
cooperation and mutual trust of many actors.143 State government 
roles vary, but generally the state government oversees licensing and 
consumer protection.144 The federal government’s oversight is 
directly linked to the funding it provides in the form of financial aid 
to institutions.145 Accreditation agencies set standards for and 
measure quality of institutions, allowing the federal government to 
determine which institutions are eligible to receive funding.146 These 
accrediting agencies are thought to act as a “bulwark” against 
potential government over-reaching.147 Finally, the Tenth 
Amendment protects states’ higher education choices, fostering the 
rich diversity that is unique to American higher education.148 
In the United States, the Department of Education’s National 
Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI) 
is a key body for policy questions of higher education accreditation.149 
Since its creation through the Higher Education Act’s 1992 
amendments, NACIQI has made recommendations to the Secretary 
of Education regarding accreditation.150 Each of the Secretary of 
Education, the Senate, and the House appoints six members to form 
the eighteen member committee.151 In general, NACIQI determines 
the criteria for establishing and maintaining accrediting agencies that 
are reliable and maintain high standards.152 Individual accreditation 
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agencies often cover a region or a particular kind of university or 
program.153 
At a recent NACIQI forum, stakeholders representing key 
organizations and researchers highlighted the current debate over the 
involvement of the federal government in the traditionally grassroots 
industry of accreditation.154 Clifford Adelman, a leading education 
researcher, explained that, using grants as an incentive, the federal 
government is encouraging accreditation agencies to try their own 
version of a Degree Qualifications Profile (DQP).155 In response to 
this federal push, Adelman advises the federal government to “please 
stay away and let this be a ground-up phenomenon, as the 
competency based DQP is truly a transformational challenge to U.S. 
higher education.”156 
The technical and philosophical challenges to a national 
qualifications framework that could extend beyond U.S. borders are 
immense. The U.S. accreditation system is praised for its cost-
efficiency, self-governed and partly volunteer-based structure, and 
flexibility.157 Judith Eaton, president of CHEA, observed that 
taxpayers are pressuring the federal government to become more 
involved in the higher education system in which it invests so many 
taxpayer dollars.158 Yet the U.S. accreditation and higher education 
systems can become internationalized without losing their grassroots 
nature. Similarly, the federal government should not react to public 
pressure by involving itself in accreditation with a heavy hand. 
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Rather, the federal government can use its position in relation to 
both international and domestic education to harness the invaluable 
experiences and expertise of U.S. accreditors and other stakeholders. 
B. Additional Examples 
Other efforts to harmonize higher education demonstrate the 
U.S.’s capacity for implementing programs similar the harmonization 
initiatives abroad. The Carnegie Classifications and Complete College 
America (CCA) are ground-up phenomena that demonstrate how 
classifications and an emphasis on accountability and transparency 
have already led to an increasingly harmonized higher education 
system at home. The Carnegie Classifications, first published in 1973, 
represent the “leading framework” used by U.S. higher education 
institutions to classify and organize higher education.159 These 
ubiquitous classifications are used to determine qualification for 
grants and other funding, as well as to categorize a wide variety of 
institutions for comparison in widely-read publications such as the 
U.S. News and World Report’s college and university rankings.160 The 
Carnegie Foundation itself has noted that the value placed on its 
classifications can create significant pressure on institutions to 
maintain or change their classification.161 The mutual interests of 
individual institutions and the federal government in these 
classifications make them well suited for use in future harmonization 
initiatives, as a model or a starting point.162 
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Complete College America, a nonprofit organization, works 
with the National Governors’ Association (NGA)163 to improve 
college graduation rates in each state and to “build consensus for 
change” among key players at the state and national levels.164 CCA 
was founded in 2009 and is supported by organizations like the 
Carnegie Corporation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and 
the Lumina Foundation.165 Through the Complete to Compete 
program of CCA, states use common metrics to measure progress 
and outcomes.166 Progress metrics measure enrollment and success in 
remedial education, success in first year college courses, credit 
accumulation, retention rates, and course completion.167 Outcome 
metrics measure degrees awarded, graduation rates, transfer rates, and 
time and credits necessary to achieve a degree.168 CCA recommends 
that states generate common definitions for certain metrics terms, 
such as “remedial education courses.”169 The technical guide to the 
common metrics also lists disciplines and defines which categories of 
courses fall into each discipline.170 By beginning this process of 
common definitions, states are already taking steps toward a more 
coordinated and cooperative system. Other key examples of 
harmonization efforts in the U.S. include the Association of 
American Colleges and Universities’ Liberal Education and America’s 
Promise (LEAP) initiative,171 the Lumina Foundation’s Tuning USA 
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project,172 and the Common Core State Standards Initiative, which is 
also a project of the NGA.173 
Through these programs, the U.S. demonstrated a strong 
capacity to create common terminology, standards, and qualification 
frameworks. These programs also demonstrate that, on a state and 
regional level, certain common classifications already exist despite the 
absence of formal measures. 
IV. COMING TOGETHER: CONSIDERATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. What We Measure Signals What We Value174 
International soft governance can help unify national policies, 
but often at the price of transparency and accountability found in the 
policies of a legitimate, binding authority.175 In the U.S., higher 
education institutions and organizations are accustomed to dealing 
with the federal government on a voluntary basis.176 Over time 
federal power in K-12 education has expanded, requiring increased 
cooperation on the local and state levels.177 Similar to international 
organizations’ influence over national education policies, the U.S. 
federal government influences local and state entities that act 
relatively independently.178 In higher education, the federal 
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government uses the provision of financial aid funds to dictate 
certain requirements, thereby involving itself in higher education 
policy-making.179 This soft governance-like control allows the federal 
government to mold higher education like it molds K-12 education.180  
This is especially true when higher education policy relates to areas 
like international affairs or economic competitiveness, which are 
constitutionally assigned powers of the national government.181 
On both national and international levels, soft governance 
control can lead to the setting of norms in higher education. These 
norms might determine how we view quality of education, the value 
of particular subject areas, or the legitimacy of institutions or higher 
education structures. Moreover, specific educational practices not 
deemed valuable and legitimate by the policy-making entity may go 
unnoticed and eventually be lost. In this way, the unique 
characteristics of individual institutions, states, or nations may not 
survive an increasingly harmonized higher education system. 
Nevertheless, on an international scale nations are 
incentivized to fall in line with the harmonization process. The 
incentive may come from the international organization itself, or the 
international aspect may be an attractive shell for national policies 
that have received prior resistance but became legitimized through an 
international organization’s support.182 As the global movement 
toward harmonization continues, it is important for the U.S. to 
become an active participant in shaping the future of higher 
education. Equally important, however, is that the U.S. examine its 
own motives for participation. While the U.S. may be accustomed to 
a position of leadership, even dominance, in its foreign affairs, this 
approach is unlikely to yield positive results in an area already 
dominated by the efforts of other nations.183 
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The American harmonization measures described above 
demonstrate that the U.S.’s values correlate with those of 
international organizations. These values in the higher education 
context emphasize reaching a consensus on classification measures 
and stress accountability and transparency. Consensus, accountability, 
and transparency lend legitimacy to initiatives. 
B.  Recommendations 
At present, the U.S. has three options with regard to 
international higher education initiatives: 1) continue its policy of 
abstinence on the national level and mild participation on an 
institutional level, 2) attempt to supersede current efforts by 
generating its own qualification framework and popularizing it with 
other nations, or 3) engage cooperatively with international 
organizations as a key partner. 
1.  Options One and Two 
Given the potential benefits of participation, the first option 
is not recommended. Participation can provide a streamlined means 
for bringing students to U.S. colleges and universities, thus 
contributing to the U.S.’s competitive edge in a global economy, and 
it would allow the U.S. to be an integral part of a key area of 
international development. The second option, which calls for 
attempting to supersede current efforts with a new, perhaps blended, 
framework, is feasible. The U.S. is uniquely positioned for this 
approach because of its connection to first-world APEC and 
European nations. Specifically, the U.S. is a member nation of APEC 
and also maintains significant cultural similarities and economic links 
to European nations. Additionally, the U.S. already is heavily 
involved with the World Bank and the OECD in education research, 
which contributes to the spread of an “institutionalized world 
culture” of education.184 The U.S. and other wealthy nations produce 
the most education research, which in turn allows them to have the 
most influence on education trends.185 Most importantly for U.S. 
impact on APEC nations, western (U.S. and European) higher 
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education credentials are given the most weight and legitimacy 
around the world.186 By blending the experimental efforts in 
European and APEC nations, the U.S. could provide the missing link 
in harmonizing higher education across the globe.  
Implementing a blended harmonization framework could 
provide U.S. higher education with an opportunity for mutually 
beneficial partnerships with other nations’ higher education systems 
and individual institutions. European harmonization frameworks are 
still at an experimentation stage and have not been universally 
adopted, leaving room for U.S. influence. The U.S. system, specially 
adapted to encompass diverse institutions and function on a 
voluntary basis, is ideal for international expansion. 
The U.S., APEC, and E.U. nations have already demonstrated 
sufficiently similar guiding principles in terms of education. All three 
place a premium on global competition and preparation for the 
changing job market, as well as emphasize goals of quality and equity 
in education generally.187 The U.S. must consider all of the domestic 
veto players that might object to international participation. Adding 
an international dimension to higher education necessarily requires 
that the federal government act as liaison between the domestic and 
the international education communities.188 Through NACIQI, 
however, the federal government already has in place the beginnings 
of a representative group. Additionally, organizations like CHEA 
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have already been strengthening their international dimension in 
response to a globalizing world.189 
Because of the complexity of American higher education, a 
combined ground-up and top-down approach to development would 
be preferable. The federal and state governments, regional 
accreditors, and other stakeholders such as professional organizations 
would need to be persuaded of the necessity of framework 
development. Because effective persuasion could require significant 
time and resources, higher education organizations and accreditation 
agencies ought to develop a framework at a series of Bologna-style 
meetings. Institutions should be allowed to opt out of the framework 
to retain their independence. The federal government may consider 
offering financial incentives to institutions for participation, but this 
is not recommended. Financial incentives may present institutions 
with a false choice because they cannot in reality afford to dismiss a 
valuable funding source. Therefore, any financial incentives would 
ensure a largely top-down approach which might not reap the full 
benefits of the U.S.’s diverse higher education system. 
U.S. policymakers strive to maintain America’s leadership role 
in higher education.190 A blended global qualifications framework 
would allow the U.S. the control it needs to participate in 
international harmonization while permitting other nations to share 
and contribute to the wealth of knowledge in the U.S. However, 
there are crucial concerns over taking a leadership role. Domestically, 
one of the higher education community’s main concerns has been the 
loss of the value of a uniquely American, diverse higher education 
system. This concern could be addressed by requiring that developers 
and implementers are experts who are sensitive to the many unique 
qualities of higher education. A framework that seeks to incorporate 
the diverse higher education systems of nations around the world 
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would by necessity be broad and likely encompass the unique 
qualities of American higher education. Internationally, an American-
led framework could easily lead to the dominance of American values 
in higher education, which in turn could lead to the homogenization 
of higher education globally. These concerns should not be 
minimized and should weigh heavily in favor of U.S. involvement in 
this area. 
2.  Option Three 
The U.S. is also uniquely positioned to make a tremendous 
show of good faith to the international community by engaging 
cooperatively with international organizations as a key partner. Rather 
than taking the lead, the U.S. can take steps to join existing initiatives 
that best support its goals. With the preeminent higher education 
network in the world, the U.S. is in a position to be influential 
without being aggressive. American universities are more likely to 
attract top students from around the world and influence the higher 
education of other nations.191 The U.S. manages to combine both 
quality and quantity of universities, while maintaining an atmosphere 
of academic freedom and freedom of expression that fosters diversity 
and growth.192 Significant time and resources would be necessary to 
emulate this approach in other nations.193 
The benefits of an American cooperative effort with other 
higher education systems are plentiful. By demonstrating a 
willingness to compromise, cooperate, and contribute our nation’s 
strengths to a global system, the U.S. makes a show of good faith to 
the world that could be invaluable in future international relations. 
Additionally, other participating nations are aided by increased 
mobility to the U.S. for students and educated workers. With 
increased mobility, students from all nations have the opportunity to 
learn skills and different perspectives abroad that can contribute to 
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the human capital at home. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized 
the importance of diversity in higher education for contributing to a 
“robust exchange of ideas.”194 
The same parallels between the U.S. and other nations that 
support the feasibility of an American-led blended framework can 
also support the feasibility of U.S. cooperation with other nations and 
international organizations. Because this is an equally viable 
alternative to taking the reins of international initiatives, the next step 
should be significant investigation on the part of U.S. policymakers 
into the will and capacity in the U.S. for harmonization. Research 
should focus on joint studies with key players like the E.U. and 
APEC. The U.S. should consider how countries outside of APEC 
and the E.U., especially South American and African nations, could 
fit into the new scheme. Additionally, research into a future 
framework should reflect a growing movement toward massive open 
online courses (MOOCs) and the potential for the traditional 
structures of higher education to be revolutionized as a result of the 
internet. Armed with knowledge, the U.S. will be better equipped to 
choose an appropriate approach to the international higher education 
of the future. 
Technology and increased mobility have contributed to 
greater interaction between national economies, politics, and cultures. 
As a leader in higher education, the U.S. is in a position of influence 
for the future of international higher education mobility initiatives. 
Participation and leadership in this as yet unsettled area of higher 
education should be a part of a broader push to revolutionize higher 
education through technology and a global perspective. Higher 
education institutions should not fear losing their unique 
characteristics in the face of globalization, as part of this broader 
push should include enhancing the connection between institutions 
and their surrounding communities to combat the pull of 
homogenization. Higher education must bear the tension inherent in 
globalization between viewing other nations as competitors or as 
respected, equal partners. Though controversial, globalization can 
occur peacefully and bring positive change if nations are willing to 
proceed thoughtfully and are open to compromise. The U.S. should 
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be training a generation of empathetic leaders for a globalized world, 
and the efficient movement of students across borders is crucial to 
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARAB SPRING: 
HOW SHARI’AH LAW AND THE 
EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION WILL IMPACT 
IP PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Stephen S. Zimowski* 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 11, 2011, thousands of Egyptians in Tahrir 
Square celebrated Hosni Mubarak’s departure and, with him, thirty 
years of rule by an oppressive regime.1 While Egyptians celebrated, 
political commentators considered the impact of the Egyptian 
revolution on peace in the Middle East.2 Some feared that an extreme 
sect of Islamic fundamentalists might be behind the revolution and 
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Affairs editorial staff for their editorial contributions to this comment. 
1 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps 
Down, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/ 
world/middleeast/12egypt.html?pagewanted=all.  
2 E.g., Douglas Bloomfield, Will Egypt’s Revolution Trample the Peace Process?, 
JERUSALEM POST, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id= 
206445 (last updated Feb. 2, 2011); Jennifer Rubin, Egypt’s Revolution Has Nothing to 
Do with Israel, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost. 
com/right-turn/2011/02/egypt_has_nothing_to_do_with_i.html; Jack Shenker, 
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pondered the impact of replacing the “Arab world’s first secular 
dictatorship”3 with a traditionalist regime, likening Egypt to Iran 
thirty years before.4 
Egypt’s pivotal role in maintaining stability in the Middle East 
over the last forty years makes its current instability a source of 
trepidation for  and businesspersons.5 This comment addresses these 
concerns relating to intellectual property (IP) rights under Islamic 
law.6 Section II defines the IP protection requirements of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) under the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and examines the 
sources and schools of Islamic jurisprudence.7 Section II also 
considers the harmony between a nation’s obligations under the 
TRIPs agreement and Islamic law.8 Section III expands upon Egypt’s 
role in international business and policy, including its membership in 
the WTO and ratification of the TRIPs agreement.9 In addition, 
Section III compares the implementation of IP protection in Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia, the former a secular Islamic nation and the latter a 
more traditionalist regime.10 Section IV addresses the application of a 
secular or traditionalist approach under Egypt’s new government, and 
how either could affect IP rights.11 
                                                 
3 Kirkpatrick, supra note 1. 
4 See, e.g., Richard Allen Greene, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: A Force to be 
Feared?, CNN (Jan. 31, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-31/world/egypt.mu 
slim.brotherhood_1_egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-ayman-nour-protests?_s=PM:W 
ORLD; Michael Slackman, Islamist Group is Rising Force in a New Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 2011, at A1. 
5 See The Global Fallout from the Middle East Crisis, BUS. STANDARD (Mar. 
14, 2011, 6:44 AM), http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/the-global-
fallout-frommiddle-east-crisis/428442/. 
6 The author uses Islamic Law in the sense of governmental application 
of the principles of the Shari’ah as applied to the nation’s system of justice. Islamic 
law and Shari’ah law are used interchangeably throughout this comment. 
7 See discussion infra Parts II.A-B. 
8 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
9 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
10 See discussion infra Parts III.A-B. 
11 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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This comment concludes that IP rights find substantial 
protection in Islamic nations.12 Many Islamic law nations have 
implemented IP protection laws and have become members of the 
WTO.13 Commentators concerned about the future of IP rights in 
Egypt can remain confident that changes in Egypt’s governmental 
structure will not substantially affect its IP protection scheme.14 
II. IP, TRIPS, AND ISLAMIC LAW 
To competently discuss IP rights under Islamic law, one must 
understand the nature of Islamic jurisprudence and the role of IP 
rights in international trade. This section explores the requirements 
imposed upon WTO member nations under the TRIPs agreement, 
the sources and schools of Islamic law, and the interaction of Islamic 
jurisprudence and IP protection. This section concludes with a 
discussion of the Islamic law of contracts and the role international 
treaties play in Islamic lawmaking. 
A. TRIPs 
In 1986, in an extended negotiation known as the Uruguay 
Round, members of the international community considered creating 
a global trade organization.15 The goal was to stabilize international 
trade by improving the established guidelines of the 1947 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947).16 The Uruguay 
Round’s conclusion in 1994 established the WTO along with several 
binding agreements for WTO member nations.17 The TRIPs 
                                                 
12 See infra Part V. 
13 See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://wto. 
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Jul. 23, 2008). 
14 See discussion infra Part IV. 
15 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO 
Agreement], http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
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agreement defines the minimal IP protection required of WTO 
members.18 
The TRIPs agreement is split into seven parts.19 Part I 
provides the basic principles of the agreement, requiring a nation to 
provide non-nationals with IP protection equal to that afforded 
nationals.20 Part II provides specific protection requirements for 
copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets, among others.21  
Part III requires a signatory nation to implement domestic laws for 
the enforcement of IP right and remedies for IP infringement.22 Parts 
IV through VII discuss IP related procedures, dispute resolution, and 
other signatory arrangements.23 
Specifically, the TRIPs agreement requires that copyright 
protection be extended to literary and artistic works in all forms, 
including books, pamphlets, lectures, musical compilations, 
choreographic works, drawings, paintings, sculptures, architecture, 
and maps.24 The agreement also adds computer programs to the list 
of protected copyright media and requires that the author be afforded 
protection for at least fifty years.25 In addition, the TRIPs agreement 
requires that patent protection be available for products or processes 
that “are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application.”26 However, the agreement permits a nation to exclude 
protection for certain medical methods and other inventions 
                                                 
18 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs 
Agreement], http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm. 
19 See id. 
20 Id. arts. 1-8. 
21 Id. arts. 9-40. 
22 Id. arts. 41-61. 
23 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, arts. 62-73. 
24 See id. art. 9. Article nine implements the requirements of the Berne 
Convention, which protects the listed media. Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris on July 24, 
1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 [hereinafter Berne Convention],  http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html. 
25 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, arts. 10, 12. 
26 Id. art. 27. 
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“necessary to protect ordre public or morality.”27 Inventors must be 
afforded at least twenty years of patent protection under the TRIPs 
agreement.28 
The TRIPs agreement also requires trademark protection be 
provided for signs and symbols “capable of distinguishing [] goods 
and services.”29 Third parties may not use an identical or similar mark 
for identical or similar business activities if such use would cause a 
“likelihood of confusion” for consumers.30 Adhering nations must 
create a system for trademark registration, and registration must be 
indefinitely renewable for terms of at least seven years.31 Finally, the 
TRIPs agreement requires protection of trade secrets, defined as 
information (1) that is “not . . . generally known among or readily 
accessible to” competitors, (2) that “has commercial value because it 
is secret,” and (3) for which the holder of the information has taken 
steps to keep it secret.32 
Some commentators criticize the TRIPs agreement for its 
adverse effect on developing countries.33 Others34 assert that IP 
protection in developing nations increases innovative activities and 
foreign investment, thereby benefiting developing economies.35 What 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 Id. art. 33. 
29 Id. art. 15. 
30 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 16. 
31 Id. arts. 15, 18. 
32 Id. art. 39. 
33 E.g., Sean Pager, TRIPS: A Link Too Far? A Proposal for Procedural 
Restraints on Regulatory Linkage in the WTO, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 215, 
221-22 (2006) (asserting that the WTO has over-exercised its authority by enacting 
affirmative regulations on member nations); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 
10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 370-71 (2006) (arguing that the TRIPs 
agreement needs reform to advance the agenda of developing nations). 
34 Supporters of the TRIPs agreement are, for the most part, pundits of 
developed nations that benefit from the international enforcement of IP rights. 
35 See Danielle Tully, Prospects for Progress: The TRIPS Agreement and 
Developing Countries After the DOHA Conference, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 
137 (2003). 
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is clear is that any nation wishing to benefit from membership in the 
WTO must enact IP laws in accordance with the TRIPs agreement.36 
B. Islamic Jurisprudence 
This section explores the primary and secondary sources of 
Islamic law and the four schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence: 
Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanbali.37 The sources of Islamic law and 
the schools of jurisprudence require concurrent discussion because 
each school uses different terminology to reflect similar principles.38 
Accordingly, discussion of a source is difficult without also 
referencing the related school. 
1. Sources of Islamic Law 
The Qur’an and the Sunnah (and Hadith) are the primary 
sources of Islamic law.39 The Qur’an is the word of Allah as spoken 
to the prophet Muhammad.40 Because the Qur’an is the highest 
source of law under Shari’ah, no other source may contradict its 
principles.41 The Sunnah is a recording of the manner and practice of 
the Prophet Muhammad’s life and provides a guide for Muslim 
behavior.42 Similarly, Hadith refers to the recorded sayings and 
opinions that the Prophet Muhammad verbalized during his life as 
well as his approval or disapproval of activities he witnessed.43  
                                                 
36 See WTO Agreement, supra note 15; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18. 
37 M. Charif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources, 
Interpretation, and Rule-Making, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 142 n.18 
(2002). 
38 See Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of its Origin and 
Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27, 57 (2002) (noting the different Arabic 
terms meaning interpretation in the public interest).  
39 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 37, at 139. 
40 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 45. 
41 Silvia Beltrametti, The Legality of Intellectual Property Rights under Islamic 
Law, in THE PRAGUE YEARBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 2009 55, 59 (Mach, T. et 
al. eds., 2010), http://www.digitalislam.eu/article.do?articleId=2729. 
42 Id. at 60. 
43 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 46-47. 
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Islamic scholars use the Sunnah and Hadith in combination to 
provide the second primary source of Shari’ah law.44 
Where the principles of the Qur’an and Sunnah do not 
adequately adjudicate a legal issue, Islamic scholars and jurists use 
Fiqh45 —the process of deducing and applying Shari’ah principles—
to reach a legal determination.46 The methodologies of Fiqh are 
numerous, and it is in the application of Fiqh that the several schools 
of Shari’ah diverge.47 However, all four schools recognize the 
fundamental methodologies of Ijma and Qiyas: reasoning by 
consensus and analogy, respectively.48 
Ijma is a consensus regarding the interpretation or application 
of Shari’ah.49 Where Islamic scholars or members of the community 
reach a consensus regarding a legal issue, their interpretation receives 
deference for future generations.50 This legal principle is not 
dissimilar to stare decisis51 under American common law.  All schools 
of Shari’ah recognize the consensus of the Sahaba (followers of the 
Prophet Muhammad); however, not all schools recognize the 
consensus of scholars from later eras.52 
Qiyas is reasoning by analogy.53 Each individual necessarily 
reasons by analogy in reaching a consensus.54 Because Ijma represents 
                                                 
44 Id. at 47. 
45 This term can also be used in reference to the collective body of laws 
arising from Fiqh. Id. at 36. However, for the purposes of this comment, Fiqh is 
used in reference to the method of reasoning. 
46 Id. at 36. 
47 See id. at 54-58; Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 37, at 140-41. 
48 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 73. 
49 Id. at 54-55. 
50 Id. 
51 Latin in origin, stare decisis means “to stand by things decided.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009). The legal doctrine in American 
common law requires judges to follow the precedent set by previous courts. Id. 
Stare decisis helps to ensure that society can rely on court decisions to guide future 
behavior, an important aspect of a common law legal system. See id. 
52 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 55-56. 
53 Id. at 56. 
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the consensus of several individuals reasoning by analogy, Islamic 
scholars grant Ijma greater authority in the hierarchy of Fiqh 
methodology.55 The schools of jurisprudence differ in the level of 
authority provided by Qiyas as well as their willingness to engage in 
the methodology.56 
Although there are numerous other Fiqh methodologies,57 
this comment additionally considers only Istislah. The term used to 
represent this methodology varies by school,58 but the principle 
invoked is interpretation in the public interest.59 Like public policy 
considerations in American common law, Islamic jurists use Istislah 
to establish legal doctrines and reach legal determinations where the 
other methodologies fall short.60 
2. Schools of Islamic Law 
The four Sunni61 schools of Islamic jurisprudence—each 
named after the founding scholar of its methodological principles62 
—are Hanbali, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanafi.63 Each school differs in its 
application of Fiqh, either by recognizing different doctrines, by 
                                                 
54 All secondary sources provide legal principles in the absence of 
primary source authority. In reaching a consensus, therefore, each individual uses 
an analogy to a primary source principle and agrees on the legal result. See id. at 56. 
55 Id. 
56 For example, Hanbali scholars employ Qiyas only as a last resort. Id. at 
73. 
57 For a discussion of additional Fiqh methods such as Istihab—
presumption of continuity, Urf—local custom, and Ijtihad—individual reasoning, 
see Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 58-59. 
58 Istislah is known as Istihsan in the Hanafi School and Masalih Al-
Mursalah in the Maliki School.  Id. at 57. 
59 Id. 
60 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 38, at 158-59. 
61 The Jafari School is an additional Shiite school of jurisprudence.  
Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 74. Because the nations discussed herein are 
predominantly Sunni, this comment does not discuss the Shiite school. 
62 Id. at 67-68. 
63 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 37, at 142 n.18. 
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giving greater or lesser authority to them, or by applying them 
differently.64 
Hanbali is the school from which Saudi scholars base their 
system of methodology and reasoning.65 The Hanbali School uses a 
more literal interpretation of the primary sources.66 Additionally, 
Hanbali scholars recognize Ijma (consensus) only of the Sahaba67 and 
refuse to apply Ijma to subsequent eras because of the divergence of 
thought.68 Finally, Hanbali scholars seldom undertake Istislah and 
resort to Qiyas only as a last resort.69 
The Shafii School is the predominant school in Egypt and 
throughout the western regions of the Middle East.70 Shafii, the 
school’s founder, is credited with the initial “systemiz[ation] of the 
fundamental principles of Fiqh.”71 Shafii scholars entirely reject 
Istislah and undertake Qiyas only to the extent a legitimate analogy 
can be drawn.72 Shafii scholars accept Ijma of the Sahaba as well as 
other eras, separating themselves from Hanbali scholars.73 
Many commentators regard the Maliki School as the most 
moderate of the four schools because it permits methods of 
interpretation beyond those of the other three.74 In interpreting 
Shari’ah, Maliki scholars place special emphasis on the historical 
custom and practices of the Medina75 people who lived among the 
Prophet Muhammad during the final ten years of his life.76 In fact, 
                                                 
64 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 70-75. 
65 Id. at 72. 
66 Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 63. 
67 The Sahaba were the followers of the Prophet Muhammad. Abdal-
Haqq, supra note 38, at 55. 
68 Id. at 73. 
69 Id. at 72-73. 
70 Id. at 71. 
71 Id. 
72 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 72. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 71. 
75 Medina is a city in what is now Saudi Arabia. It is the center of the 
Maliki School and was the home of the Prophet Muhammad for the final ten years 
of his life.  Id. at 70-71. 
76 Id. 
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Maliki scholars place those customs above Ijma, Qiyas, and Istislah 
on the Fiqh hierarchy.77 The Maliki School is found predominantly 
throughout northern and western Africa, including parts of northern 
Egypt.78 
Hanafi is the final Sunni school of Islamic jurisprudence. It is 
prevalent throughout the central region of the Middle East, including 
Jordan and some parts of Egypt.79 Like Maliki scholars, Hanafi 
scholars interpret Shari’ah based on local customs and practices.80  
However, unlike Maliki scholars, Hanafi scholars consider custom 
only after interpretation through Ijma, Qiyas and Istislah fails to 
provide a suitable resolution.81 The Hanafi School tends to be more 
moderate in its interpretation and application of Shari’ah.82 
Because each of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
interprets Shari’ah differently, laws in Islamic nations can vary 
substantially.83 To appreciate these differences, it is helpful to 
understand the Islamic schools of jurisprudence and their varying 
applications of the Fiqh methodologies. 
C. Islamic Law’s Effect on IP Protection 
After the discussion of Islamic jurisprudence above, this 
Section briefly explores the effect of Shari’ah on IP laws and the 
                                                 
77 Abdal-Haqq, supra note38, at 71. 
78 Id. at 70-71; Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 62. 
79 Id. at 69; Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 62. 
80 Id. at 70. 
81 Id. 
82 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 63. 
83 For example, family law and criminal law issues are often dependent 
on the interpretation of Shari’ah employed in a region, as are human rights 
considerations. Compare Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Honor Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment 
Under Islamic and Jordanian Criminal Law, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 251 (2004) 
(discussing certain Jordan laws relating to human rights), with Frank E. Vogel, The 
Trial of Terrorists Under Classical Islamic Law, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (2002) 
(comparing differences in treatment of criminals in various Islamic nations); see also 
Katherine M. Weaver, Women’s Rights and Shari’a Law: A Workable Reality? An 
Examination of Possible International Human Rights Approaches Through The Continuing 
Reform of the Pakistani Hudood Ordinance, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 483 (2007) 
(discussing the plight of woman under the law in some Islamic nations). 
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requirements under the TRIPs agreement. Because the primary 
sources of Shari’ah do not explicitly support IP rights, an Islamic 
lawmaker must rely on Fiqh methodologies to justify IP protection.84 
There is substantial support for protecting personal property rights 
under Shari’ah; protecting IP rights follows naturally by analogy. 
Personal property rights derive from both the Sunnah85 and the 
Qur’an: “And among His Signs Is . . . the quest that ye (Make for 
livelihood),”86 recognizing the acquisition of property through 
personal undertakings.87 Whether through research, composition, 
ingenuity or some combination thereof, IP, like personal property, 
derives from the efforts of the discoverer. The same justifications for 
tangible personal property rights therefore extend to intangible IP 
rights.88 
Neither of the primary sources (the Qur’an and the Sunnah) 
limits its discussion of property to tangible property.89 This fact is 
important because scholars employ Fiqh reasoning only for 
clarification when the primary sources are silent or ambiguous.90 
Some scholars interpret the silence of the primary sources on this 
issue to be a rejection of intangible property rights.91 However, this 
interpretation conflicts with the generally accepted practice of 
                                                 
84 See generally Steven D. Jamar, The Protection of Intellectual Property Under 
Islamic Law, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 1079 (1992) (asserting that Shari’ah is silent on IP 
rights); Beltrametti, supra note 41 (arguing that Shari’ah supports IP rights, however 
does so through principles of Fiqh interpretation outside the primary sources). 
85 Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 65 (quoting Translation of Sahih Muslim, 
Book 7, The Book of Pilgrimage (Kitab Al-Hajj) ch. 17, No.2803) (asserting that 
recognition of personal property can be found in the recorded words of 
Muhammad: “[Y]our property are as sacred and inviolable as the sacredness of this 
day of yours.”). 
86 Qur’an, 30:23. 
87 See Jamar, supra note 84, at 1083 (“The act of making unproductive 
land productive, of using something unused, creates ownership.”). 
88 See id. at 1086 (arguing that, at worst, Islamic jurisprudence is silent on 
protecting IP, and IP rights may be specifically supported through the 
methodologies of Shari’ah interpretation); see generally Beltrametti, supra note 41 
(exploring the relationship between IP law and Shari’ah). 
89 See Qur’an, 30:23; Jamar, supra note 84, at 1083; Beltrametti, supra note 
41, at 65-66. 
90 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 37, at 140. 
91 See Jamar, supra note 84, at 1085. 
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applying Fiqh to “fill in the gaps” left by the primary sources.92  
Drawing an analogy between tangible and intangible property is 
consistent with accepted methods of Shari’ah interpretation.93 
Certain schools of Islamic jurisprudence are more likely to 
draw such an analogy.94 Scholars of the Hanbali and Shafii Schools 
disfavor Qiyas (reasoning by analogy) and instead prefer a literal 
translation of the primary sources.95 By contrast, scholars of the 
Maliki and Hanafi Schools apply Qiyas more liberally and are likely to 
accept IP as analogous to personal property.96 Support for IP laws 
may therefore depend on the prevailing practice of the region, at least 
insofar as support depends upon interpretation through Qiyas. 
Istislah (public interest) further supports protecting IP rights.  
There are significant benefits, both economic and societal, in 
providing IP protection.97 Recognizing IP rights allows innovators to 
profit from their ingenuity.98 The financial benefits encourage further 
innovation and technological advances,99 in turn improving quality of 
life.100 
                                                 
92 Id. at 1082. 
93 Note that there is some support in historical Islamic jurisprudence for 
recognizing intangible property. Id. at 1085 (“[O]ne does not amputate the hand of 
a thief for stealing a book because the thief’s intention is not to steal the book as 
paper, but the ideas in the book . . . .  [T]his particular rule is not Quranic, does not 
come from the traditions, is not based on consensus, and is not from the qiyas type 
of reasoning.  That is, this rule comes from a commentary on the law written by a 
prominent jurist.”).  
94 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
95 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 69-74. 
96 See id. 
97 See generally Intellectual Capital and Intellectual Property, KLM, INC. MGMT. 
CONSULTATION (Jul. 1, 2011), http://klminc.com/intellectual-capital/intellectual-
capital-and-intellectual-property (discussing the assessment of the value of a 
business’s intellectual property). 
98 See id. (“On average, in successful organizations Brands, Intellectual 
Property, and other Intangible Assets are two to three times the value of physical 
assets.”). 
99 Why Intellectual Property Matters, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www. 
state.gov/e/eb/tpp/ipe/why/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
100 Id. 
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Some scholars argue that IP protection harms the public 
interest. “If public interest is drawn too broadly and too powerfully, 
it can be [used] to remove protections for IP on the grounds that the 
whole society has need of or could benefit by unrestricted use of the 
item.”101 Pharmaceutical patents present the most obvious support 
for this proposition. 
The owner of a pharmaceutical patent has a monopoly over 
the medication’s production.102 With complete control over 
production, the patent owner can manipulate both the price and 
supply of the medication.  Such manipulation can result in high prices 
and limited supply, which together harm public health.103 
Accordingly, developing countries often advocate against 
pharmaceutical patent protection.104 In response, many developed 
countries have argued that pharmaceutical patents incentivize drug 
development, improving health care overall.105 
Furthering the pharmaceutical patent debate’s importance is 
the WTO’s requirement under the TRIPs agreement that member 
nations enact laws protecting pharmaceutical patents.106 If Islamic law 
                                                 
101 Jamar, supra note 84, at 1090-91. 
102 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 28 (“A patent shall confer on its 
owner the following exclusive rights . . . to prevent third parties not having the 
owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, [or] selling . . . 
[the patented] product.”). 
103 For example, the petitioning of Pfizer Inc. to reduce the price of its 
AIDS treatment drug Diflucan for use in high-risk, poor countries has resulted in 
about forty-seven percent of those infected receiving treatment. See Kate Kelland, 
HIV Numbers Hit New High as AIDS Drugs Save Lives, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2011, 
6:21 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/21/us-aids-global-unaids-idU 
STRE7AK0KX20111121. 
104 See Jonathan Lynn, Developing Countries Form Intellectual Property Group, 
REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2010, 10:11 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/04/26/id 
INIndia-48011820100426 (reporting the dissatisfaction of developing countries 
with many IP schemes because they “deprive poor people of access to essential 
medicines”). 
105 See id. (noting the assertion by developed countries that “strong [IP] 
rights are needed to encourage invention”). 
106 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 70 (requiring laws enacting 
“patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products 
commensurate with [the member nation’s] obligations under Article 27”); but cf. 
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 27 (“Members may exclude from patentability 
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prohibits pharmaceutical patent protection, Islamic nations would be 
ineligible for WTO membership.107 Due to these concerns, WTO 
members are currently engaged in negotiations concerning 
pharmaceutical patent protection requirements under the TRIPs 
agreement.108 To date, the WTO has not reached a resolution.109 
Indeed, the implications of this debate on Islamic nations 
could be severe. If lawmakers employing Istislah believe 
pharmaceutical patent protection harms the public interest, they may 
refuse to accept the TRIPs agreement110 and reject WTO 
membership.111 This result is surprising given the reputation of 
moderation enjoyed by Shari’ah scholars willing to engage in Istislah 
in comparison to their unwilling counterparts.112 
Scholars of the Shafii and Hanbali Schools rarely engage in 
Istislah;113 in fact, Shafii Scholars outright reject the methodology.114  
In part because of their reluctance to employ Istislah, many 
commentators believe the Shafii and Hanbali Schools to be more 
traditionalist than the Maliki and Hanafi Schools.115 However, 
lawmakers guided by the Shafii and Hanbali Schools who disfavor 
                                                 
inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of 
which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, 
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by their law.”).  
107 If a nation refuses to implement IP protection, they cannot adopt the 
TRIPs agreement and are therefore ineligible for WTO membership. See supra Part 
II.A. 
108 The Doha Round, or Doha Development Agenda, is designed to 
address the concerns of developing WTO members.  See The Doha Round, WORLD 
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm#develop 
ment (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
109 See Paige McClanahan, Doha Round Trade Talks – Explainer, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 3, 2012, 5:17 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/ 
sep/03/doha-round-trade-talks-explainer. 
110 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 70 (requiring a WTO 
member nation to protect pharmaceutical patents). 
111 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
112 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 71; Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 63. 
113 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 72-73. 
114 Id. 
115 See id. at 71; Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 63. 
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interpreting Shari’ah in the public interest will not encounter the 
pharmaceutical patent debate and will therefore have no compelling 
argument for rejecting IP rights. 
Overall, Fiqh methodology tends to support recognizing IP 
rights. Nevertheless, Shari’ah law does not compel such 
recognition.116 Islamic lawmakers might therefore reject the 
arguments supporting IP rights, leaving them to determine the 
wisdom of undertaking IP protection statutorily and without 
significant guidance from Shari’ah. 
D. Contracting to Protect IP Rights 
Many considerations will influence the decisions of Islamic 
lawmakers. These influences include international trade, where 
treaties with foreign nations can significantly benefit an Islamic 
nation’s economy.117 International treaties represent binding 
contractual agreements between two or more nations.118 
Islamic law commands individuals to uphold their obligations 
under contractual agreements.119 Likewise, Islamic nations must fulfill 
their contractual agreements.120 In fact, the Qur’an explicitly compels 
practitioners to honor both contractual agreements121 and treaties.122 
Therefore, if an Islamic nation enters an international agreement to 
                                                 
116 See generally Jamar, supra note 84 (asserting that Shari’ah is silent on IP 
law); Beltrametti, supra note 41 (arguing that Shari’ah supports IP law, however 
does so through principles of interpretation outside the primary sources). 
117 See, e.g., Jordan: GDP (Purchase Power Parity), INDEX MUNDI, http:// 
www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=jo&v=65 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (stating 
that Jordan’s GDP has more than doubled since 1999, which is the same period 
Jordan began reforms in IP law, joined the WTO, and entered the US-Jordan 
FTA). 
118 Frederick L. Kirgis, Treaties as Binding International Obligation, AM. SOC’Y 
OF INT’L LAW (May 1997), http://www.asil.org/insight9.cfm. 
119 Qur’an 5:1. 
120 Jamar, supra note 84, at 1087. 
121 Qur’an 5:1 (“O ye who believe!  Fulfill (all) obligations.”). 
122 Qur’an 9:4 (“(But the treaties are) not dissolved with those Pagans 
with whom ye have entered into alliance and who have not subsequently failed you 
in aught, nor aided any one against you.  So fulfill your engagements with them to 
the end of their term: for Allah loveth the righteous.”). 
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protect IP rights, it is obligated to enact laws in accordance with that 
treaty’s provisions. 
Shari’ah interpretation undoubtedly plays a significant role in 
the legal decisions of any Islamic nation. Lawmakers may differ with 
respect to Fiqh methodologies and may debate whether Shari’ah 
supports IP protection.123 However, there is little, if any, support for 
prohibiting IP protection.124 If an Islamic nation contracts to protect 
IP rights through an international treaty or some other agreement, it 
must fulfill its contractual obligations.125 
III. IP UNDER ISLAMIC LAW: JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND PRE-
REVOLUTION EGYPT 
Shari’ah interpretation varies considerably among Islamic 
jurists.126 Consequently, Islamic lawmaking can be unpredictable.  
This section considers the effects of two separate implementations of 
Shari’ah: the secular approach, taken in the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan (Jordan), and the traditionalist approach, taken in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Saudi Arabia). Additionally, this section 
reviews IP law in Egypt under the Mubarak regime and sets the stage 
for a discussion on the future of IP protection in Egypt. 
A. IP Protection in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
By enacting new laws and regulations, Jordan has substantially 
expanded its IP protection over the past fifteen years.127 As a result, 
IP rights now find significant protection in the Hashemite kingdom. 
                                                 
123 See discussion supra Parts II.B-C. 
124 See generally Beltrametti, supra note 41; Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38; 
Jamar, supra note 84. 
125 See infra Part III.C. 
126 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
127 E.g., Law No. 9 of 2006 (Trade Names), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 2 Feb. 
2006 (Jordan); Law No. 9 of 2005 (Amending the Copyright Protection Law), Al-
Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 21 Feb. 2005 (Jordan); Law No. 28 of 2007 (Amending the 
Patents Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 31 Mar. 2007 (Jordan). Each of these laws can 
be found at  http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO. 
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Jordan’s legal system combines Islamic law with a civil code 
adopted from and similar to many European countries.128 The 
Jordanian Constitution of 1953 establishes “an independent 
sovereign Arab State” and a “parliamentary [system] with a hereditary 
monarchy.”129 Although the Constitution adopts Islam as the state 
religion,130 Article 14 provides for freedom of religion.131 However, 
this provision is limited to the “exercise of all forms of worship and 
religious rites in accordance with the customs observed in the 
Kingdom, unless such exercise is inconsistent with public order or 
morality.”132 Despite the constitutional declaration of religious 
tolerance, Jordan prohibits conversion from Islam and provides that 
the king must be a member of the Islamic faith.133 In effect, Islam 
remains a substantial influence on Jordan’s legal system. 
Given Islam’s influence, Jordan’s interpretation of Shari’ah is 
critical to its implementation of IP protection. As discussed 
previously, Jordanian lawmakers predominantly follow the Hanafi 
School of Shari’ah interpretation.134 Hanafi scholars’ emphasis on 
Qiyas (analogy) and Istislah (public interest) provide significant 
support for IP rights.135 An array of recently enacted Jordanian laws 
reflects this support. These laws protect patents,136 copyrights,137 
                                                 
128 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 69. 
129 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN Jan. 
8, 1952, art. 1, [hereinafter CONSTITUTION OF JORDAN], http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=9789. 
130 Id. art. 2. 
131 Id. art. 14. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. art. 28(e) (“No person shall ascend the Throne unless he is a 
Moslem . . .”); see also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, JULY-DECEMBER, 2010 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
REPORT (Jordan) (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/ 
168267.htm (“[T]he government’s application of Sharia infringes upon the religious 
rights and freedoms laid out in the constitution by prohibiting conversion from 
Islam and discriminating against religious minorities in some matters.”).  
134 See supra Part II.B.2. 
135 See supra Part II.C. 
136 Law No. 32 of 1999 (Patents), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 20 Sept. 1999 
(Jordan); Law No. 28 of 2007 (Amending the Patents Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 31 
Mar. 2007 (Jordan). Each of these laws can be found at http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO. 
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trademarks,138 trade names,139 trade secrets,140 plant varieties,141 
integrated circuits,142 and industrial designs.143 
Not surprisingly, Jordan’s IP law reformation coincides with 
its entry into the WTO and its adoption of the TRIPs agreement.144 
Notably, the current patent statute protects pharmaceutical patents 
after its amendment in 2001.145 In addition to WTO membership, 
                                                 
137 Law No. 22 of 1992 (Protection of Copyright and its Amendments) 
Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 19 Mar. 1992 (Jordan); Law No. 88 of 2003 (Amending the 
Copyright Protection Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 30 Sept. 2003 (Jordan); Law No. 8 
of 2005 (Amending the Copyright Protection Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 21 Feb. 
2005 (Jordan); Law No. 9 of 2005 (Amending the Copyright Protection Law), Al-
Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 21 Feb. 2005 (Jordan). Each of these laws can be found at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO. 
138 Law No. 33 of 1952 (Trademarks), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 20 May 1952 
(Jordan); Law No. 19 of 1953 (Marks of Goods with its Amendments), Al-Jarida 
Al-Rasmiya, 16 Feb. 1953 (Jordan); Law No. 34 of 1999 (Amending the Trademarks 
Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 22 Sept. 1999 (Jordan); Law No. 29 of 2007 (Amending 
the Trademarks Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 31 Mar. 2007 (Jordan); Law No. 15 of 
2008 (Amending the Trademarks Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 11 Mar. 2008 
(Jordan). Each of these laws can be found at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ 
profile.jsp?code=JO. 
139 Law No. 9 of 2006 (Trade Names), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 2 Feb. 2006 
(Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO. 
140 Law No. 15 of 2000 (Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets), Al-Jarida 
Al-Rasmiya, 2 May 2000 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp? 
code=JO. 
141 Law No. 24 of 2000 (Protection of New Varieties of Plants), Al-Jarida 
Al-Rasmiya, 11 June 2000 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp? 
code=JO. 
142 Law No. 10 of 2000 (Protection of Layout-Designs of Integrated 
Circuits), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 14 Feb 2000 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex 
/en/profile.jsp?code=JO. 
143 Law No. 14 of 2000 (Industrial Designs and Models), Al-Jarida Al-
Rasmiya, 24 Feb. 2000 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp? 
code=JO. 
144 Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Jul. 23, 2008). 
145 Temporary Law No. 71 of 2001 (Amending Patents Law), Al-Jarida 
Al-Rasmiya, 9 Oct. 2001 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp? 
code=JO. 
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Jordan signed a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the United 
States146 (US-Jordan FTA) in 2000.147 
Jordan’s recent ingress into the international trade arena 
coincides with the rise of King Abdullah II (Abdullah) in 1999.148 
Jordan’s GDP has more than doubled from sixteen billion in 1999 to 
an estimated thirty-four billion in 2010, reflecting economic progress 
as a result of the Abdullah administration’s secular approach to 
international politics and trade.149 Assuming the Abdullah 
administration retains power, Jordan’s secular approach to IP 
protection will likely continue.150 
Jordan’s recently enacted legislation reflects lawmakers’ belief 
that Islamic law supports IP rights.151 Further demonstrating this 
belief, Jordanian lawmakers have adopted a number of IP-related 
international treaties,152 including the WIPO Copyright Treaty,153 the 
Berne Convention,154 and the Paris Convention.155 
                                                 
146 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 
4, 2000, 41 I.L.M 63 [hereinafter USJ FTA], http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agree 
ments/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005607.asp. 
147 Mohammad El Said, Jordan, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAWS, 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Jordan-1, Jordan-24 (Roger Blanpain & 
Hendrick Vanhees eds., 2005). 
148 Id. at 23. 
149 Jordan: GDP (Purchase Power Parity), INDEX MUNDI, http://www.index 
mundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=jo&v=65 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
150 See generally Ranya Kadri & Ethan Bronner, Government of Jordan is 
Dismissed by the King, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at A8, http://www.nytimes.com/20 
11/10/18/world/middleeast/king-abdullah-ii-of-jordan-fires-his-government.html 
(facing political pressure and accusations of slowing political change, King 
Abdullah II fired his prime minister and members of his administration). 
151 E.g., Law No. 28 of 2007 (Amending the Patents Law), Al-Jarida Al-
Rasmiya, 31 Mar. 2007 (Jordan); Law No. 9 of 2005 (Amending the Copyright 
Protection Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 21 Feb. 2005 (Jordan); Law No. 15 of 2008 
(Amending the Trademarks Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 11 Mar. 2008 (Jordan). 
Each of these laws can be found at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp? 
code=JO. 
152 See Jordan: IP Laws and Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http:// 
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO (last updated Aug. 15, 2011). 
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The Jordanian government also endorsed IP rights by 
undertaking the US-Jordan FTA.156 Article 4.3 of the US-Jordan FTA 
requires that each state must provide IP protection “no less 
favorable” than the protection provided to “its own nationals.”157 In 
addition, Articles 4.24 and 4.25 encourage the enforcement of IP 
rights against infringers from either country by awarding monetary 
damages “sufficiently high to deter future acts of infringement.”158 
Finally, contemporaneous to the US-Jordan FTA, both the 
U.S. government and the Jordanian government signed an important 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).159 The MOU begins by stating: 
The Government of the United States of America . . . and the 
Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan . . . recognizing the 
need to promote adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, to 
provide enhanced intellectual property protection to account for the 
latest technological developments, and to promote greater efficiency 
and transparency in the administration of intellectual property 
systems in order to strengthen the international trading system; 
Agree . . .160 
This language unequivocally reflects Jordan’s recognition of 
IP rights. Because the Qur’an commands adherence to treaties and 
                                                 
153 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997), http:// 
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/pdf/trtdocs_wo033.pdf. 
154 Berne Convention, supra note 24. 
155 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as last 
revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, Jul. 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 
U.N.T.S. 305, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.pdf.  
156 USJ FTA, supra note 146. 
157 Id. art. 4.3. 
158 Id. art. 4.24-4.25. 
159 Memorandum of Understanding on Issues Related to the Protection 
of Intellectual Property Rights Under the Agreement Between the United States 
and Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000 
[hereinafter IP MOU], http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreemen 
ts/fta/jordan/asset_upload_file120_8462.pdf. 
160 Id. (second emphasis added). 
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contractual agreements, this agreement compels the Jordan 
government to protect IP rights.161 
Given Jordan’s secular implementation of Islamic law, it is 
not surprising to find significant protection for IP rights. The 
prevalence of Hanafi Scholars has likely contributed to Jordan’s 
secular approach, and there is little reason to expect any change in the 
near future considering the continued surge in Jordan’s economy. As 
will be discussed, the adoption of a similarly secular approach in 
post-revolution Egypt would likely benefit its economy and its 
citizens. 
B. IP Protection in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Unlike Jordan, many commentators view Saudi Arabia as a 
fundamentalist government because of its substantial lack of progress 
with respect to human rights.162 According to the Saudi Basic Law, 
“The state protects human rights in accordance with the Islamic 
Shari’ah.”163 Consequently, one might expect the fundamentalist Saudi 
regime to be hesitant to implement IP protection. Nevertheless, 
Saudi Arabia has passed numerous IP statutes in the last decade.164 
Although Saudi Arabia has failed to progress significantly in the area 
                                                 
161 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
162 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www. 
amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/saudi-arabia?id 
=1011230 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012); BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, 
AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, JULY-DECEMBER, 2010 INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (Saudi Arabia) (Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter SA RF 
REPORT 2011], http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168275.htm. 
163 BASIC SYSTEM, Mar. 5, 1992, art. 26 (Saudi Arabia) [hereinafter SA 
BASIC LAW] (emphasis added), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id= 
7973. Because the Saudi Constitution is literally the Qur’an and Sunnah, the Saudi 
Basic Law acts as would a typical national constitution.  Id. art. 1. 
164 See Law of Trade Names, Umm al-Qura, 20 Nov. 1999 (Saudi Arabia); 
Law of Patents, Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits, Plant Varieties, and 
Industrial Designs, Umm al-Qura, 16 July 2004 (Saudi Arabia); Copyright Law, Umm 
al-Qura, 30 Aug. 2003 (Saudi Arabia); Law of Trademarks, Umm al-Qura, 7 Aug 
2002 (Saudi Arabia) [hereinafter SA IP Laws].  Each of these laws can be found at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=SA. 
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of human rights,165 the same is not true of its progress in international 
trade. 
Today, Saudi Arabia remains as one of only three Middle 
Eastern nations that uses Shari’ah as the sole basis for its legal 
system.166 Article 1 of the Saudi Basic Law states: “The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its 
religion; God’s book and the Sunnah of His Prophet . . . are its 
constitution.”167 The Saudi Basic Law also states that the 
“[g]overnment in Saudi Arabia derives power from the Holy Qur’an 
and the Prophet’s tradition” and that the “Government . . . is based 
on the premise of justice, consultation, and equality in accordance 
with the Islamic Shari’ah.”168 These examples, among others,169 
demonstrate the emphasis on Islamic law found in Saudi Arabia’s 
Basic Law. Accordingly, Islamic law is paramount to lawmaking in 
Saudi Arabia. 
The Fiqh methodology employed by Hanbali scholars 
provides the basis for Saudi law.170 Hanbali scholars place little 
emphasis on Istislah (public interest), and they undertake Qiyas 
(reasoning by analogy) only as a last resort when guidance cannot be 
found through the literal words of the primary sources.171 As a result, 
Saudi lawmakers will most likely avoid significant use of Fiqh 
methodologies; instead, they will construct laws using the 
traditionalist view of Shari’ah interpretation.172 
                                                 
165 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 162; SA RF REPORT 2011, supra 
note 162. 
166 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 68. The other two nations that use 
Shari’ah law as the sole basis for their legal system are Sudan and Iran. Id. 
167 SA BASIC LAW, supra note 163, art. 1. 
168 Id. art. 7-8. 
169 For example, showing the government’s commitment to preserving 
Islamic ideals in its citizens, children “shall be brought up on the basis of the 
Islamic faith.” Id. art. 9; see also id. art. 14 (“[E]ducation will aim at instilling the 
Islamic faith in the younger generation.”). 
170 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 72. 
171 See id. at 72-73. 
172 The traditionalist view of Shari’ah interpretation looks less to Fiqh 
interpretation methodologies and more to the literal language of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah for guidance.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
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Despite this traditionalist view, Saudi lawmakers have passed 
several laws protecting IP rights.173 These laws indicate their belief 
that IP rights are consistent with Shari’ah without significant 
interpretation through Fiqh. Saudi laws protect copyrights,174 
trademarks,175 trade names,176 patents,177 integrated circuits,178 
industrial designs,179 and plant varieties.180 Like Jordan, Saudi Arabia 
passed the majority of these laws shortly before joining the WTO in 
December 2005.181 Saudi Arabia’s willingness to adopt TRIPs, given 
its traditionalist reputation, indicates that Islamic law supports IP 
rights irrespective of the jurist’s method of Shari’ah interpretation. 
Notwithstanding Saudi Arabia’s traditionalist reputation and 
its lack of progress on human rights issues,182 lawmakers have 
provided substantial IP protection.183 Although Saudi Arabia may not 
agree with Jordan’s secular approach to Shari’ah,184 both nations 
agree that Islamic law should protect IP rights. 
                                                 
173 See SA IP Laws, supra note 164. 
174 Copyright Law, Umm al-Qura, 30 Aug. 2003 (Saudi Arabia), http:// 
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3593. 
175 Law of Trademarks, Umm al-Qura, 7 Aug 2002 (Saudi Arabia), http:// 
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3595. 
176 Law of Trade Names, Umm al-Qura, 20 Nov. 1999 (Saudi Arabia), http 
://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7890. 
177 Law of Patents, Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits, Plant Varieties, 





181 See Accession Status: Saudi Arabia, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www. 
wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_arabie_saoudite_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 
2012). 
182 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 162; SA RF REPORT 2011, supra 
note 162. 
183 See SA IP Laws, supra note 164. 
184 Compare Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Honor Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment 
Under Islamic and Jordanian Criminal Law, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 251 (2004) 
(discussing certain Jordan laws relating to human rights), with Frank E. Vogel, The 
Trial of Terrorists Under Classical Islamic Law, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (2002) 
(considering certain Saudi laws and human rights implications); see also Katherine 
M. Weaver, Women’s Rights and Shari’a Law: A Workable Reality? An Examination of 
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C. IP Protection in Pre-Revolution Egypt 
Since the Camp David accords and the peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel in 1978,185 Egypt has shown stability in an otherwise 
volatile region.186 Moreover, Egypt has been a leader in the secular 
Islamic movement.187 As the “Arab world’s first secular 
dictatorship,”188 Egypt represented a significant shift toward tolerance 
and away from the traditionalist views many believe to be the primary 
source of Middle Eastern instability.189 For example, Egypt was one 
of the first Middle Eastern members of the WTO190 and has been a 
leading advocate for developing nations in the Doha Round of WTO 
negotiations.191 With the departure of President Mubarak, Egypt’s 
role as a stable leader in the Middle East is now uncertain. 
                                                 
Possible International Human Rights Approaches Through The Continuing Reform of the 
Pakistani Hudood Ordinance, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 483 (2007). 
185 In September 1978, U.S. President Jimmy Carter invited Israeli Prime 
Minister Begin and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat to Camp David for secret 
negotiations. As a result, Egypt and Israel have remained at peace for the last three 
decades. See Camp David Accords, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www. 
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/91061/Camp-David-Accords (last visited Oct. 
30, 2012). 
186 See Jane Friedman, Hosni Mubarak Brought Stability to Egypt, At a Price, 
VOICE OF AM., http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Mubarak-
Egypts-Controversial-Former-Leader-115924004.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2011) 
(reflecting on the Mubarak presidency and the stability of the Egypt-Israel peace 
treaty over the last three decades). 
187 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 1; see also Jamar, supra note 84, at 1080 
(noting that Egypt’s IP laws have been adopted by many other Islamic nations). 
188 Kirkpatrick, supra note 1. 
189 See Mary Kate Cary, Democracy Must be the Future of the Middle East, US 
NEWS, Mar. 2, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/03/02/ 
democracy-must-be-the-future-of-the-middle-east (noting that “violent extremism” 
is a “source[] of tension in middle eastern nations”);  Terrorism, Concerns about 
Extremism & Foreign Policy, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 30, 2011), 
http://www.people-press.org/2011/08/30/section-6-terrorism-concerns-about-
extremism-foreign-policy/ (discussing concerns about violent extremism in the 
Muslim American community). 
190 See Egypt – Member Information, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www. 
wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/egypt_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
191 See Lynn, supra note 104 (noting that Egypt is “coordinator” of 
developing countries’ intellectual property group). 
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Prior to the revolution, the Egyptian legal system combined 
Islamic law with a European style civil code.192 Like Jordan’s 
Constitution and Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law, the Egyptian 
Constitution193 established “Islam [as] the Religion of the State”194 
and declared “the principal source of legislation [to be] Islamic 
Jurisprudence.”195 Significantly, the Egyptian Constitution made “[a]ll 
citizens [] equal before the law”196 with respect to “sex, ethnic origin, 
language, religion or creed”197 and “guarantee[d] the freedom of belief 
and the freedom of practicing religious rights.”198 Such provisions are 
unusual for Islamic law constitutions199 and reflect the secularist 
governing approach adopted in Egypt. 
Shari’ah interpretation in Egypt derives primarily from Shafii 
scholars, although Hanafi and Maliki scholars have some influence.200 
Shafii scholars reject Istislah (public interest) and consider Qiyas 
(analogy) to be “the farthest legitimate extent” of Shari’ah 
interpretation permissible.201 However, the more moderate Hanafi 
and Maliki Schools permit consideration of Istislah, and Egypt’s 
legislative actions reflect this influence.202 
                                                 
192 Hossam A. El Saghir, Egypt, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAWS, 3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Egypt-1, Egypt-16 (Roger Blanpain & 
Hendrick Vanhees eds., 2009). 
193 Note that, throughout this section, the Egyptian Constitution, 
statutes, international treaties, and other agreements created under the former 
Egyptian government will be referenced.  Although it will not be specified in each 
instance, any reference to governmental documents in this section should be 
understood as relating to the former Egyptian government, and not to the post-
revolution government. 
194 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as 
amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007, art. 2 [hereinafter 
CONSTITUTION OF EGYPT], http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id= 
189854. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. art. 40. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. art. 46. 
199 See supra Parts III.A-B. 
200 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 70-73. 
201 Id. at 72. 
202 E.g., CONSTITUTION OF EGYPT, supra note 194, art. 2 (providing 
multiple clauses denoting considerations of public interest as well as considerations 
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Egypt began its IP protection scheme near the end of the 
1800s, earlier than most nations in the region.203 More recently, Egypt 
enacted a comprehensive IP statute that protects copyrights, 
trademarks, trade names, trade secrets, patents, integrated circuits, 
and plant varieties.204 It is significant that Egypt had IP laws in place 
before any international agreement so required.205 Egyptian 
lawmakers chose to protect IP independent of any contractual 
obligation, thereby showing that they “believed intellectual property 
to be compatible with Shari’ah.”206 
Furthermore, Egypt is among the first Islamic nations to have 
joined the WTO207 and has adopted several IP related international 
treaties.208  Egypt’s adherence to TRIPs is especially significant given 
that Egyptian scholars are willing to engage in Istislah (public 
interest).209 As discussed previously, the TRIPs agreement requires 
protecting pharmaceutical patents,210 and some scholars argue that 
this protection is harmful to the public interest.211 In effect, Egypt has 
                                                 
of the rights and privileges of the individual and public order and morality); Law 
No. 82 of 2002 (Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights), Al-Jarida 
Al-Rasmiyya, 3 Jun. 2002 (Egypt), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_ 
id=126540 (noting the interests of public order and morality). 
203 Heba A. Raslan, Shari’a and the Protection of Intellectual Property – The 
Example of Egypt, 47 IDEA 497, 498 (2007). 
204 Law No. 82 of 2002 (Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 3 Jun. 2002 (Egypt), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/ 
en/text.jsp?file_id=126540.  The statute consists of four books.  Book one covers 
patents and integrated circuits; book two covers trademarks, trade names and trade 
secrets; book three covers copyrights; and book four covers plant varieties. 
205 Raslan, supra note 203, at 498. 
206 Chad M. Cullen, Can TRIPs Live in Harmony with Islamic Law? An 
Investigation of the Relationship Between Intellectual Property and Islamic Law, 14 SMU SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 45, 62 (2010). 
207 Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Jul. 23, 2008). 
208 For a list of Egypt’s IP related multinational treaty agreements, see 
Egypt: IP Laws and Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=EG (last updated July 2, 2012). 
209 Egyptian scholars are willing to engage in Istislah because of the 
influence of the Hanafi and Maliki Schools. See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 70-
73. 
210 See supra Part II.C. 
211 See supra Part II.C. 
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rejected this argument, and its role as a leading nation in the Middle 
East makes this rejection quite influential. 
In fact, Egypt had been a leading advocate on behalf of 
developing nations in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations,212 
where pharmaceutical patent protection is a principle concern.213  
Although Egypt disfavored pharmaceutical patent protection, 
lawmakers did not assert that such protection conflicted with Islamic 
law. Instead, Egypt enacted complying legislation and thereafter 
petitioned the WTO for a change in TRIPs requirements.214 In 
essence, Egypt asserted that the benefits of IP protection outweigh 
the harm that might result to public health.215 Through these actions, 
Egyptian lawmakers demonstrated their belief that Istislah does not 
forbid IP protection. 
Like the Islamic nations considered previously, Egypt has 
asserted harmonization of IP protection and Shari’ah through its legal 
and political actions. Finding neither convincing theoretical support 
against IP rights nor a real world example of an Islamic nation 
rejecting them, Islamic law appears to support IP protection. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 
With new government comes change. Indeed, change is 
precisely what Egyptian citizens want, and rightly so.216 However, not 
all change is for the better. This section discusses the potential 
changes coming to Egypt through a new democratically elected 
                                                 
212 Lynn, supra note 104. 
213 See The Doha Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/eng 
lish/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm#development (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
214 See Lynn, supra note 104. 
215 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
216 The Mubarak regime’s human rights violations against the Egyptian 
people are well documented.  See Emily Loftis, Mubarak’s Human Rights Legacy, 
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 1, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2011/ 
01/mubaraks-human-rights-record (commenting on accusations of torture, police 
violence, and other human rights violations in Egypt); see also Egypt: Impunity for 
Torture Fuels Days of Rage, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2011/01/31/egypt-impunity-torture-fuels-days-rage (asserting that human 
rights violations by the Mubarak administration fueled the revolution). 
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government and how different applications of Islamic law might 
affect Egyptian IP protection and international trade relations. 
The traditional argument against IP rights begins by asserting 
that “the concept of ownership in Shari’a is confined to tangible 
objects only.”217 This assertion is based on the idea that, because the 
primary sources (Qur’an and Sunnah) do not mention intangible 
property, Shari’ah does not support its recognition.218 Such a 
construction essentially rejects Fiqh interpretation methodologies 
entirely.219 Even the most traditionalist Shari’ah scholars rarely accept 
this extreme position.220 
In the past, Egyptian lawmakers have demonstrated a 
willingness to engage in Fiqh primarily under the Shafii School of 
interpretation, with some influence from the Hanafi and Maliki 
Schools.221 Because the same scholars continue to predominate in 
Egypt, there is no reason to expect any shift in the theology of 
Egyptian lawmakers causing the rejection of IP rights. 
Although Shafii scholars are more traditional in their 
application of Fiqh reasoning, they have always accepted Qiyas 
(reasoning by analogy) as a legitimate interpretation method.222 There 
is a clear analogy to be drawn between tangible and intangible 
property, especially because the Qur’an justifies property 
accumulation through individual undertaking.223 Like tangible 
property, IP arises from such undertakings, making IP rights equally 
justified. 
                                                 
217 Raslan, supra note 203, at 502 (quoting Mufti Taki Usmani, Copyright 
According to Shariah, ALBALAGH, http://www.albalagh.net/qa/copyright.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2012)). 
218 See supra Part II.C. 
219 See supra Part II.C. 
220 All schools of Shari’ah interpretation accept the fundamental Fiqh 
methodologies of Ijma (consensus) and Qiyas (analogy).  Abdal-Haqq, supra note 
38, at 73. 
221 See supra Part III.C. 
222 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 72. 
223 The Qur’an recognizes accumulation of wealth and property through 
the efforts of the individual.  Qur’an, 30:23 (“And among His Signs Is . . . the quest 
that ye (Make for livelihood).”). 
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A second argument against IP rights arises from the Shari’ah 
prohibition of gains disproportionate (and therefore dishonest) to the 
property holder’s efforts.224 Some scholars argue that although IP 
rights arise from personal efforts, they provide disproportionate 
wealth to undeserving persons.225 
This argument ties in with another similar argument against 
IP rights: Shari’ah prohibits usury, or interest.226 Some Islamic 
scholars view interest as unwarranted financial gain and argue that it 
is therefore prohibited.227 These prohibitions derive from the main 
justification of property under Islamic law—that individuals should 
accumulate in wealth and property an amount proportionate to their 
efforts.228 
Some traditionalist scholars therefore argue that Islamic law 
prohibits IP protection because the owners of IP rights often receive 
royalties far greater than their investment.229 Additionally, these 
scholars argue that licensing fees are comparable to interest, and 
represent an unjustified markup, or usury.230 
While such arguments may have found support in historical 
Islamic interpretation, they have proved far less useful in modern 
Islamic society.231 An absolute ban on interest would render banking 
                                                 
224 Qur’an 104:1-2 (“Woe to every (kind of) scandal-monger and 
backbiter, who pileth up wealth and layeth it by.”). 
225 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 75; Amir H. Khoury, Ancient and 
Islamic Sources of Intellectual Property Protection in the Middle East: A Focus on Trademarks, 
43 IDEA 151, 167 (2003). 
226 Qur’an 2:275 (“But Allah hath permitted trade and forbidden usury.”); 
Qur’an 2:278 (“O ye who believe!  Fear Allah, and give up what remains of your 
demand for usury, if ye are indeed believers.”). 
227 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 75-76; Khoury, supra note 225, at 190-
91. 
228 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 75-76; Jamar, supra note 84, at 1083; 
Khoury, supra note 225, at 168. 
229 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 75-76; Khoury, supra note 225, at 189. 
230 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 76; Khoury, supra note 225, at 191. 
231 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 86; see also Khoury, supra note 225, at 
191 (asserting that Shari’ah principles supporting IP protection outweigh those 
rejecting it); Raslan, supra note 203, at 557 (asserting that Shari’ah principles and its 
main objectives support IP rights). 
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impracticable, and, as such, the Shari’ah prohibition of usury is 
normally limited to excessive interest.232 Furthermore, the 
disproportionate gains argument represents a subjective 
determination, and rejecting IP rights entirely on such a basis is 
improbable at best. A more likely solution would be statutory 
limitations on royalties. 
Today, neither moderate nor traditionalist Shari’ah scholars 
find much support for the outright rejection of IP rights.233 The 
realities of modern society encourage IP protection.234 The number 
of Islamic nations who have enacted IP protection legislation reflects 
this reality.235 There is little room remaining in modern Islamic 
society for the type of literal interpretation that would preclude IP 
rights under Shari’ah. 
Whatever the political nature of the new Egyptian 
government, lawmakers will most likely continue to protect IP rights.  
Egypt has historically been among the leaders in the secular Islamic 
movement,236 which indicates the progressive mindset of many 
Egyptian citizens. With a populace that supports continued 
advancement in the global marketplace, an Islamic traditionalist 
government rejecting IP rights would be incompatible. 
Moreover, Egypt will continue to protect IP rights because it 
must adhere to the international agreements of the previous 
government. Islamic law commands practitioners to fulfill their 
contractual obligations.237 Even if the new Egyptian government 
                                                 
232 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 76; Khoury, supra note 225, at 190; 
Raslan, supra note 203, at 531-32. 
233 See discussion supra Part III. 
234 It is generally accepted that IP protection provides incentive for 
innovation and is beneficial to a nation’s economy.  See supra Part II.C. 
235 Membership in the WTO requires ratification of TRIPs and IP 
protection laws; the current Islamic members of the WTO include Bangladesh, 
Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, and 
Saudi Arabia. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Aug. 24, 2012). 
236 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 1; see also Jamar, supra note 84, at 1080 
(noting Egypt’s IP laws have been adopted by many other Islamic nations). 
237 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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considered disregarding the obligations of its predecessor regime, 
Islamic law compels it otherwise.238 International scholars and 
businesspersons can therefore rest assured that Egyptian IP 
protection will persevere. 
Egypt’s future as a stable, secular leader in the Middle East 
may be in doubt,239 but the revolution’s effect on IP rights and 
protections should be minimal. The Egyptian people seek progress in 
human rights and quality of life, and IP rights provide a vehicle for 
that progress. 
CONCLUSION 
Historically, IP rights have contributed substantially to 
economic advancement.240 The United States—the world’s 
predominant economic power241 —has enjoyed the benefits of IP 
protection since ratifying its Constitution in 1787.242 After 
implementing similar policies, other nations have experienced similar 
                                                 
238 See supra Part II.C; see also Qur’an 5:1 (requiring fulfillment of 
contractual obligations). 
239 For a discussion of the current political instability in Egypt, see Egypt 
News – Revolution and Aftermath Chronology, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/ 
top/news/international/countriesandterritories/egypt/index.html (last updated 
Mar. 20, 2013). 
240 See generally Jeong-Yeon Lee & Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property 
Protection and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment, 78 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 181 (1996) 
(analyzing the role a nation’s IP protection plays in encouraging investment from 
U.S. businesses, thereby boosting economic growth). 
241 The International Monetary Fund ranks the U.S. nominal GDP in 
2011 (the most recent statistics available) at approximately 15 trillion, more than 
double China’s 7.3 trillion as the world’s second largest economy. Data from the 
World Bank and Central Intelligence Agency show similar results. List of Countries by 
GDP (Nominal), WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_ 
by_GDP_%28nominal%29 (last modified Oct. 29, 2012). 
242 The U.S. Constitution specifically provides for patent and copyright 
protection.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  The U.S. legislature has protected other 
forms of IP, such as trademarks, statutorily. E.g., Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1141 (1946). 
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economic gains.243 The impact of innovation on economic prosperity 
is undisputable, and IP protection encourages this innovation. 
The same economic interests inspire Islamic nations like 
Egypt to protect IP rights. Shari’ah principles have progressed over 
time, and few Islamic scholars now advocate against IP rights. 
Perhaps the words of Steven D. Jamar244 reflect this progression best: 
Regardless of whether Islamic law moves in the 
direction of modern reformist theoreticians or toward 
more fundamentalist traditionalists, there is no 
compelling reason to anticipate dramatic 
enhancement or reduction in the protections of 
intellectual property based solely on the desire to 
make them fit within the shari’a. Other political 
concerns may result in sweeping changes or a 
particular zealot’s view of the proper interpretation of 
the Quran and the shari’a could result in dramatic 
changes, but such changes are not compelled by 
either traditional or modern understanding of the 
shari’a.245 
Without a prohibition on IP rights arising from Islam, Egypt 
can continue IP protection and ride its revolution to economic 
prosperity and social equality, a vision that the Egyptian people yearn 
to experience. 
 
                                                 
243 See COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2002), http://www.iprcommis 
sion.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf. 
244 Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Institute of 
Intellectual Property and Social Justice, Howard University School of Law. 
245 Jamar, supra note 84, at 1106. 
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“THE LIVING ARE GETTING RARER”: 
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN 
WHITE RHINOCEROS HORNS UNDER 
THE CONVENTION ON 




It is early Saturday morning, August 20, 2011, on the Aquila 
Private Game Reserve in South Africa.1 Three rhinoceros are grazing 
on the plain. Suddenly, a dart flashes. One of the rhinoceros is hit, 
then another, then the third. They all go down. The poachers 
approach with their chainsaws. 
One of the rhinoceros is named Absa.2 Absa is an eleven-
year-old male white rhino who acquired his name from a donor to 
the reserve.3 The poachers want Absa and the other rhinos for their 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, 2013, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State 
University. I would like to thank all those who were involved in the editing process 
for their help and advice. I hope that this comment inspires readers to take action 
to help save not only the white rhinoceros, but all endangered species. 
1 Rebecca Meredith, Absa the Injured Rhino May Not Survive in the Wild, 
CAPE TIMES (S. Afr.), Aug. 25, 2011, at 6. 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
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horns, and after they are through butchering the other male rhino, 
they move to Absa. The poachers use their chainsaw to saw off one 
horn and part of his second.4 However, in the process reserve staff 
notice the scene and the poachers flee leaving the other male dead, 
Absa injured, and the third, a female, unharmed.5 
Absa, whose leg may have been broken from being 
tranquilized, was given immediate veterinary care.6 His potential leg 
fracture troubled the veterinarians,7 and he struggled with 
hypothermia and dehydration.8 Unfortunately, he died five days 
later—a result of injuries sustained during the poaching.9 
Even though Absa was unable to recover, veterinarians 
questioned whether he would have survived in the wild had they been 
able to treat his wounds.10  Without their horns, rhinoceros are more 
susceptible to attacks by predators, and other rhinoceros often 
ostracize hornless rhinos like Absa.11  Thus, the poachers’ inhumane 
                                                 
4 Murray Williams, Rhino Dies of Injuries After Poaching Attack, CAPE ARGUS 
(S. Afr.), Aug. 25, 2011, at 6, http://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/rhino-dies-of-
injuries-after-poaching-attack-1.1124896#.UUeHb4VpfSk. 
5 See id. 
6 See Meredith, supra note 1. 
7 See id (explaining that if Absa’s leg was broken, the veterinarians would 
have had to put Absa down because a rhinoceros leg cannot be healed once it has 
been broken). 
8 See Williams, supra note 4. 
9 See id. 
10 See Meredith, supra note 1. 
11 See id.; see also Southern White Rhinoceros, PHILA. ZOO, 
http://www.philadelphiazoo.org/zoo/Meet-Our-Animals/Mammals/Hoofed/ 
Southern-white-rhinoceros.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2013); Southern White Rhinoceros, 
ZOOS S. AUSTL., http://www.zoossa.com.au/monarto-zoo/animals-exhibts/ 
animals?species=Southern%20White%20Rhinoceros (last updated July 28, 2011) 
(explaining the significance and complexity of the social behavior and relationships 
of the white rhinoceros. The white rhino has a more complex social relationship 
than other rhinoceros. It lives in herds or “ranges,” of up to 14. It depends on its 
herd to defend against threats. “Ranges” generally consist of maturing males and 
females. Once a male rhino ages it becomes more solitary, but the “ranges” often 
overlap. This overlap means that the rhinos often encounter one another and, 
when they do meet, they greet each other by touching nose to nose and sometimes 
by rubbing their horns together. Dominant adult males will guard their ranges from 
other males but allow overlap of ranges with subordinate males. Males only breed 
once they have achieved dominant status. In order to achieve this status, they must 
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treatment of Absa likely would have destroyed his well-being even if 
he survived the attack. 
The tragic story of Absa the rhinoceros is regularly repeated 
in South African wildlife reserves.12 The poachers who cut off Absa’s 
horn made off with an estimated $554,020.00 United States Dollars 
(USD)13 worth of rhinoceros horn. This cruelty is motivated chiefly 
by money and leaves behind devastation for this beautiful and 
endangered species.14 
Because the white rhino is endangered, trade of its horns is 
strictly regulated.15 Unfortunately, the current regulations have been 
ineffective at limiting the activities of poachers, like those who 
attacked and ultimately killed Absa. Why is this butchery happening? 
The main reason is the large demand for rhinoceros horns on the 
Asian black market,16 where the horns are used in traditional 
medicines and are believed to cure cancer.17  The high demand for 
these horns drives up prices and fuels the illegal trade,18 which in turn 
leads to rhinoceros poaching in South Africa, where white rhinoceros 
are predominately found and the largest supply is located.19 The high 
                                                 
claim a territory and defend it with their horns and other territorial markers and 
noises, like snorts and deep roars. Clashing of horns is also used in mating). 
12  See infra Part II.A. 
13  See Meredith, supra note 1 (stating that the horns the poachers took 
from Absa and the other male were worth R4 million—four million South African 
Rand). Using the conversion rate on Nov. 30, 2012, four million South African 
Rand is equivalent to 350,000 USD. Currency Converter, OANDA, 
http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
14  Convention on Int’l Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora apps. I-II, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.C. I-14537 (2011) 
[hereinafter CITES], http://www.cites.org/ (listing rhinoceritdae ceratotherium 
simum simum, the white rhinoceros, as an endangered species). 
15 Id. arts. 3-4; see also infra Part III.A. 
16 E.g., Richard Slater-Jones, The Economics of Rhino Poaching: Tipping Point, 
FIN. MAIL (S. Afr.), Sept. 9, 2011; see also infra Part II.C. 
17 See Slater-Jones, supra note 16. 
18 See id. 
19 See Press Release, S. Afr. Dep’t of Envtl. Affairs, Statement By 
Minister Edna Molewa on the Ongoing Scourge of Rhino Poaching (Aug. 29, 2011) 
[hereinafter Molewa Press Release on Poaching Scourge], http://allafrica.com/ 
stories/201108300180.html (stating that South Africa has the highest number of 
white rhinoceros on the continent); see also infra Part II.C; Marianne Merten, Proposed 
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demand for and comparatively low supply of white rhinoceros horns 
creates a huge incentive for poachers. Some reports assert that 
rhinoceros horns are worth more per kilo than diamonds, gold, 
heroin, or cocaine.20 
This comment will explain the legal causes and consequences 
of the poaching and trading of this majestic, endangered species and 
will convey the urgency of the need to put an end to this practice. 
Part II will discuss, through examples, what is happening to white 
rhinoceros like Absa.21 Part II will also discuss the primary countries 
involved in the trade and identify the primary reasons for the traffic 
of white rhinoceros horns.22 Parts III and IV will identify and 
examine the laws, treaties, and actions being taken in the nations that 
export and import rhinoceros horns23 and will show that the 
poaching of rhinos like Absa continues despite the prohibitory and 
regulatory laws and treaties.24 Additionally, Part IV will explore the 
reasons why black market trafficking continues, such as the lack of 
enforcement of existing laws and the bribery of park rangers and 
game preserve owners.25 Part IV will also discuss current attempts by 
the importing and exporting countries to resolve current problems 
and to establish what needs to be done to prevent future poaching.26 
Finally, this Comment will conclude by demonstrating how 
individuals and other organizations are helping the white 
rhinoceros.27 
                                                 
Freeze on Rhino-Hunting Permits to Stop Abuse, CAPE TIMES (S. Afr.), Aug. 30, 2011, at 
6 (stating that ninety-three percent of Africa’s white rhinoceros population reside in 
South Africa); Traditional Medicine, SUN. OBSERVER (Sri Lanka), Oct. 2, 2011, 
http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2011/10/ 02/spe01.asp (“South Africa is home to 
the majority of the world’s rhinos.”). 
20 E.g., UK Secures International Agreement to Combat Illegal Rhino Trade, EUR. 
UNION NEWS, Aug. 26, 2011, http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/2011/ 
08/20/rhinohorn/. 
21 See infra Part II.A. 
22 See infra Part II.B-C. 
23 See infra Part III-IV.B. 
24 See infra Part IV.C-D. 
25 See infra Part IV.E. 
26 See infra Part IV.F. 
27 See infra CONCLUSION. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
Absa’s story is not atypical. In 2011, on average, one rhino 
was butchered for its horn every 21-22 hours.28 These numbers have 
only continued to escalate in 2012 and 2013.29 This section will 
explain the problem of rhinoceros poaching and compare it to the 
lessons learned from the elephant poaching crisis. This section will 
also explain the primary locations of the illegal rhinoceros poaching 
and trade and the main reasons behind the activity. 
A. The Problem 
The international community has proclaimed that rhinoceros 
poaching has reached a crisis point.30 Rhinoceros have been classified 
as an endangered species for the purposes of regulated international 
trade since 1973.31 Because of the rhino’s endangered species status, 
there are very strict regulations on whether, how, and when rhinos 
can be traded internationally.32 However, because of high demand for 
their horns, rhinoceros are being poached regularly. In 2011, almost 
400 rhinoceros were killed.33 In 2012, poachers killed 668 rhinos and 
                                                 
28 E.g., Slater-Jones, supra note 16; Barbara Maregele, Protesters Seek More 
State Assistance to Save Rhinos, CAPE TIMES (S. Afr.), Sept. 23, 2011, at 6. 
29 See Update on Rhino Poaching Statistics, S. AFR. DEP’T OF ENVT’L AFFAIRS 
(Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.environment.gov.za/?q=content/stats_rhino_ 
poaching_update. 
30  Jenna Bonella, Progress Made to Stop Illegal Wildlife Trade, WORLD 
WILDLIFE FUND, Aug. 24, 2011, http://worldwildlife.org/press-releases/progress-
made-to-stop-illegal-wildlife-trade (stating that rhinoceros and elephant poaching 
was a major area of concern at the 61st meeting of the CITES Standing 
Committee, where conservation groups urged the international community to take 
further steps to prevent this illegal activity). 
31 See CITES, supra note 14, apps. I-II. 
32 See CITES, supra note 14, arts. 3-4. 
33 See, e.g., WWF: Record Rhino Poaching in South Africa, VOICE OF AM. 
NEWS, Nov. 2, 2011, http://www. voanews.com/content/wwf-record-rhino-
poaching-in-south-africa-133173778/159118.html (claiming the number of rhino 
killed in South Africa as of early November 2011 was 341—already eight more 
than the total number in 2010—and predicting the number of rhinos poached in 
2011 to reach 400); Slater-Jones, supra note 16 (stating that at least 279 rhino have 
been butchered in 2011 and the total estimated for the end of the year is likely to be 
around 400); Hunting Laws Abused, MERCURY (S. Afr.), Sept. 7, 2011, at 11 (stating 
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158 have already been poached this year.34 With only about 20,000 
white rhinoceros left in South Africa,35 the white rhinoceros may 
soon become extinct if the poaching continues. 
Like the white rhino, elephants are poached for their ivory 
tusks. A comparison can be drawn, and lessons can be learned from, 
the elephant poaching crisis.36 Both rhinoceros poaching and 
elephant poaching come with common myths and misconceptions. 
While rhinoceros poaching myths tend to center on the use of the 
horn itself, elephant misconceptions stem from the belief that taking 
the tusks is not hurting the animals: “Another problem . . . is that the 
Chinese word for ivory is elephant’s teeth—xiang ya . . . . Seventy 
percent thought tusks can fall out and be collected by traders and 
grow back.”37 Thus, the common belief lies in the misconception that 
elephants do not have to be killed for their tusks.38 
While many people know about elephant poaching, white 
rhinoceros poaching has been overshadowed. Since white rhinoceros 
                                                 
that at least 279 rhino have been killed as of early September 2011 and that the 
estimated total death toll for the year will likely be the highest ever). 
34 See Update on Rhino Poaching Statistics, supra note 29; see also Lynn 
Herrmann, Eight Rhinos Killed in One Day in South Africa, First 2012 Deaths, DIGITAL 
J. (Can.), Jan. 11, 2012 (noting that the first eight white rhino deaths of 2012 were 
believed to be poached in one day, making it an unprecedented one-day total). 
35  Lyse Comins, Wildlife Staff: Rangers Bust for Poaching: Questions Raised 
about Senior Officials in Rhino Horn Syndicates, INDEP. ON SAT. (S. Afr.), Oct. 1, 2011, 
at 2. 
36 Elephant poaching peaked “[d]uring the great elephanticide of the 
1970s and 1980s, [when] Africa’s elephant population was cut from an estimated 
1.3 million to some 600,000 . . . . At the height of the slaughter, it is believed, 
70,000 elephants a year were being killed continent-wide.” Alex Shoumatoff, Agony 
and Ivory, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 2011), http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/ 
2011/08/elephants-201108. While elephant poaching has decreased due to 
awareness, public outcry, and stricter enforcement of international laws and 
regulations, it remains a problem. See id. Poachers continue to hunt elephants for 
the ivory in their tusks. Like the rhino horn, obtaining an elephant’s ivory tusks is 
worth the risk for poachers, pricing at about $700 USD per pound. See id. In 2010 
alone, the ivory trade accounted for an estimated $114 billion USD. See id. There is 
an estimated 450,000 pounds of ivory being traded per year, meaning more than 
35,000 elephants are still being killed each year. See id. 
37 See Shoumatoff, supra note 36 (internal quotations omitted). 
38 See id. 
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poaching is reaching a critical level, it is time this problem shared the 
spotlight with elephant poaching. Otherwise, someday soon there 
may not be any white rhinoceros left to save. 
Veterinarians see the destruction of the white rhinos 
firsthand. One veterinarian described a scene in Kariega Game 
Reserve in the Eastern Cape in South Africa: 
The horror of that first encounter remains branded in 
my memory. In a small clearing . . . stood an animal 
hardly recognizable as a rhino. His profile completely 
changed by the absence of his horn. Skull and soft 
tissue injuries extended down into the remnants of his 
face, through the outer layer of bones, to expose the 
underlying nasal passages . . . revealing pieces of loose 
flesh which hung semi-detached from his deformed 
and bloodied face . . . his left front leg . . . could only 
be dragged behind him. To compensate, he used his 
mutilated muzzle and nose as a crutch . . . [h]is one 
eye was injured and clouded over, adding to his 
horrific appearance . . . [his] blood was bubbling 
inside his skull cavity and [I] wondered how every 
breath must add to the agony, the cold air flowing 
over inflamed tissues and exposed nerves . . . he had 
little chance of healing.39 
 
This is the state in which these poor rhinoceros are left once 
the poachers are through getting the horn they came for. Most of the 
time, poachers tranquilizer darts to bring the rhino down before they 
take chainsaws and axes to the rhinoceros.40 However, the drugs are 
generally not strong enough to kill the rhinos, so most are left to 
bleed to death, or park rangers are forced to euthanize them when 
found.41 The injuries to the rhinoceros are usually too severe to heal, 
so they are forced to suffer, sometimes for days, before ultimately 
passing away—Absa suffered such a fate.42 
                                                 
39 William Fowlds, Op-Ed., Revealing the Cruelty Inflicted on Rhinos, 
MERCURY (S. Afr.), Aug. 29, 2011, at 6, http://www.iol.co.za/mercury/revealing-
the-cruelty-inflicted-on-rhinos-1.1127041#.UUpH3IVpcy8.  
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
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Additionally, many of the victims are female rhinoceros, who 
may be leaving unweaned calves behind.43 Conservation groups have 
tried to rescue and relocate orphaned calves,44 but sometimes they are 
too late. The calves tend to remain by their dead mothers and are 
often killed simply because they are in the poachers’ way.45 
Sometimes the poachers immobilize the calves by cutting the tendons 
in their back legs so that the calves do not bother the poachers while 
they work; other times the calves themselves are butchered for their 
small horns and toenails.46 
The South African community recognizes three primary 
classes of people who kill rhinoceros.47 The first is the owner of a 
rhinoceros.48 Rhino owners may obtain a permit to kill rhinos;49 in 
such cases, the killing is legal.50 However, some owners kill their 
rhinos without a permit and sell the horns illegally, then claim they 
were victims of poachers.51 Some reserve owners allow or even hire 
poachers to come and kill their rhinoceros for illegal trading 
                                                 
43 See Tanya Waterworth, Stop Legal Rhino Hunting, It’s Fueling Poaching, 
Says SanWild, INDEP. ON SAT. (S. Afr.), Sept. 10, 2011, at 10, 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/legal-rhino-hunting-could-
be-abolished-1.1134863#.UUpIgIVpcy8. 
44 See id. (stating that many orphaned calves are taken to SanWild, a 
wildlife sanctuary, where they are treated and hand raised). 
45 See id. 
46 See id. 
47 Legalizing Rhino Horn Trade will Stop the Slaughtering of Animals, STAR (S. 
Afr.), Sept. 24, 2011, at 14.  
48 See Hunting Laws Abused, supra note 33 (stating that “more than a 
quarter of [South Africa’s] rhinos are privately owned” on private game reserves). 
49 See id. (stating that 140 rhino hunting permits have been issued by 
national agencies); Marianne Merten, Move Afoot to Stomp Out Rhino Poaching, DAILY 
NEWS (S. Afr.), Aug. 31, 2011, at 6, http://www.iol.co.za/scitech/science/ 
environment/move-afoot-to-stomp-out-poaching-1.1127598#.UUspwYVpcy8 
(reporting on South Africa’s rhino hunting permit system). 
50 See Legalizing Rhino Horn Trade will Stop the Slaughtering of Animals, supra 
note 47. 
51 See Caryn Dolley, Some Rhino Owners Selling Horns, CAPE TIMES (S. Afr.), 
July 19, 2012, at 7, http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/some-rhino-owners-
selling-horns-1.1345156#.UUsp-IVpcy8 (reporting that some of the owners are at 
the center of major rhino horn syndicates). 
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purposes.52 These poachers make up the second class. The reserve 
owner will generally take a portion of the proceeds generated from 
the sale of the poached rhino horn.53 Finally, the true poachers make 
up the third class.54 These poachers are generally indiscriminate about 
the rhinos that they kill. This group is the largest, and is rapidly 
growing.55 
B. Where? 
The overwhelming majority of the world’s white rhinoceros 
population—ninety-three percent—is located in South Africa.56 
Because most rhinos live in South Africa, the majority of the 
poaching problem occurs there. However, poaching occurs in some 
Asian counties, like India, as well.57 
The main destination for the poached horns is Asia; 
specifically, Southeast Asian countries like the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam [hereinafter Vietnam], which, according to the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF), is the biggest consumer of illegal rhinoceros 
horns.58 Vietnam is not only a destination for the horns, but is also a 
transit country—it serves as the hub where the horns are imported 
and then sent to other Southeast Asian countries.59 Because Vietnam 
is a critical country in the illegal trade of white rhinoceros horns, the 
South African government recently met with Vietnamese officials to 
                                                 
52  See Legalizing Rhino Horn Trade will Stop the Slaughtering of Animals, supra 
note 47. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 See Traditional Medicine, supra note 19. 
57 E.g., Kaziranga Takes Battle to Poachers’ Court, PIONEER (India), Sept. 23, 
2011 (stating that poachers have been caught in Assam, India poaching the one 
horned rhino). 
58 See WWF: Record Rhino Poaching in South Africa, supra note 33; see also 
WWF Calls for End to Rhino Poaching on World Rhino Day: At Least 287 Rhinos Have 
Been Killed in South Africa as Crisis Escalates, PRWEB.COM (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://www.prweb.com/releases/World_Wildlife_Fund/World_Rhino_Day/prwe
b8816028.htm. 
59 See Merten, supra note 19. 
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sign a memorandum of understanding.60 This memorandum serves as 
a means of cooperation between the two countries, and the goal of 
the document is for the countries to work together to prevent the 
illegal trade and smuggling of rhino horns.61 
C. Why? 
As previously stated, South Africa is the primary source for 
horns and the demand is primarily in Southeast Asia.62 But why is the 
demand so high in this region? 
Crushed rhinoceros horns are used as an ingredient in ancient 
Asian medicines.63 The horn is purported to have detoxifying 
properties and is prepared by being ground up in a serrated bowl and 
consumed with water or alcohol.64 Traditionally, the medicines have 
been used to treat fever, high blood pressure,65 strokes,66 and as an 
aphrodisiac.67 More recently, the medicines have also been used as a 
cure for cancer.68 In fact, a Vietnamese government minister stated 
that he was “cured of cancer through mixing a rhino horn 
                                                 
60 See Vietnam, South Africa Sign MOU on Anti-Smuggling of Rhino Horns, 
VIET. NEWS BRIEF, Sept. 29, 2011; see also infra Part IV.F. 
61 See Vietnam, South Africa Sign MOU on Anti-Smuggling of Rhino Horns, 
supra note 60. 
62 See Traditional Medicine, supra note 19; WWF Calls for End to Rhino 
Poaching on World Rhino Day: At Least 287 Rhinos Have Been Killed in South Africa as 
Crisis Escalates, supra note 58. 
63 See Vietnam, South Africa Sign MOU on Anti-Smuggling of Rhino Horns, 
supra note 60. 
64 See Paul Ash, Rise in Vietnamese Use of Rhino, SUN. TIMES (S. Afr.), Aug. 
26, 2012, http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/science/2012/08/26/rise-in-vietname 
se-use-of-rhino. 
65 See id. 
66 See UK Secures International Agreement to Combat Illegal Rhino Trade, supra 
note 20. 
67 See Masoka Dube, South Africa: Poisoned Horn Won’t Deter Poaching in the 
Kruger, ALLAFRICA.COM (Sept. 15, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201109 
160364.html; but see Ash, supra note 64 (“[D]espite the pervasive media myth, rhino 
horn has not previously been used as an aphrodisiac.”). 
68 See, e.g., Smuggling of Rhino Parts Goes Online, CHANNEL NEWSASIA 
(Sing.) (Sept. 5, 2011), http://wildsingaporenews.blogspot.com/2011/09/ 
smuggling-of-rhino-parts-goes-online.html; Slater-Jones, supra note 16. 
 
2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:1 
192 
concoction.”69 This belief has spurred rhino poaching to such a 
degree that the once critically endangered Javan rhinoceros, a 
Vietnam native, was declared extinct in October 2011.70 
The belief in the healing power of rhino horns, however, is 
untrue— “rhino horn is made up of the same substance as our 
fingernails and has no medicinal value whatsoever, so what people 
say is a myth and not fact.”71 This false belief triggers the demand of 
horns and is difficult to disprove for several reasons. First, the myth 
is embedded in the ancient culture of Southeast Asia.72 To disprove 
it, thousands of people must be convinced that much of their ancient 
belief system is scientifically untrue. Such beliefs are difficult to 
overcome.73 However, Vietnamese conservation groups are working 
to remedy this lack of understanding by distributing medical reports 
that definitively prove that rhino horns have no special medicinal 
value.74 Second, people in countries like Vietnam often only know of 
the therapeutic uses of the horns and not of the countervailing injury 
to the animals and the environment.75 
                                                 
69 Anna Majavu, Big-Money Rhino Crime, TIMES (S. Afr.), Aug. 30, 2011 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
70 See Mike Ives, Javan Rhino Now Extinct in Vietnam, WWF Says, NBC 
NEWS, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45031207/ns/world_news-world_environ 
ment/t/javan-rhino-now-extinct-vietnam-wwf-says/ (last updated Oct. 25, 2011, 
10:24 AM). 
71 Asha Muktar, High Price of Rhino Horn Fuels Poaching, NAIROBI STAR 
(Kenya), Sept. 23, 2011 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
72 See Sheree Bega, Vietnam Joins Anti-Poaching Rhino Campaign; Consumer 
Countries Get on Board to Stem Change, STAR (S. Afr.), Oct. 3, 2011, at 4, 
http://www.iol.co.za/saturday-star/vietnam-joins-anti-poaching-rhino-campaign-
1.1149550#.UUs2foVpcy8. 
73 Such beliefs can be difficult to overcome especially because rhinoceros 
horns are not only believed to be cures for ailments, but were once seen as a status 
symbol. See id. For example, Asian royalty used to drink from cups made from 
rhinoceros horn. Id. The horns are also given as gifts to “curry favor with socio-
economic and political elites.” See Ash, supra note 64. Arguments for how the 
ancient belief system can be overcome are beyond of the scope of this comment. 
74 See Bega, supra note 72. 
75 See id. 
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Due to the high demand, rhino horn’s reportedly sell for 
roughly $5,813 USD to $7,556 USD per horn in Southeast Asia.76 
Because trade in white rhino horns is illegal, the exact value of the 
horn is hard to determine, but it is estimated that a large rhino horn 
could potentially sell for $1,000,000 USD if sold in the United 
States.77 The high sale price makes poaching worth the risk for many 
poachers, which is a major factor contributing to the continuation of 
the poaching problem.78 
III.  THE EXISTING LAW 
Since illegal poaching and trade of the white rhinoceros 
transpires across international boundaries, prevailing international 
governance plays a large role. This section will discuss three 
international legal structures that affect white rhinoceros poaching 
and trade: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP), and World Trade Organization 
(WTO) agreements. 
A. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora 
On March 3rd, 1973, countries from around the world 
gathered to create and implement CITES under the United Nations 
Environment Programme.79 By 2009, 175 nations had signed this 
treaty, including South Africa and Vietnam.80 
                                                 
76 Currency Converter, OANDA, http://www.oanda.com/currency/ 
converter/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (converting R50,000 and R65,000 South 
African Rand into U.S. Dollars using the date last visited as the conversion rate 
date). For South African Rand value of rhino horns, see UK Secures International 
Agreement to Combat Illegal Rhino Trade, supra note 20; Majavu, supra note 69; Slater-
Jones, supra note 16. 
77 See Slater-Jones, supra note 16. 
78 See id. 
79 See generally CITES, supra note 14. 
80 See Member Countries, CITES.ORG, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/ 
parties/chronolo.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2013) (South Africa joined in 1975 and 
Vietnam joined in 1994). 
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The treaty’s purpose is to recognize and protect the diverse 
and irreplaceable wildlife within each country.81 The preamble states 
that each signing country should: (1) remain conscious of the 
aesthetic, scientific, and cultural value of its wildlife; (2) recognize 
that the country’s citizens are the best protectors of this wildlife; (3) 
understand “that international co-operation is essential for the 
protection of certain species of wild fauna and flora against over-
exploitation through international trade”; and (4) realize the urgent 
need for taking appropriate steps to ensure the protection of the 
endangered wildlife within each country.82 
CITES defines “critically endangered species” as “any species 
threatened with extinction which may or may not be affected by 
trade.”83 The treaty divides the different species up into three groups: 
Appendix One includes critically endangered species whose trade 
must be strictly enforced and allowed only in exceptional 
circumstances to prevent further endangering their survival;84 
Appendix Two includes threatened85 species whose trade must be 
strictly regulated so that such species will not become critically 
endangered, as well as any species whose trade would affect the trade 
of those threatened species;86 and Appendix Three includes any 
species which the parties feel need to be regulated to prevent the 
species’ exploitation.87 
The white rhinoceros falls under Appendix Two, while all 
other rhinoceros species fall under Appendix One.88 The white rhino 
was listed under Appendix One when the treaty originated, but its 
                                                 
81 See CITES, supra note 14, pmbl. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. art. 2. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. (“Threatened” means those species that may not be on the verge 
of extinction, but are still endangered). 
86 See CITES, supra note 14, art. 2. 
87 See id. art. 2. 
88 See id. apps. 1-2. 
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status was changed in 1995.89 This transfer occurred to permit the 
international trade in hunting trophies.90 
Article four of the treaty regulates the export and import of 
the species listed in Appendix Two.91 To export an Appendix Two 
species, such as the white rhino, the trader must acquire a prior grant 
of permission and present an export permit.92 Export permits are 
strictly regulated and are issued only if the following conditions are 
met: (1) a “Scientific Authority”93 of the country issuing the export 
permit has stated that the export of the species will not be 
detrimental to its survival; (2) the specimen being exported cannot 
have been obtained in violation of the exporting country’s laws; and 
(3) if the trader is exporting a live animal, the means of export must 
minimize any risk of injury or cruelty to the animal.94 The Scientific 
Authority in the exporting country will monitor the local population 
of the species and will limit export permits to avoid moving the 
species into Appendix One.95 If the Scientific Authority finds that 
export permits need to be further limited, it will advise the 
appropriate managing authority of the exporting country.96 In 
addition, to import any Appendix Two species one must present an 
export permit or a re-export certificate.97 
                                                 
89 Listed Species Database, CITES.ORG http://www.cites.org/eng/ 
resources/species.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
90 See id. 
91 See CITES, supra note 14, art. 4. 
92 See id. 
93 “Scientific Authority” is defined as a scientific authority designated by 
the member country. Id. arts. 1, 9. 
94 See id. art. 4. 
95 See id. 
96 See CITES, supra note 14, art. 4. 
97 See id. Re-export refers to the exportation of an animal that was already 
exported and imported. A re-export certificate is needed to re-export any species 
listed under Appendix Two. See id. A re-export certificate will be granted only if the 
applicant meets the following conditions: (1) the government of the country of re-
export is satisfied that the specimen was imported into that country in accordance 
with the provisions of CITES; and (2) if the trader is exporting a live animal, the 
means of export will be done in the best way possible to minimize risk or injury or 
cruelty to the animal. Id. 
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Article six further defines the criteria needed to obtain export, 
import, and re-export permits and certificates.98 Article seven lists 
exceptions to the regulations—including trade within the country 
itself, household effects, and species bred in captivity—none of 
which apply to the international trade in white rhinoceros horns.99 
Article eight states that the participating countries “shall take 
appropriate measures to enforce the provisions of [CITES] and to 
prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof.”100 Such measures 
include penalizing trade in or possession of any species protected by 
CITES, as well as confiscating and returning species and specimens 
to the country of export.101 Additionally, each country shall keep 
records of the export and import of any species listed in CITES, 
including the contact information of traders, the number of permits 
issued, and information concerning the species and specimens 
traded.102 Every participating country must periodically update the 
CITES Secretary with information on the country’s implementation 
of the regulations of the treaty.103 If a country fails to effectively 
implement the conditions of CITES, the next Conference of the 
Parties104 will review the country’s laws and consider remedial 
actions.105 
                                                 
98 See CITES, supra note 14, art. 6. An export permit has been granted, it 
must be used within six months from the date on which it was granted. Id. Each 
export permit must contain the following information: the CITES title, the name 
and any identifying stamp of the granting country’s government, and a control 
number assigned by that government. Id. All export permits and certificates must 
be in the original form and separate permits are required every time a trader exports 
a species or specimen. Id. The importing country cancels and retains the export 
permit after the species or specimen arrives, as well as any corresponding import 
permit. Id. When appropriate, a government may put a mark on specimens to help 
in identification. Id. “For these purposes ‘mark’ means any indelible imprint, lead 
seal or other suitable means of identifying a specimen, designed in such a way as to 
render its imitation by unauthorized persons as difficult as possible.” Id. 
99 See CITES, supra note 14, art. 7. 
100 See id. art. 8. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
104 See CITES, supra note 14, art. 11 (A Conference of the Parties is when 
delegations from all of the countries participating in CITES have a meeting to 
review the implementation of the treaty, to make any needed amendments, to hear 
reports from participating countries, to make recommendations for better 
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Since its inception, the parties to CITES have been 
specifically concerned with the trade of rhinoceros.106 In November 
1994, the Ninth Conference of Parties passed Resolution Conference 
9.14, which effectively transferred the white rhinoceros from an 
Appendix One species to an Appendix Two species.107 The reason 
for the change was to allow trade in white rhinoceros hunting 
trophies.108 The Second Conference of the Parties established the 
general exception for trade in hunting trophies of species listed in 
Appendix One in March 1979.109 The Resolution creating the 
exception permits trading only according to Article Three’s 
regulations.110 These regulations include the need for export and 
import permits, which the state’s Scientific Authority may grant as 
                                                 
implementation, etc. The Conference of the Parties is held every two to three 
years). 
105 See id. art. 13. 
106 See id. apps. I-II (Rhinoceros has always been listed as an Appendix 
One endangered species). 
107 CITES, Conservation Of and Trade In African and Asian Rhinoceroses, Res. 
Conf. 9.14 (Rev. CoP15) (Nov. 7-18, 1994) [hereinafter CITES Res. Conf. 9.14], 
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php. 
108 See CITES, supra note 14, apps. I-II. While the reasons for the shift of 
the white rhino from Appendix One to Appendix Two are not explicitly stated, a 
reasonable comparison can be drawn to the movement of the black rhinoceros 
from Appendix One to Appendix Two for hunting trophy purposes. In October 
2004, the Thirteenth Conference of the Parties moved the black rhinoceros from 
Appendix One to Appendix Two, ten years after the white rhino was similarly 
moved. CITES, Establishment of Export Quotas for Black Rhinoceros Hunting Trophies, 
Res. Conf. 13.5 (Rev. CoP14) (Oct. 2-14, 2004), 
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php. The Conference defined a hunting 
trophy of a black rhinoceros as “the horns or any other durable part of the body, 
mounted or loose.” Id. The Conference recognized that the black rhino is 
threatened, but believed that its threatened status was recovering and that 
conservation was being effectively managed. Id. Therefore, the Conference decided 
that the financial benefits of permitting the trade in black rhinoceros hunting 
trophies outweigh the potential danger of extinction, but that trade must be limited, 
allowing only five black rhino hunting trophies to be exported from South Africa 
per year. Id. 
109 CITES, Trade in Hunting Trophies of Species Listed In Appendix I, Res. 
Conf. 2.11 (Rev.) (Mar. 19-30, 1979) [hereinafter CITES Res. Conf. 2.11], 
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php. 
110 See id. at 1. 
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long as exportation of the trophies is not “detrimental to the survival 
of the species.”111 
Since the white rhino’s reclassification by Ninth Conference 
of the Parties’, there has been concern that some countries are not 
effectively implementing the exportation regulations of Appendix 
Two species, such as the white rhino.112 At the Fifteenth Conference 
of the Parties—held between March 13th and 25th, 2010—delegates 
expressed concern over the continued drastic decline of the 
rhinoceros despite measures taken to protect it by member countries, 
such as South Africa.113 The Conference recognized that the primary 
reason for this continuing decline is the illegal trade in rhinoceros 
horns and that this trade is a “global law enforcement problem.”114 
The globalization of the threat to the species is increasing the cost of 
protecting the rhinoceros beyond some countries’ means;115 the 
Conference therefore called upon other nations, international 
organizations, non-profit aid groups, and others to help fund the 
conservation and protection of rhinoceros.116 The Fifteenth 
Conference further urged countries trading in rhinoceros horns to 
adopt “more comprehensive and effective legislation and 
enforcement controls, including international trade restrictions and 
penalties, aimed at reducing illegal trade,”117 and to engage in more 
vigilant law enforcement, early detection, and international law 
enforcement cooperation.118 
                                                 
111 See id. 
112 CITES, Review of Significant Trade in Specimens of Appendix-II Species, Res. 
Conf. 12.8 (Rev. CoP13) (Nov. 3-15, 2002), http://www.cites.org/ 
eng/res/index.php. 
113 See CITES Res. Conf. 9.14, supra note 107. 
114 See id. 
115 See id. (the trade in rhinoceros horns extends beyond the home 
countries’ borders and CITES recognizes that many of these home countries may 
be incapable of international law enforcement. Additionally, CITES recognizes that 
many of the home countries do not have adequate resources to do all that is 
necessary to end the trade). 
116 See id. 
117 See id. at 1.  
118 See CITES Res. Conf. 9.14, supra note 107. The Conference also 
recognizes the primary reason behind the continuing demand: traditional medicine 
use. CITES, Traditional Medicines, Res. Conf. 10.19 (Rev. CoP14) (June 9-20, 1997), 
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To address the growing concerns regarding the decline in 
rhinoceros, the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties directed the 
Secretariat119 to further examine the rhino conservation and trade 
policies in countries where illegal killing of rhinoceros poses a 
significant threat to the survival of the species.120 The Conference 
also directed the Secretariat to examine efforts to reduce the illegal 
trade in importing countries.121 The Conference stressed the urgency 
of the problem and the great need for cooperation between countries 
engaged in rhinoceros horn trading.122 
However, if the problem is so urgent, and the decline in white 
rhinoceros is so rapidly occurring, why hasn’t CITES placed the 
white rhinoceros back on Appendix One where it cannot be hunted 
at all? The black rhino, also switched from Appendix One to 
Appendix Two for hunting trophy purposes, was declared extinct in 
November 2011, and the white rhinoceros may be next.123 In fact, the 
                                                 
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php. The Conference acknowledges that East 
Asian traditional medicines often use endangered species and that this use can be a 
potential threat to such species. Id. While organizations, such as the World Health 
Organization, and treaties, such as CITES, acknowledge the importance of 
traditional medicine in Asian cultures, the Conference believes that measures need 
to be taken to increase understanding, improve research, and further conserve the 
wildlife used in these medicines, such as rhinoceros horn, so the threat to the 
rhinoceros will not increase. Id. 
119 The Secretariat shall be provided by the Executive Director of the 
United Nations Environment Programme and shall arrange and service meeting of 
the Parties, perform functions designated to him or her under CITES, request and 
study reports submitted by Parties, call to the attention of the Parties any matter 
pertaining to CITES, prepare annual reports for the Parties, publish amendments 
and changes to appendices, make recommendations for the implementation of 
regulations under CITES, and to perform any other function designated to him or 
her by the Parties. See CITES, supra note 14, art. 12. 
120 CITES, Conservation Of and Trade In African and Asian Rhinoceroses, 15.71 
to 15.73 (Mar. 13-25, 2010), http://www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. 
123 See Black Rhino Extinct, White Rhinos Next, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Nov. 11, 
2011, http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/247342/20111111/black-rhinos-extinct-
white-javan-international-union.htm# (stating that the IUCN declared the black 
rhinoceros extinct); see also Lewis Smith, The Last Charge as Western Black Rhino is 
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International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) declared 
that the white rhinoceros is “possibly extinct” in northern Africa and 
the white rhinoceros in southern Africa is endangered.124 
Likely because the southern white rhino came back from near 
extinction,125 it was moved to Appendix Two. Nevertheless, the white 
rhino population is now declining once again.126 The extinction of the 
black rhino caused CITES Secretary-General John Scanlon “grave 
concern.”127 He believes CITES can no longer rely on previously 
used methods to combat rhino poaching and trafficking.128 
Hopefully, concern about the survival of the white rhino will inspire 
CITES members to move the white rhino back to Appendix One. 
However, some advocates contend that legalizing the trade in 
rhino horns is the only way to stop the abuse of the CITES permit 
system.129 They argue that removing the illicit elements of the rhino 
horn trade would reduce the market price, thereby de-incentivizing 
poachers by lowering potential profits.130 Two-thirds of CITES 
                                                 
124 See Black Rhino Extinct, White Rhinos Next, supra note 123; Smith, supra 
note 123; see also Black Rhinos, Two Other Species Extinct: The Economics of Conservation, 
INT’L BUS. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011. 
125 See Black Rhinos, Two Other Species Extinct: The Economics of Conservation, 
supra note 124; Neo Maditla, We’re Stepping Up to Rhino War—Conservationists: 
Prosecutors Getting Special Training, CAPE ARGUS (S. Afr.), Dec. 15, 2011 (stating that 
in the 1930s there were fewer than 100 white rhino left in the world; today there 
are about 20,000). 
126 See Maditla, supra note 125; see also Slater-Jones, supra note 16. 
127 See Head of UN-Backed Convention Urges Greater Effort to Combat Illegal 
Rhino Trade, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.un.org/ 
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40361&Cr=endangered&Cr1=#.UNICp4VpfSk.  
128 See id. 
129 See Sheree Bega, Vietnamese Issued with 69% of Rhino Hunting Licenses, 
SAT. STAR (S. Afr.), Nov. 19, 2011, http://www.security.co.za/ 
fullStory.asp?NewsId=19600; John Hume, Op-Ed., Seven Good Reasons to Legalize 
Rhino Horn Trade, TIMES (S. Afr.), Mar. 28, 2012, 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/ilive/2012/03/28/seven-good-reasons-to-legalise-
rhino-horn-trade-ilive (Mr. Hume lists seven reasons he believes the trade should 
be legal. For example, he advocates giving consumers the option of buying from a 
legal source; he argues the horn can be harvested sustainably; and he claims the 
rhino numbers would increase). 
130 See Bega, supra note 129; see also Parks Sitting on U.S. $10 Million Ivory, 
HERALD (Zim.), Oct. 12, 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201110130194.html; 
Michael Eustace, Op-Ed, Legal Horn Trade Could Save Our Rhino 13 and Africa’s 
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member nations in attendance at the meeting would have to agree for 
CITES to lift the ban on rhino horn trade.131 Such a majority seems 
unlikely given the current state of rhinoceros populations around the 
world. South Africa considered lifting its ban on rhino horn trading 
and commissioned a national study on the viability of legalization and 
its potential impact on the global market.132 However, South Africa 
has stated it is not ready to propose lifting the ban and has tabled any 
proposal until 2016.133 
In July 2012, CITES held its 62nd meeting of the Standing 
Committee, in which over 350 participants—from parties, to 
                                                 
Parks, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.), Jan. 20. 2012 (this opinion piece believes that the CITES 
ban on rhino horn trading simply pushed the trade underground, where it has 
flourished and created a black market.  The trade has made criminals rich and has 
degenerated Africa’s parks. If the rhino horn trade was legal, South Africa could 
supply the market with approximately 600 rhino horns from natural deaths, as well 
as from their private government stock, which would supply the market for several 
years and effectively curb poaching. This would be the most cost-effective 
approach for the countries involved. The article proposes a central selling 
organization, with owners of rhinos, buyers, and sellers sharing in the profits, 
meaning a lot money will go to the South Africa government, as the largest number 
of rhinos is under national park control. The horns would be marked and have a 
DNA signature so there would be no room for fraud. The article acknowledges the 
opposing argument—that legalizing the trade will further stimulate the illegal trade 
and that the demand for the horns is insatiable. But the author believes that there 
will be no room for an illegal market if there is a legal one). 
131 See Parks Sitting on U.S. $10 Million Ivory, supra note 130. 
132 See Tony Carnie, Proposal to Lift Rhino Horn Trade Ban Revisited, 
MERCURY (S. Afr.), Sept. 1, 2011; Masoka Dube, Study into Legalizing Rhino Horn 
Trade, STAR (S. Afr.), Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/study-into-
legalising-rhino-horn-trade-1.1148961; Statement by Edna Molewa, Minister of 
Water and Environmental Affairs on Rhino Poaching After Engaging Provinces 
(Oct. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Molewa Rhino Poaching Statement], 
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=22317&tid=45
856; see also Eustace, supra note 130. 
133 See Tony Carnie, SA ‘Not Ready’ to Lift Ban on Horn Trade, MERCURY 
(S. Afr.), Apr. 5, 2012,  http://www.iol.co.za/ mercury/sa-not-ready-to-lift-rhino-
horn-trade-ban-1.1270655#.UUuxvIVpcy8 (reporting that South Africa is not 
ready to propose a lift on the 30 year old ban on the rhino horn trade. The article 
reports that South Africa still sees many hurdles in its way before it can consider 
this option, such as legalities and formal support from the trade partners in Asia); 
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intergovernmental bodies, to non-governmental organizations—met 
to discuss the agenda for the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties.134 
The committee made decisions concerning countries involved in the 
ivory trade, trade in rhino horns, and trade in tigers.135 Vietnam was 
instructed to prepare a report on its progress, on measures taken to 
supplant the illegal trade, and its current inventory of rhinoceros 
hunting trophies.136 Failure to do so could result in a suspension of all 
trade in any species listed under CITES.137 The Standing Committee 
also instructed CITES’s Rhino Working Group138 to develop a 
                                                 
134 See CITES Meeting to Tackle Smuggling of Elephant Ivory and Rhino Horn, 
UNEP NEWS CTR. (July 25, 2012), http://www.unep.org/newscentre/ 
default.aspx?DocumentID=2691&ArticleID=9234. 
135 See CITES Bares Teeth, But Can It Bite?, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND 
GLOBAL  (July 27, 2012), http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?205796=. 
136 See id.; CITES Acts to Curb Smuggling of Elephant Ivory and Rhino Horn, 
WEB NEWSWIRE (Aug. 10, 2012), http://htsyndication.com/htsportal/ 
article?arid=%2275460%22&pub=%22Web+Newswire%22. 
137See id. 
138 At its 61st meeting in August 2011, the Standing Committee 
established a Rhinoceros Working Group tasked with identifying measures that 
could be taken by CITES Parties to reduce the impact of illegal trade on the 
conservation of rhinoceroses and to enhance existing controls on trade in 
rhinoceros horn products. CITES Notification to the Parties No. 2012/014, 
Conservation Of and Trade In African and Asian Rhinoceroses (Feb. 20, 2012), 
www.cites.org/eng/notif/2012/E014.pdf. The Working Group acknowledged that 
Vietnam was a major county involved in the trafficking problem and requested 
Vietnam answer the following questions to present at the Sixteenth Conference of 
the Parties: (a) the legislation governing rhino horn trade and penalties for illegal 
trade; (b) measures implemented to prevent illegal import and trade in rhino horn; 
(c) current ongoing activities to combat illegal rhino horn trade; (d) specific 
enforcement actions over the past three years to prevent illegal trade in rhino horn 
and the results of such operations; (e) is a multi-disciplinary approach followed to 
prevent illegal rhino horn trade and if so which authorities are involved?; (f) 
measures implemented to prevent rhino horns from going into commercial trade. 
For example, are owners of such horns mandated to hold possession licenses? Are 
they allowed to give away or sell the horn in their possession? Are there specific 
legislation for this purpose?; (g) what measures are in place to monitor the retail 
market?; (h) efforts to curtail advertising of rhino horn, including via Internet; (i) 
are the use of rhino horn as a palliative medicine for cancer in any way allowed?; (j) 
what are being done to curtail the use of rhino horn as an additive to drinks, etc.?; 
(k) provision, in a table, detailing how many seizures of rhino horn they have made, 
how many people have been arrested, how many convictions and the sentences 
rendered, etc.; and (l) feedback with regard to progress made in the stock check of 
rhinoceros hunting trophies to verify the use of such trophies. CITES, Interpretation 
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“demand reduction strategy.”139 More than 50 countries submitted 
proposals regarding species protection to the Standing Committee to 
be heard at the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties.140 
In March 2013, CITES celebrated forty years at its Sixteenth 
Conference of the Parties held in Bangkok, Thailand.141 The 
conference added to and toughened agreements on the trade of rhino 
horns, including “measures to boost forensic testing of seized or 
stockpiled contraband, a strategy that uses DNA and other scientific 
clues to pursue poachers and smugglers.”142 Additionally, delegates 
approved the requirement that the eight countries where most illegal 
trade in rhino horns occurs—China, Kenya, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda and Vietnam—must increase 
enforcement efforts or risk sanctions.143 Based on the answers 
Vietnam submitted to the Rhino Working Group, the delegates at the 
Sixteenth Conference of the Parties decided the following: the South 
African restriction against granting hunting permits to Vietnamese 
citizens will remain in place, Vietnam must continue to monitor and 
protect rhinos, Vietnam should increase surveillance at ports and 
airports, and Vietnam must continue to report to the Secretariat all 
measures it has taken to regulate the possession of rhino hunting 
trophies and provide “updated details of seizures and prosecutions, 
including details of penalties imposed.”144 The Conference also 
recognized that Vietnam has made some strides, such as educating 
rangers, customs officials, and the public, and collaborating with 
                                                 
and Implementation of the Convention: Species Trade and Conservation: Rhinoceroses, CoP16 
Doc. 54.1 (Rev. 1) (Mar. 3-14, 2013), at 4 [hereinafter CITES CoP16 Doc. 54.1], 
http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/index.php. 
139 See CITES Bares Teeth, But Can It Bite?, supra note 135. 
140 See New Protections Sought for Polar Bear, Elephants, Manta Rays and Other 
Species Under UN-Backed Treaty, UN NEWS CTR. (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43222; Drive for Legislation, 
Control of Rhino Horn Sales, STAR (S. Afr.), May 22, 2012, at 6 (detailing one such 
proposal by the KwaZulu-Natal conservation boss to create a legal global trade 
organization for rhino horn). 
141 CITES, http://www.cites.org/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2013). 
142 See Russell McLendon, 5 Big Breakthroughs at CITES 2013, MOTHER 
NATURE NETWORK (Mar. 20, 2013, 3:55 PM), http://www.mnn.com/earth-
matters/animals/blogs/5-big-breakthroughs-at-cites-2013. 
143 See id. 
144 See CITES CoP16 Doc. 54.1, supra note 138, at 5-8. 
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international organizations; however, more needs to be done to 
combat the poaching and trafficking problem.145 
B.  The United Nations Environment Programme 
In 2002, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed a 
strategic plan, proffered by the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CPCBD), to achieve a 
“significant reduction in the current state of biodiversity loss at the 
global, regional, and national levels” by 2010.146 In 2010, proclaimed 
the International Year of Biodiversity, UNEP released reports on the 
state of biodiversity147 in areas around the world.148 Since CITES falls 
under the UNEP, UNEP’s biodiversity initiatives require discussion. 
1.  The State of Biodiversity in Africa 
The report on Africa focuses primarily on the key threats to 
African biodiversity.149 Africa was unable to meet its 2010 
biodiversity goal because of its failure to implement biodiversity 
                                                 
145 See id. at 6. For a more in depth report on the findings of the 
Secretariat, see CITES, Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention: Species Trade 
and Conservation: Rhinoceroses, CoP16 Doc. 54.2 (Rev. 1) (Mar. 3-14, 2013), 
http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/index.php. 
146 See U. N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, STATE OF BIODIVERSITY IN AFRICA 1 
(2010) [hereinafter UNEP BIODIVERSITY REPORT: AFRICA], 
http://www.cbd.int/iyb/doc/celebrations/iyb-egypt-state-of-biodiversity-in-
africa.pdf; U. N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, STATE OF BIODIVERSITY IN ASIA AND THE 
PACIFIC 1 (2010) [hereinafter UNEP BIODIVERSITY REPORT: ASIA], 
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/regional%20brief%20for%20Asia%20and
%20Pacific.pdf. 
147 The UNEP states “[t]he word ‘biodiversity’ is a contraction of 
biological diversity. Diversity is a concept which refers to the range of variation or 
differences among some set of entities; biological diversity thus refers to variety 
within the living world. The term ‘biodiversity’ is indeed commonly used to 
describe the number, variety and variability of living organisms. This very broad 
usage, embracing many different parameters, is essentially a synonym of ‘Life on 
Earth.’” What is Biodiversity?, U. N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, WORLD CONSERVATION 
MONITORING CTR., http://www.unep-wcmc.org/what-is-biodiversity_50.html 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2012). 
148 See id. 
149 UNEP BIODIVERSITY REPORT: AFRICA, supra note 146, at 1. 
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strategies into government programs.150 Despite the failure to meet 
biodiversity goals, forty-nine countries in Africa have national 
biodiversity plans; many of these countries have reported on the 
effectiveness of those plans, and many have expanded their protected 
areas for biodiversity.151 
The report encourages African nations to integrate 
biodiversity into developing plans and policies to help effectively 
manage the numerous threats to Africa’s biodiversity.152 While there 
have been improvements, UNEP additionally urges expanding 
awareness of biodiversity’s importance for the country, the economy, 
and the welfare of society.153 
2. The State of Biodiversity in Asia and the Pacific 
Like Africa, the countries in Asia and the Pacific also failed to 
achieve the CPCBD’s biodiversity goals.154 Asia and the Pacific are 
home to the highest number of endangered species in the world as 
well as the world’s highest concentration of people, creating unique 
threats to Asia’s biodiversity.155 These nations have, however, shown 
their awareness of biodiversity concerns by expanding protected 
areas and preserving ecosystems.156 
The awareness of and concern about biodiversity in both 
Africa and Asia can serve only to strengthen protection for 
endangered species, such as the white rhinoceros. With the increase 
in protected areas for biodiversity on both continents, regulations, 
and international treaties, hopefully the poaching of white rhinoceros, 
as well as other endangered species, will decrease. 
                                                 
150 See id. 
151 See id. at 1-2. 
152 See id. at 9-10. 
153 See id. 
154 UNEP BIODIVERSITY REPORT: ASIA, supra note 146, at 2. 
155 See id.  
156 See id. at 4-5. 
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C.  The World Trade Organization Agreements 
While there is no specific WTO agreement on the 
environment,157 the goal of environmental protection has been 
fundamental to the WTO since its inception.158 Because 
environmental protection is an important goal, WTO rules encourage 
member countries to create and implement trade-related measures 
aimed at addressing environmental concerns.159 These measures must 
not conflict with the overall objective of the WTO by restricting 
trade or affecting the rights of other WTO members.160 Member 
nations have the right to adopt regulations on trade to protect the 
environment as long as these regulations comply with the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).161 If such regulations are 
exempt under GATT, the regulations may still be justified under 
Article XX.162 During negotiations in the Doha Round,163 WTO 
                                                 
157 International trade in endangered species would most likely be 
contained in a WTO agreement on environmental conservation, if such an 
agreement existed. 
158 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh 
Agreement] (the goals of protecting and sustaining the environment are found in 
the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement and they relate to the overall objectives 
of the WTO, which are to reduce international trade barriers and eliminate 
discriminatory treatment in international trade); see also An Introduction to Trade and 
Environment in the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_intro_e.htm (last visited Apr. 
6, 2013). 
159 See WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: Introduction, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_intro_e.htm (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
160 See id. (many exceptions to environmental protection rules have been 
created to ensure a balance between member countries’ rights to basic trade and 
their rights to create regulations concerning the environment and public health). 
161 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947) [hereinafter GATT] (GATT is one of the founding 
agreements of the WTO. Established in 1947, GATT sets forth many of the rules 
and agreements followed by the WTO). 
162 See WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: Introduction, supra note 159. 
(Article XX of GATT lays out exceptions in which member countries may create 
environmental regulations that are exempted from GATT rules, such as regulations 
necessary to protect the health of humans, animals or plants.) 
163 See The Doha Round, WORLD TRADE ORG.,  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) 
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member nations are currently addressing environmental issues 
relating explicitly to multilateral trade negotiation for the first time, 
with the overarching objective of enhancing the “mutual 
supportiveness of trade and environment.”164 
WTO rules do not take precedence over national regulations 
respecting the conservation of endangered species.165 However, if 
there is a conflict between WTO rules and a member nation’s 
environmental regulations, the WTO will encourage collaboration to 
solve the dispute.166 For example, the United States, a member 
nation, enacted legislation to protect sea turtles, a species on the 
brink of extinction due largely to incidental capture from commercial 
fishing.167 This created a conflict between the member nations who 
wished to protect the sea turtles, and other WTO members who 
engage in commercial fishing.168 The dispute came before the WTO, 
which urged all member nations to work together to create a mutually 
acceptable solution.169 
Could such an arrangement work with white rhinoceros? 
South Africa could enact greater environmental legislation to 
conserve white rhinoceros. Such legislation would most likely create 
conflict between South Africa and other countries whose economies 
rely, to some extent, on illegal rhino horn trading. Vietnam is likely 
one such country.  Is this conflict significant enough for the WTO to 
                                                 
(the Doha Round is the latest round of trade negotiations among WTO members, 
and it seeks to reform twenty areas of international trade by revising trade rules and 
barriers). 
164 See An Introduction to Trade and Environment in the WTO, supra note 158. 
165 See id. 
166 See id. 
167 See An Introduction to Trade and Environment in the WTO, supra note 158; 
India etc. Versus US: ‘Shrimp-Turtle,’ WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis08_e.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 
2013). 
168 See An Introduction to Trade and Environment in the WTO, supra note 158. 
169 See id.; India etc. Versus US: ‘Shrimp-Turtle,’ supra note 167 (the WTO 
encouraged a cooperative environmental solution for the protection of sea turtles 
between the conflicting parties. It allowed the party member wishing to protect the 
sea turtles to create legislation that would not, in good faith, prohibit other 
countries from fishing. This “encouragement” worked and the parties ended up 
implementing the suggestions of the WTO). 
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get involved? Would the WTO encourage South Africa and Vietnam 
to collaborate and resolve the dispute? Since WTO agreements 
restrict Vietnam’s right to trade, the WTO would probably not 
resolve such disputes between these countries, but a WTO resolution 
is still a useful consideration. Additionally, the Doha Round 
negotiations relating to trade and the environment may help eliminate 
the illegal rhino trade. 
IV.  THE CURRENT STATE OF THE RHINOCEROS TRADE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA AND VIETNAM 
Member nations must enact domestic laws to enforce 
international agreements like CITES. This section explores how 
South Africa and Vietnam are domestically implementing CITES, 
examining the current state of each county’s laws and enforcement 
and how poachers are eluding those laws. This section also examines 
each country’s response to illegal rhino poaching and trade. 
A.  Current South African Law 
In South Africa, much of the rhinoceros hunting occurs 
legally through the CITES permit system and most permitted hunters 
are Vietnamese.170 Under this system, South African authorities are 
often obliged to issue hunting permits because the permit application 
meets the CITES criteria for trophy hunting.171 However, rhinoceros 
poaching has increased drastically in recent years, largely a result of 
abuses of the permit system by “pseudo-hunters.”172 As a result, 
                                                 
170 See CITES Res. Conf. 2.11, supra note 109; see also Saving the Rhino—
Now, STAR (S. Afr.), Aug. 31, 2011, at 14; Masood BoomGaard, Reports Reveal that 
Most Hunters are Vietnamese, SUN. TRIBUNE (S. Afr.), Jan. 15, 2012, at 11. 
171 See CITES Res. Conf. 2.11, supra note 109; Saving the Rhino—Now, 
supra note 170; BoomGaard, supra note 170; Press Release, S. Afr. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Affairs, Minister Edna Molewa Publishes Proposed Amendments to the Norms 
and Standards for Marking of Rhinoceros Horn and Hunting of White Rhinoceros 
for Trophy Hunting Purposes (Sept. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Molewa Amendments 
Press Release], http://www.environment.gov.za/?q=content/molewa_normsand 
standards_rhinohunting. 
172 See Bega, supra note 129 (stating that over sixty-nine percent of 
hunting permits granted in South Africa have gone to Vietnamese “pseudo-
hunters” who are fueling the rhino poaching crisis). Pseudo hunters, unlike classic 
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South Africa’s Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, Edna 
Molewa, has proposed several amendments to the current permit 
system.173 
Among Minister Molewa’s suggestions is the mandatory 
micro-chipping174 of all rhinoceros horns, to be monitored and 
maintained by South Africa’s Department of Environmental 
Affairs.175 Currently, the Department is responsible for, inter alia, 
maintaining environmental quality and protection, managing ocean 
and coastal resources, and promoting conservation.176 Thus, 
protecting the white rhino is clearly within the Department’s purview. 
Minister Molewa has also suggested strengthening control over white 
rhino hunts, creating a more stringent hunting permit called a 
“TOPS” permit,177 and having a conservation official supervise all 
hunts and provide full reports to the Department.178 All applicants 
would be required to provide proof of membership to a hunting 
organization recognized by their home country to even be considered 
                                                 
hunters truly engaged in trophy hunting, hunt the rhinos and take the horns back 
with them to Vietnam to sell on the black market, thus abusing the CITES permit 
system. Id. 
173 See Molewa Amendments Press Release, supra note 171. 
174 See id. Under the micro-chipping proposal, the permit issuing 
authority would implant one micro-chip into all rhinoceros, whether state owned or 
privately owned, as well as all the horns obtained from dehorning; the micro-chip 
numbers would be put into the Traffic Rhino Horn Stockpile Database, and would 
be kept on the Department of Environmental Affairs’ national database so that the 
South African government can keep track of all rhino horns and their movements. 
175 See id. 
176 S. AFR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. AFFAIRS, STRATEGIC PLAN: 1 APRIL 2011 
TO 31 MARCH 2016, at 22-43 (undated), http://www.info.gov.za/view/Download 
FileAction?id=175474 (outlining the vision, mission, values, goals, strategic 
objectives, and policy initiatives for South Africa’s Department of Environmental 
Affairs regarding the country’s environment). 
177 See Molewa Amendments Press Release, supra note 171 (“TOPS” 
stands for “threatened or protected species”). This permit would enable the issuing 
authority to trace rhino horns back to the hunt’s location. Id. 
178 See id. 
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for a TOPS permit, which would be restricted to one white rhino 
trophy per year.179 
Minister Molewa has also stated that South Africa should 
refuse all rhino hunting permit applications from Vietnam.180 
Furthermore, Minister Molewa’s proposed amendments would 
mandate that, before exporting the trophy, a hunter take his kill to a 
local taxidermist and have a micro-chip installed in the rhino’s 
horn.181 Finally, the amendments propose taking DNA samples from 
rhinos before and after death to assist law enforcement in 
prosecutions.182 While these amendments are being considered, 
Minister Molewa has recommended a moratorium on rhinoceros 
hunting.183 However, hunters fear a moratorium would only increase 
rhino poaching, causing even more harm.184 
To implement Minister Molewa’s proposed amendments, 
South African lawmakers must amend South Africa’s Biodiversity Act 
of 2004, specifically Chapter Seven, where the CITES permit system 
is encoded.185 The purpose of the Biodiversity Act is to manage and 
conserve biodiversity within South Africa by protecting threatened or 
protected species186 and “[giving] effect to ratified international 
agreements relating to biodiversity which are binding on [South 
                                                 
179 See Strict New Rules to Curb Rhino Poaching, Control Hunts, PRETORIA 
NEWS (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/strict-new-rules-to-
curb-rhino-poaching-control-hunts-1.1277833#.UWh0tqKG2So. 
180 See Sue Blaine, No Rhino Hunt Permits for Vietnam, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.), 
Apr. 5, 2012, http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2012/04/05/no-rhino-hunt-
permits-for-vietnam. 
181 See Molewa Amendments Press Release, supra note 171. 
182 See id. 
183 See Molewa Rhino Poaching Statement, supra note 132 (if the 
moratorium were to go into effect, no rhinoceros hunting would be permissible, 
even if it had been permissible under the permit system. Minister Molewa has 
considered recommending a moratorium as a last resort to end rhino poaching. 
The minister can impose a moratorium if there is clear abuse or a complete collapse 
in the permit system.); see also Merten, supra note 19 (stating that Minister Molewa 
hopes to begin the moratorium soon, but that it will be a challenge and will 
probably not begin any sooner than late 2012). 
184 See Ban Worries Hunters, MERCURY (S. Afr.), Sept. 2, 2011, at 3. 
185  Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 ch. 7 (S. Afr.), http://www.info.gov.za/ 
acts/2004/a10-04/. 
186    Id. § 51. 
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Africa].”187 The Minister of Environmental Management is 
responsible for ensuring that the Act’s objectives are being achieved; 
currently, Minister Molewa holds this position.188 The Act also 
establishes the South African Nation Biodiversity Institute—the 
scientific authority CITES suggests—to monitor and report on the 
state of biodiversity in South Africa.189 
Chapter Seven of the Act implements the permit system.190 
This Chapter sets out the permit application standards,191 
requirements,192 and provides a permit cancellation process.193 
Chapter Seven also creates an appeals procedure for those unhappy 
with the decision of the issuing authority.194 Under this system, a 
rhinoceros hunter hoping to keep the horn as a trophy needs four 
separate permits: one to tranquilize the rhino, one to dehorn it, one 
to transport the horn, and one to keep it.195 
One of the Minister’s proposed amendments will allow the 
issuing authority to postpone its decisions on a permit application if 
the applicant is under investigation for a violation of the Biodiversity 
Act relating specifically to rhinoceros hunting.196 Another would 
create a new provision suspending an issued permit if the permit 
holder is under investigation.197 These new amendments will 
hopefully reduce the abuse and fraud within the permit system by 
                                                 
187 Id. § 2. 
188 Id. §§ 1, 9, 35. 
189 See id. §§ 10-12, 59-61. 
190 Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 § 87. 
191 Id. § 88 (stating that any person may apply, the issuing authority’s 
powers, and the conditions which must be met in order to grant an applicant a 
permit). 
192 Id. § 90 (stating that a permit must specify its purpose, the time it will 
be valid, any specified conditions, and any other matters prescribed). 
193 See id. § 93 (stating the issuing authority may cancel a permit at any 
time if the permit was issued under false pretenses or the permit holder failed to 
comply with the permits conditions and/or any provisions of the Act, South 
African law, or international law regarding the permitted activity). 
194 See id. §§ 94-96. 
195 See Slater-Jones, supra note 16. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. 
 
2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:1 
212 
warning the issuing authorities of possible fraud and giving them the 
authority to act. 
Because white rhinos are considered “threatened or 
protected” species, the South African Biodiversity Act requires 
national protection for them.198 Therefore, the majority of the white 
rhinos live in national parks. South Africa has nineteen national 
parks, including the world-renowned Kruger National Park.199 Kruger 
is known for its impressive size, its diversity of species, its advanced 
environmental management and conservation, and its approximately 
5,000 rhinoceros.200 Due to Kruger’s size—which makes going 
undetected easier for poachers—and prevalence of rhinoceros, most 
of the world’s white rhino poaching occurs in Kruger National 
Park.201 In fact, wildlife officials have started removing signs 
indicating where rhinos can be found around the park—which were 
in place to aid sight-seers and safari groups hoping to spot a rhino—
to prevent poachers from using the signs to track down rhinos.202 
Authorities have also proposed reinstalling an electrified fence along 
the park’s border with neighboring Mozambique to physically deter 
poachers from entering.203 
In addition to the national parks, South Africa has state game 
preserves that carry-out regional biodiversity conservation in their 
specific province and provide for eco-tourism.204 These preserves are 
                                                 
198 See Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 § 56. 
199 S. AFR. NAT’L PARKS, http://sanparks.org.za/parks/ (last visited Apr. 
6, 2013). 
200 Kruger National Park, S. AFR. NAT’L PARKS, 
http://sanparks.org.za/parks/kruger/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
201 See Merten, supra note 19; Update on Rhino Poaching Statistics, supra note 
29. 
202 Kraig Becker, Signs Indicating Locations of Rhinos Being Removed from Kruger 
National Park, GADLING TRAVEL BLOG (Dec. 15, 2011, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.gadling.com/2011/12/15/signs-indicating-locations-of-rhinos-being-
removed-from-kruger-n/. 
203 See Sheree Bega, Kruger Fence ‘Only Temporary Deterrent,’ CAPE ARGUS (S. 
Afr.), Jan. 21, 2012, at 10. 
204 See, e.g., EZEMVELO KZN WILDLIFE, http://www.kznwildlife.com/ 
index.php?/About-l-Biodiversity-Conservation-l-Ezemvelo-KZN-Wildlife.html 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife is a game-preserve that 
manages the biodiversity conservation and eco-tourism of the provincial regions of 
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also areas subject to poaching, although to a lesser extent.205 
Additionally, poachers are increasingly targeting private game 
reserves since security and anti-poaching measures have expanded in 
the national parks.206 On a more positive note, South Africa’s wildlife 
sanctuaries help care for injured and orphaned animals, such as the 
rhino calves who are orphaned after their mothers have been 
poached.207 
The amendments proposed by Minister Molewa and the 
actions of park and preserve officials are not the only 
recommendations offered to stop white rhinoceros poaching. One 
additional option to deter poaching may be preemptive government 
dehorning of the rhinos.208 The South African government is 
currently undertaking a rhinoceros dehorning impact study to 
determine the feasibility of this option.209 Another alternative might 
be to inject the horn with a parasiticide that is toxic to humans.210 
This plan was proposed by the Rhino Rescue Project211 seeking a 
                                                 
Khahlamba-Drakensberg, Zululand, and the coastal region. The organization’s 
officers work in the communities bordering protected areas to ensure that the 
province’s conservation legislation is being implemented). 
205 See Merten, supra note 19. 
206 See id. 
207 About Us, SANWILD.ORG, http://www.sanwild.org/about.html (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2013) (SanWild was funded by a wildlife conservation activist who 
began taking in orphaned and injured animals herself while working for a game 
preserve. Noticing the need for a rehabilitation center, as well as the unwillingness 
of national parks, game preserves, and private game farms to help rehabilitated 
animals back into the wild, the founder of SanWild purchased a large sector of 
land, which has since grown, and began her own rehabilitation center and 
sanctuary. SanWild rescues injured and orphaned wild animals and secures the 
animals’ long-term welfare and safety). 
208 See, e.g., Merten, supra note 19; Slater-Jones, supra note 16; Molewa 
Rhino Poaching Statement, supra note 132. 
209 See, e.g., Merten, supra note 19; Slater-Jones, supra note 16; Molewa 
Rhino Poaching Statement, supra note 132. 
210 See Charl Du Plessis, Poachers’ Toxic Shock, TIMES (S. Afr.), Sept . 8, 
2011, http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/ 2011/09/08/rhino-poachers-toxic-shock. 
211 Rhino Rescue Project, Swaziland, ECOVOLUNTEER NETWORK, 
http://greenvolunteers.com/rhino.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (the rhino rescue 
project is a group of volunteers who aim to protect wildlife, particularly the white 
and black rhinoceros, from poaching). 
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more humane way to reduce poaching than dehorning.212 The 
injected parasiticide would benefit the rhino by targeting ticks, but if 
it is ingested by humans, the poison can induce nausea, vomiting, and 
convulsions.213 The parasiticide is also infused with a dye that is 
detectable by x-ray, enabling the injected horns to be easily identified 
in airports when being illegally transported.214 This alternative, along 
with micro-chipping, has been implemented on at least ten 
rhinoceros so far this year; one rhinoceros died as a result of the 
operation.215 Some skeptics believe these options will not deter 
poaching because it is unlikely that a sufficient number of rhinos will 
be caught to dehorn or inject with the dye.216 
B. South African Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement is the key to decreasing poaching and 
conserving the white rhinoceros. Multiple law enforcement agencies 
are involved, including: the police, park rangers, the justice system, 
and specialized committees. 
                                                 
212 See Du Plessis, supra note 210. 
213 See id. 
214 See id.; see also Dube, supra note 67. 
215 See, e.g., Geoffrey York, Anti-rhino-poaching Treatment Ends in Heartbreak 
in Africa, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Feb. 9, 2012, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/worldview/anti-rhino-poaching-
treatment-ends-in-heartbreak-in-africa/article545097/ (reporting that Spencer, a 20 
year old male rhino, died during a procedure to inject his horn with the pesticide, a 
dye, a micro-chip, and a tracking device. Spencer’s heart stopped while he was still 
under the anesthetic. The veterinarian performing the procedure believed the death 
may have been because of Spencer’s old age and has stated that, while Spencer’s 
death is tragic, he will not discontinue injecting horns with pesticide and dye); 
Shaun Smillie, Horn-chipping Operation Kicks Off, STAR (S. Afr.), Feb. 9, 2012, at 3; 
Sheree Bega, Poisoned Rhino Horn Plan Goes Awry, STAR (A. Afr.), Feb. 11, 2012, at 7 
(reporting that Spencer’s death will not “be in vain” as veterinarians will continue 
to try this practice to stop poaching. The procedure Spencer underwent went 
“smoothly.” The main concern was Spencer’s age). 
216 See Dube, supra note 67. 
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1. South Africa’s Police Force 
South Africa’s main police force is the South African Police 
Service (SAPS).217 Minister Molewa considers SAPS to be at the 
forefront of the fight against poaching, commenting that SAPS 
continues to strengthen its biodiversity enforcement and monitoring 
capacities.218 SAPS works closely with other, more specialized crime 
units, such as Hawks,219 and INTERPOL’s Wildlife Crime Working 
Group.220 
Although SAPS officers are prohibited from commenting on 
rhinoceros poaching,221 it is still apparent that SAPS is doing its job. 
There are frequent press releases about police arrests of suspected 
poachers and traffickers.222 Reports indicate 165 arrests of suspected 
poachers in 2010, 232 arrests in 2011, 267 arrests in 2012, and 61 
arrests as of March 2013; the large majority occurred in Kruger 
National Park.223 Arrests at international airports also occur as 
                                                 
217 Vision and Mission, S. AFR. POLICE SERV., http://www.saps.gov.za/ 
org_profiles/vision_mission.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (SAPS responsibilities 
include preventing, combating and investigating crimes, protecting inhabitants of 
South Africa, upholding and enforcing the law, ensuring criminals are brought to 
justice, and participating in efforts to address the causes of crime). 
218 See Molewa Press Release on Poaching Scourge, supra note 19. 
219 See id.; Slater-Jones, supra note 16 (the Hawks are a specialized 
organized crime unit considered to be the leading police agency in the fight against 
rhino poaching). 
220 See Molewa Press Release on Poaching Scourge, supra note 19. The 
Wildlife Crime Working Group is a part of INTERPOL focusing its expertise and 
experience on the poaching, trafficking, or possession of legally protected flora and 
fauna, like the white rhino. It is the international police authority for enforcing 
CITES and created a practical guide explaining the operations of both INTERPOL 
and CITES and making specific recommendations regarding the cooperation 
between them. Environmental Crime Committee, INTERPOL http://www.interpol.int 
/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Environmental-Crime-Committee/Wildlife-
Crime-Working-Group (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
221 See Mandla Khoza & Masoka Dube, Comment on Rhino Poaching 
Restricted, STAR (S. Afr.), Sept. 12, 2011, at 6, http://www.iol.co.za/the-
star/comment-on-rhino-poaching-restricted-1.1135346#.UUxhQIVpfC4 (SAPS 
Commissioner banned all officers, provincial and regional, from commenting on 
rhino poaching incidents). 
222 See sources cited infra notes 224-25. 
223 See Rhino Poaching Arrests Up in South Africa, UPI.COM (Mar. 22, 2012, 
9:42 PM), http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2012/03/22/Rhino-poaching-
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customs officers in South Africa work closely with SAPS and the 
Hawks to thwart international smuggling.224 A manager at OR Tambo 
International Airport stated that airports “have a role to play in 
maximizing security to prevent criminal activities in and out of the 
country.”225 SAPS has even licensed private game farmers to carry 
semi-automatic weapons in hopes that they will assist SAPS in 
catching the rhino poachers.226 In addition, police often offer rewards 
for information leading to the arrest of poachers.227 Finally, SAPS is 
also working closely with the National Joints Operation (NatJoints), 
which created a special committee and elevated rhino poaching to the 
highest level of security management.228 
                                                 
arrests-up-in-South-Africa/UPI-87401332466959/; South Africa: Over 200 Alleged 
Rhino Poachers Arrested, BUANEWS (Nov. 3, 2011), http://allafrica.com 
/stories/201111040112.html; Update on Rhino Poaching Statistics, supra note 29; 
Vietnamese Man Arrested for Illegally Possessing Rhino Horns, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY 
(China) (Apr. 23, 2012), http://english.cri.cn/6966/2012/04/24/3123s695120.htm 
(in 2012 a Vietnamese man was found and arrested in OR International Airport 
with millions of rand worth of rhino horn). 
224 E.g., Press Release, Joint Statement by the SARS and Crime Line, 
Another Blow for Rhino Syndicate (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201111080070.html; see also Frankfurt’s Wildlife Sniffer 
Dogs Draw Interest from European Airports, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Ger.) (Sept. 8, 2011), 
http://www.dw.de/frankfurts-wildlife-sniffer-dogs-draw-interest-from-european-
airports/a-15359372 (explaining how dogs are used to protect endangered species 
from illegal international trade by sniffing out wildlife contraband in luggage at 
customs. The practice started in Frankfurt, Germany, and has since expanded to 
more European airports. This practice puts added pressure on smugglers engaged 
in illegal international trade of endangered species. Since its inception in Germany, 
the dogs have found over 250 illegally smuggled animals or animal products, 
including rhinoceros horns, causing seizures by officers to increase across Europe). 
225 Airports Add Weight to Fight Against Poachers, TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012, 12:23 
AM), http://www.timeslive.co.za/business/2012/02/08/airports-add-weight-to-
fight-against-poachers. 
226 See Wyndham Hartley, Semi-automatic Arms to Fight Rhino Poachers, BUS. 
DAY (Sept. 23, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2011/ 
09/23/semi-automatic-arms-to-fight-rhino-poachers. 
227 See Rhino Poaching: A R500,000 Reward Offered for Information, 
BIZCOMMUNITY.COM (Feb. 13, 2012), http://m.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/ 
507/70706.html. 
228 See Molewa Press Release on Poaching Scourge, supra note 19. 
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2. South Africa’s National Park Rangers 
The national park rangers and officers are also integral players 
in law enforcement. To help combat poachers, South Africa has 
increased its number of park rangers. For example, within the last 
year approximately fifty-seven rangers have been added to Kruger 
National Park alone.229 As recently as August 2012, South Africa 
National Parks (SANParks) inaugurated 150 new rangers230 and 
implemented new “hi-tech” techniques to fight poachers.231 Minister 
Molewa commended the rangers’ work and innovative methods in 
fighting poaching.232 In addition, a volunteer ranger organization 
called “Honorary Rangers” donated millions of dollars of anti-
poaching equipment, including compasses, camouflage equipment, 
and first-aid kits, to rangers in Kruger National Park.233 The park 
rangers “risk their lives daily to protect wildlife from poachers and 
traders.”234 In fact, while tracking poachers with a team of other 
rangers, one ranger was mistakenly shot and killed after the group 
                                                 
229 See id. 
230 See SANParks Step Up the Fight Against Poaching in Kruger National Park, 
BIZCOMMUNITY.COM (Aug 2, 2012), http://www.bizcommunity.com 
/Article/196/507/79467.html. 
231 See Going to War For Rhinos, INDEP. ON SAT. (S. Afr.), July 28, 2012, at 
7 (outlining several new “hi-tech” techniques rangers are now using to track and 
catch poachers, including a rhino horn DNA database, unique dog tracking 
systems, and helicopters). 
232 See Molewa Press Release on Poaching Scourge, supra note 19. 
233 See Tony Carnie, Kruger Rangers Kitted Out to Tackle Poachers, MERCURY 
(S. Afr.), Nov. 15, 2011, at 5, http://www.iol.co.za/mercury/kruger-rangers-kitted-
out-to-tackle-poachers-1.1178315#.UUxkPIVpfC4. 
234 WWF Calls for End to Rhino Poaching on World Rhino Day At Least 287 
Rhinos Have Been Killed in South Africa as Crisis Escalates, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND 
(Sept. 21, 2011), http://worldwildlife.org/press-releases/wwf-calls-for-end-to-
rhino-poaching-on-world-rhino-day (internal quotations omitted). 
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split up.235 In some countries, rangers are trained to kill poachers 
outright if caught.236 
South African park rangers also receive special training from 
the WWF on how to handle a rhinoceros if found hornless.237 The 
rangers are taught to avoid touching the animal and cordon off the 
area.238 Additionally, they are taught to take a DNA sample from the 
rhino to use as forensic evidence to help find the poacher.239 
Recently, however, rangers have begun to strike over pay and terms 
of employment, creating concern for the rhinos under their care.240 
                                                 
235 Ranger Mistaken for Poacher, CAPE ARGUS (S.Afr.), Sept. 13, 2011, at 4; 
see also Gianluca Mezzofiore, Kruger Park Rhino Poaching Wars: Policeman and Ranger 
Shot Dead After Radio Breakdown, INT’L BUS. TIMES NEWS, Apr. 30, 2012, 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/335022/20120430/south-africa-kruger-park-
rhinos-poaching.htm (both police and rangers fighting against poaching have been 
accidently shot). 
236 See Sian Powell, Hunters Now the Hunted, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 30, 2011, 
at 9, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/hunters-now-the-
hunted/story-e6frg6z6-1226232815327 (explaining how park guards in the Indian 
state of Assam “hunt” rhino poachers and shoot to kill, regardless of whether they 
initiate the shooting or flee. The officers are given immunity from prosecution if 
they kill a suspected poacher in protected forests, so the state’s forests have 
become a “bloody battleground.” The officers believe they are simply performing 
their duties and that killing poachers is entirely legal. Additionally, they feel that 
they are keeping the community and tourists safe.); see also Local Rhino Poachers Shot 
Dead, AGENCIA DE INFORMACAO DE MOCAMBIQUE (Mozam.), Jan. 12, 2012, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201201130328.html (recently rangers in Kruger 
National Park killed two suspected poachers during a shoot-out, but this is not the 
general practice in South Africa and the general manager of Kruger has stated that 
he regrets the deaths). 
237 See Maditla, supra note 125. 
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 See Rhinos Threatened By SAF Ranger Strike, VOICE OF AM. (Feb. 6, 
2012), http://www.voanews.com/content/ rhinos-threatened-by-saf-ranger-strike-
138848174/151697.html; Tony Carnie, Kruger Rangers Go On Strike, MERCURY (S. 
Afr.), Feb. 2, 2012, at 3, http://www.iol.co.za/mercury/kruger-rangers-to-go-on-
strike-1.1225684 (stating that while the rangers are on strike, honorary rangers, 
police and the South African National Defense Force will be filling their place in 
the parks). 
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3. South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority 
Another pivotal player is the National Prosecuting Authority 
of South Africa (NPA), the single prosecuting authority in South 
Africa.241 It is the NPA’s sole responsibility to prosecute poachers in 
custody. Poachers can be charged with illegally hunting the white 
rhinoceros in a national park, violating the Biodiversity Act, 
possessing unlicensed fire-arms and ammunition, and illegal trade and 
trafficking.242 Additionally, the NPA is receiving special training from 
the WWF to inform the prosecutors on conservation matters.243 The 
NPA’s understanding is important to ensure that poachers cannot 
evade prosecution and to aid the justice system in determining 
sentences.244 Since this training has commenced, guilty verdicts have 
increased noticeably and prison sentences frequently reach up to 
eight years and, in one instance, even twenty-five years.245 However, 
despite the hard work of the NPA, many people feel that the 
prosecution rates are too low and the cases are taking too long, 
thereby failing to convey a “tough on poaching” message.246 
4. South Africa’s National Anti-Poaching Committee 
One final law enforcement player is the National Anti-
poaching Committee, which was created to improve communications 
and coordination among poaching law enforcement.247 The 
Committee agreed on four initial priorities to help combat rhino 
poaching.248 First, the Committee wants to create a national hotline 
                                                 
241 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 179. 
242 See, e.g., South Africa: Over 200 Alleged Rhino Poachers Arrested, supra note 
223. 
243 See Maditla, supra note 125. 
244 See id. 
245 See id.; see also Erin Conway-Smith, South Africa: Rhino Poachers from 
Mozambique Jailed for 25 Years, GLOBAL POST (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/south-africa/120201/ 
south-africa-rhino-poaching-mozambique-poachers-sentenced-25-years. 
246 See Molewa Press Release on Poaching Scourge, supra note 19. 
247 See National Anti-poaching Committee Established, MAIL & GUARDIAN (S. 
Afr.), Aug. 23, 2010, http://mg.co.za/article/2010-08-23-national-antipoaching-
committee-established. 
248 See id. 
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for reporting rhino poaching.249 Second, the Committee plans on 
coordinating intelligence from all groups involved in fighting rhino 
poaching.250 Third, the Committee hopes to organize a national 
fundraising campaign.251 Fourth, the Committee wants to raise 
poaching awareness among the people of South Africa.252 The 
Committee’s efforts are ongoing. 
C. Current Vietnamese Law 
While South Africa is taking great strides to comply with 
CITES and to deter rhino poaching, Vietnam has a long way to go. 
Recently, poaching forced Vietnam’s native rhinoceros, the Javan 
rhino, into extinction.253 The WWF accuses the Vietnamese 
government of failing to control poaching due to insufficient political 
support for endangered species conservation.254 The WWF stated 
that “significant improvements need to be made in law enforcement 
and protected area management in Vietnam.”255 The WWF also 
ranked Vietnam as the worst Asian or African country for wildlife 
crimes, giving it a “red score” for rhinoceros and tigers.256 
                                                 
249 See id. 
250 See id. 
251 See id. 
252 See National Anti-poaching Committee Established, supra note 247. 
253 See Ives, supra note 70. 
254 See id. 
255 See id. (internal quotations omitted). 
256 See Vietnam at Bottom of WWF Species-Protection Report, GUARDIAN, July 
22, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10348872; Vietnam Accused 
Over Rhino Poaching, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), July 23, 2012, at 28 (describing the 
WWF’s African and Asian country ranking system reflecting progress in each 
country’s protection of endangered species. The WWF ranked 23 countries, giving 
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As a comparison, China, another area of high rhino horn 
trafficking,257 has made considerable efforts to decrease the 
international trade in endangered species.258 Through confiscation of 
weapons, tougher penalties, and awareness campaigns, China has 
reduced the number of criminal cases involving trafficking of 
endangered species.259 In January 2012, China’s State Forestry 
Administration began a crack-down on Chinese auction houses to 
ensure that they are following Chinese wildlife laws and regulations 
and to emphasize that they are subject to the trade ban on 
endangered species.260 Although Vietnam could benefit from 
Chinese-like law enforcement efforts, Vietnam has taken steps to 
raise public awareness through a campaign providing scientific 
research showing the need to protect the rhino.261 
In 2007, the CITES Scientific and Management Authorities 
of Vietnam conducted a voluntary assessment of Vietnam’s wildlife 
trade policies, both domestic and international, to identify strengths 
and weaknesses.262 Vietnam recognized that it is an important 
                                                 
257 See Jessica Hatcher, Op-Ed., Deadly Trade: Rhino Horn Poaching Surges, 
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Dec. 10, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/wildlife 
/8935724/Deadly-trade-rhino-horn-poaching-surges.html (commenting on China 
as a main destination for poached rhino horns, which are used in traditional 
Chinese medicines. The Kenya Wildlife Service has noted a correlation between the 
influx in Chinese labor and poaching; there are about a million Chinese workers 
now in Africa. The author went on safari with many wealthy and influential 
Chinese figures—a safari meant to educate. The article is optimistic about China’s 
efforts to stop the illegal trade of both rhinoceros horns and elephant tusks and the 
author hopes the increase of Chinese laborers and tourists to Africa will help 
spread the word about the evils of poaching). 
258 See Wildlife Smuggling Becomes Rarer But Has Not Gone Extinct, CHINA 
DAILY, Oct. 20, 2011. 
259 See id. 
260 See China Applies Trade Ban to Wildlife Auctions, INT’L FUND FOR 
ANIMAL WELFARE (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.ifaw.org/africa/news/china-
applies-trade-ban-wildlife-auctions. 
261 See VN, South Africa Act on Wildlife Protection, VIET. NEWS AGENCY 
(Sept. 29, 2011, 8:51 PM), http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/VN-South-Africa-act-
on-wildlife-protection/20119/21283.vnplus. 
262 See generally CITES SCIENTIFIC AUTH. OF VIET. & CITES MGMT. 
AUTH. OF VIET., REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF VIETNAM’S WILDLIFE TRADE 
POLICY (2008) [hereinafter VIETNAM WILDLIFE TRADE POLICY REPORT], 
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location for wildlife trade, both legal and illegal.263 Vietnam also 
recognized the importance of biodiversity, which, due to degradation 
and deforestation, has become a critical issue.264 Additionally, 
Vietnam acknowledged its peoples’ traditional consumption of 
wildlife, much of which is legal through the CITES permit program, 
but which has also fueled the well documented and expanding illegal 
trade market.265 As a result of this acknowledgement, after Vietnam 
became a CITES member in 1994, it created a National Action Plan 
aimed at promoting the sustainability of natural resources, improving 
the economy, strictly controlling trade in endangered species, and 
enhancing the efficiency of the agencies which control illegal wildlife 
trade.266 
After Vietnam joined CITES in 1994, the government passed 
several decrees concerning illegal trade in endangered species; two of 
which focus on international trade.267 The first, Decree No. 
11/2002/ND-CP, was passed as the principal legal basis for 
implementing CITES and providing training for enforcement.268 
However, due to its hasty passage, the law overlapped with a 
Vietnamese Customs law, creating confusion regarding the proper 
procedure when species are listed under both laws and resulting in no 
fines being issued for violations of illegal trading under CITES.269 
Therefore, Decree No. 82/2006/ND-CP was passed to remedy the 
problems of Decree No. 11/2002/ND-CP, but it had problems of its 
own.270 It failed to effectively manage punishments for violations or 
craft proper disposal techniques for confiscated specimens.271 
                                                 
http://www.cites.org/common/prog/policy/Vietnam_wildlife_trade_policy_revie
w.pdf. 
263 See id. at 1. 
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Overall, these actions have failed to meet Vietnam’s 
conservation goals and there are still many problem areas concerning 
Vietnam’s wildlife trade policy. One explanation might be Vietnam’s 
attempt to address too many issues at once, making implementation 
much more difficult.272 While there were training programs and 
education about certain endangered species, they did not focus on the 
white rhinoceros, or any rhinoceros for that matter,273 and local 
citizens were provided with little guidance on endangered species.274 
Furthermore, insufficient government funding has made 
implementation difficult and has limited law enforcement agencies, 
resulting in policies which have had very little impact on the illegal 
trade of endangered species.275 
Despite the ineffective implementation, Vietnam’s efforts 
have had a few positive effects. For example, conservation policies 
have created over 120 new special use forests, the decreased 
deforestation, and decreased damage to marine ecosystems.276 
However, Vietnam can do much more to effectively manage the 
illegal trade in wildlife. For example, confusion still exists because of 
overlapping policies among different agencies, and loopholes in 
endangered species legislation make it easy to bypass current laws.277 
So easy, in fact, that some restaurants continue selling prohibited 
rhinoceros horns.278 
Moreover, the rhino horn trade has historically provided jobs 
and income for many of Vietnam’s poor.279 Even if the trade began 
legally and has since become illegal, most traders continue to work 
because it is so hard for them to find another means of income.280 
Without the support and cooperation of traders, policies attempting 
                                                 
272 See VIETNAM WILDLIFE TRADE POLICY REPORT, supra note 262, at 
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to control the illegal trade of wildlife tend to be ineffective. The 
Vietnamese wildlife trade law have not yet met the goals of CITES.281 
D. Vietnamese Law Enforcement 
Despite campaigns to raise awareness and the secretary of the 
Vietnamese embassy in South Africa’s declaration that the rhino horn 
trade is the “shame of [the] nation,”282 Vietnamese law enforcement 
continues to be insufficient—a key area where it cannot afford to be 
lax if it wishes to tackle the problem of rhino poaching. Vietnam’s 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment has taken notice of 
the problem.283 Le Xuan Canh, the director of the Institute of 
Ecology and Biological Resources, has informed the Vietnamese 
government that its poaching problem is due to illegal trade in 
endangered species, deforestation, and lack of wildlife protection.284 
Yet, nothing seems to be happening to correct the problem. 
Vietnam has reported that its law enforcement controls only five to 
ten percent of the total illegal wildlife trade.285 Decree No. 
139/2004/ND-CP contains provisions for punishing those involved 
in the illegal trade of endangered species, making the crime a high 
level offense.286 However, effective law enforcement has been 
difficult because the Decree was developed primarily to combat 
illegal trade in wild flora, which differs substantially from trade in 
fauna because of the size and mobility of some animals.287 
Additionally, law enforcement personnel have received insufficient 
                                                 
281 See id. 
282 See Vietnam, South Africa Sign MOU on Anti-Smuggling of Rhino Horn, 
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283 See Fewer Than 50 Tigers Still Left in the Wild, VIET. MINISTRY OF 
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information concerning the illegal trade and the CITES requirements, 
harming implementation efforts.288 
In 2010, Vietnam hosted South African representatives 
involved with monitoring the rhinos and enforcing poaching laws to 
discuss Vietnam’s efforts to control the illegal rhino trade.289 The goal 
of the meeting was to improve collaboration between the two 
nations.290 Not only is there a lack of enforcement in Vietnam, but 
there is a lack of a system to enforce; there is no legal system in place 
to register and track already owned horns, which allows legally 
obtained horns to more easily enter the illegal trade market.291 
Hopefully, the collaboration between South Africa and Vietnam will 
lead to a substantial reduction of rhino poaching. 
E.  How Poachers Are Getting Around the Laws 
Despite poaching laws and law enforcement efforts, poachers 
continue to victimize rhinoceros, and the number of poachers is not 
declining.292 Like other organized crime, rhino poaching and horn 
trafficking has become syndicated.293 There are several known gangs 
and syndicates; the more sophisticated ones use helicopters, high-
powered firearms, and new technology to avoid detection while 
hunting.294 The syndicates are largely foreign, but some are suspected 
of working with South African citizens, even law enforcement 
officers and government employees.295 Many of the syndicates shoot 
                                                 
288 See id. at 32. 
289 See South African Delegates Visit Vietnam to Address Illegal Rhino 
Horn Trade, TRAFFIC (Oct. 20, 2010) [hereinafter South African Delegates Visit 
Vietnam], http://www.traffic.org/home/2010/10/20/south-african-delegates-visit-
viet-nam-to-address-illegal-rh.html. 
290 See id.  
291 See id. 
292 See supra Part II.A. 
293 See sources cited infra notes 295-98. 
294 See Slater-Jones, supra note 16. 
295 See Zanu-PF, Aliens Colluding in Poaching Syndicates, ZIM. STANDARD, 
Oct. 23, 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201110240648.html; see also Tendai 
Rupapa, Rhino Horn Case Takes New Twist, HERALD (Zim.), Jan. 11, 2012,  
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87#.UUxujoVpfC4 (explaining how three rhino poachers suspected of murdering a 
game ranger were caught with illegal rhino horns in the car of Zimbabwe’s Local 
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the rhinos “legally” by abusing the permit system.296 For example, a 
recent Thai syndicate was suspected of using strippers and prostitutes 
posing as hunters to obtain permits to hunt white rhinos.297 
Once a horn is obtained,298 the syndicates have a number of 
methods they use to smuggle it to its final destination. There are 
established smuggling routes, which are shared with smugglers of 
other animals and changed often to avoid detection.299 The smugglers 
hide the rhino horns in containers, such as large “statues” or luggage, 
or ship them in bulk consignments by boat.300 More recently, 
smugglers have been using the internet, selling the horns online and 
mailing them disguised as art or antiques.301 In addition, smugglers 
                                                 
Government, Rural and Urban Development Deputy Minister. The Deputy 
Minister denies involvement, saying that he sold the vehicle and has had nothing to 
do with the car since). 
296 See Omphitlhetse Mooki, Suspected Thai Rhino Poaching Kingpin Fights for 
Bail, PRETORIA NEWS (S. Afr.), Oct. 27, 2011, at 4. 
297 See id. 
298 See Rhino Horn Thieves Gas Paris Museum Guards, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), 
Dec. 7, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france 
/8939250/Rhino-horn-thieves-gas-Paris-museum-guards.html (rhino horns are 
most frequently obtained by hunting the rhino, as described throughout this 
comment. However, recently, a pair of thieves stole a white rhino horn from a 
hunting and nature museum in Paris, France. Zoos and museums across Europe 
have been alert to possible thefts of rhino horns for some time, as this most recent 
robbery is not the only one. Rhino horns were stolen from at least three other 
French museums in 2011, as well as from a taxidermist in Vienna); 50 Overseas 
Museums Holding Rhino Heads Have Been Burgled, CAPE TIMES (S. Afr.), Jan. 31, 2012, 
at 3; Rhinos Given Fake Horns, N. Z. HERALD, Dec.22,2011, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10774696 
(in response to the rhino horn thefts from museums, curators in a Swiss museum 
have replaced the horns of its rhinos on display with fake horns); Michael 
McCarthy, British Zoos Put on Alert Over Rising Threat of Rhino Rustlers, INDEP. (U.K.), 
Jan. 30, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/british-zoos-
put-on-alert-over-rising-threat-of-rhino-rustlers-6296572.html (noting that zoos 
have also been warned to prepare for potential targeting by rhino poachers and 
other criminals looking to steal and sell their rhino horns on the black market). 
299 See Candice Bailey & Shaun Smillie, Record Rhino Horn Haul: 33 of Them 
Seized in ‘Scrap Plastic’ Shipment in Hong Kong, STAR (S. Afr.), Nov. 16, 2011, at 1, 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/record-rhino-horn-haul-1.1179722#. 
UUxvzIVpfC4. 
300 See id.; Wildlife in Their CITES, METRO (U.K.), Oct. 5, 2011, at 20. 
301 See Smuggling of Rhino Parts Goes Online, CHANNEL NEWSASIA (China), 
Sept. 5, 2011, http://wildsingaporenews.blogspot.com/2011/09/smuggling-of-
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have started making fake horns in order to mark-up the prices on real 
horns.302 However, due to the increasing efforts of law enforcement 
personnel, many syndicate rings have been busted sending several 
high-profile smugglers to trial.303 For example, the Groenewald Gang, 
started by a couple that operates a safari touring company, recently 
appeared in court facing hundreds of charges under several laws.304 
For the most part, law enforcement personnel are fighting on 
behalf of the white rhinoceros to end poaching. Unfortunately, some 
officers and park rangers are also involved in poaching, largely 
because of the great monetary benefits.305 South African police, 
politicians, and government officials have taken bribes from the 
poaching syndicates or aided them in some other way.306 One 
Vietnamese diplomat was even caught on tape making an illegal rhino 
horn purchase.307 Permit issuing authorities have also been suspected 
of aiding poaching by issuing questionable permits.308 Additionally, 
the South African government has kept stockpiles of rhino horns, 
which have been audited and are reported to be secretly held in safe 
keeping.309 However, the Minister Molewa’s Department’s booklet 
entitled “National Strategy for the Safety and Security of Rhinoceros 
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Populations in South Africa” says these stockpiles may be depleting 
as well, implying that some officials are stealing and selling the 
horns.310 
So many park rangers and game preserve employees have 
been involved in poaching that South Africans have coined the 
involvement “khaki-colored crime.”311 All levels of rangers have been 
implicated, many have been arrested,312 and some have been 
criminally charged.313 Additionally, veterinarians have been implicated 
in aiding the poaching syndicates by providing them with 
immobilizing drugs only available to vets.314 In one notable instance, 
a South African court convicted a veterinarian of aiding rhino 
poaching.315 However, instead of a court sentence, the South African 
Veterinary Council sentenced the vet to six months suspension and a 
fine.316 This “puny” sentence caused an outcry in the environmental 
conservation community.317 Those responsible for protecting the 
                                                 
310 See id. 
311 See Melanie Gosling, Rhino Poaching’s Inside Job, MERCURY (S. Afr.), 
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poaching (reporting on the accusation of two senior national park officials’ 
involvement in rhino poaching). 
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(reporting that three veterinarians appeared in court relating to charges of illegal use 
of M99, a drug commonly used by poachers). 
315 Shaun Smillie, Outrage Over Vet’s ‘Puny’ Sentence, STAR (S. Afr.), Feb. 9, 
2012, at 6, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/outrage-over-vet-s-
puny-sentence-1.1230448. 
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white rhino often help the poachers instead, making the fight against 
poaching even more difficult. 
F. The Response 
Clearly rhinoceros poaching is a problem. Unfortunately, the 
problem only seems to be growing. While South Africa is taking great 
strides to fight the poachers and curb the supply, the demand in 
countries is soaring; and Vietnam, for one, is doing little to control 
it.318 If the demand is great and prices for rhinoceros horns are high, 
the poaching problem will only persist. Additionally, a major 
roadblock in the fight to stop poaching is the involvement of people 
“on the inside.”319 Fortunately, South Africa and Vietnam have begun 
to take steps to work together to address the problem, as has the 
larger international community. 
To put an end to poaching, South Africa must first tackle its 
“khaki-colored crime” problem and suppress insider assistance to 
poaching syndicates. The specialized South African police force, 
known as the Hawks, has commented that they will continue to hunt 
those insiders despite the challenges of being repeatedly “stymied” by 
them.320 Additionally, retired park rangers, who are viewed as 
independent from their former parks and therefore less corruptible, 
are helping law enforcement officials generate new and effective ways 
to defeat poachers.321 Park officials have also encouraged bordering 
communities to help arrest poachers.322 Minister Molewa has also 
discussed cross-border law enforcement between SAPS and their 
counter-part in Mozambique.323 
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In response to the alarming number of rhinoceros poached in 
2012, Minister Molewa called all of South Africa to action.324 The 
Minister stated: “It is clear that this is an organized crime of the 
highest degree . . . [and] we need inputs and actions from all South 
Africans.”325 The minister called on rhino anti-poaching organizations 
for input, plans to add 150 more park rangers to the existing 500 in 
Kruger National Park, aims to deploy conservation specialists at key 
places of entry for poachers, especially sea ports and airports, and 
intends to continue working closely with Vietnam.326 
South Africa is also taking steps to curb the demand for 
rhinoceros horn in Vietnam. In September 2011, South Africa hosted 
Vietnamese delegates to address the growing demand for rhino 
horns, and the parties drafted a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) to work together to prevent rhino poaching and preserve this 
endangered species.327 The MoU seeks to disrupt the rhino horn trade 
through cooperation between Asian and African governments and 
cooperation among law enforcement during investigations, among 
prosecutors during trials, and among supervisors during legal 
hunting.328 The delegates are CITES members, including Vietnam’s 
Deputy Director of the General Department of Forestry, Ha Cong 
Tuan, and South Africa’s Deputy Director of biodiversity and natural 
conservation, Fundisile Mketeni.329 The delegates praised Vietnam’s 
participation, acknowledging the importance of Vietnam’s 
cooperation and effective implementation of CITES in order to win 
this fight.330  This 2010 meeting, arranged by IUCN331 and 
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TRAFFIC,332 inspired South Africa and Vietnam to meet once again 
in 2012.333 
On August 17, 2012, Deputy International Relations and 
Cooperation Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim and Vietnam’s Deputy 
Foreign Affairs Minister Le Luong Minh held a second meeting in 
South Africa concerning the MoU.334 The delegates expressed great 
                                                 
331  IUCN, http://www.iucn.org/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) (IUCN is a 
global network which provides frameworks for planning, implementing, 
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wildlife trade, wildlife trade routes, and rapid response and innovation; (4) The 
Core Competencies—TRAFFIC uses its expertise, in research, analysis, proposing 
solutions, advocacy and awareness, and supporting remedial action to carry out its 
mission; and (5) The Partnerships—drawing upon the expertise of its partnerships 
with WWF and IUCN, helps TRAFFIC to deliver more effective conservation 
action plans.); see also Sheree Bega, Rhino Report Gives Some Hope, STAR S. Afr.), Aug. 
25, 2012, at 8 (reporting on TRAFFIC’s rhino and elephant program leader Tom 
Milliken’s new report “The South Africa-Vietnam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A 
Deadly Combination of Institutional Lapses, Corrupt Wildlife Industry 
Professionals and Asian Crime Syndicates.” Milliken worked on compiling the 
report over a three year period. The report documents corrupt South African 
wildlife and government officials. Milliken’s own eye-witness reports on 
Vietnamese usage of rhino horns, Vietnam’s denial over their role in the trade, 
growing arrest rates, increased awareness, and trafficking). 
333 See WWF Calls for End to Rhino Poaching, supra note 58. 
334 See SA, Vietnam Discussing Poaching, S. AFR. PRESS ASS’N, Aug. 17, 
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concern over the poaching problem and sought to strengthen their 
cooperation in the field of bio-diversity conservation and protection 
through further bilateral agreements.335 They also discussed finalizing 
the MoU, the scope of which will include provisions on bio-diversity 
management, law enforcement, CITES compliance.336 The MoU 
would also require Vietnamese efforts to increase public awareness of 
the problem by providing education about legal rhino hunting in 
Vietnam.337 
On December 10, 2012, the MoU was officially signed by 
Minister Molewa and H.E. Cao Duc Phat, Vietnam’s Minister of 
Agriculture and Rural Development.338 At the signing ceremony, 
Minister Molewa stated that “South Africa is looking forward to 
receiving the close cooperation from Vietnamese partners to stop the 
illegal trade of rhino horns.”339 Agreeing, Minister Cao Duc Phat 
stated that the fight “against crime on wildlife regulations especially 
on the rare, precious and endangered species including rhinos . . . are 
always of concern to the Vietnam government . . . . The Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development . . . are [sic] submitting the Prime 
Minister to issue a Decision on banning the import of all rhino 
specimens to Vietnam.”340 Although the MoU is written in general 
terms, it indicates that rhino horn trafficking will be at the top of the 
policy agenda for the two nations.341 
The epidemic of rhino poaching is a global concern not only 
limited to South Africa and Vietnam. An international effort will be 
required to address the problem; and many countries will have to 
become involved. Kenyan citizens have created an on-line petition to 
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compel the Chinese government to act against the poaching and 
trafficking of rhino horns.342 Five other African Countries—
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, Angola, and Namibia—have legalized 
the sale of rhinoceros horn powder in pharmacies, hoping to reduce 
the profitability of the illegal trade.343 The Australian government has 
suggested using microdots, originally used to track stolen vehicles, to 
track rhino horns and poachers.344 Activists in India have tried to 
enlist the help of reformed poachers to inform on their former 
gangs.345 
The United Kingdom, a leading member of CITES, has been 
working to unite the international community and debunk the myth 
of rhino horns’ medicinal effects, to create public awareness of the 
poaching crisis, and to encourage the sharing of intelligence and 
policing tactics.346 In January 2012, the U.K.’s Department for 
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs invested over one million 
pounds in a wide range of projects to protect endangered species, 
including the white rhinoceros.347 The U.K. government is committed 
to being a pioneer in, and an example of, international 
conservation.348 
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Finally, the United States, in conjunction with several other 
countries, has started a partnership called the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership to address environmental challenges, such as illegal trade 
in wildlife like the white rhino.349 In May 2012, the U.S. Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the poaching 
problem in Africa, hearing from wildlife experts and organizations 
including the WWF and TRAFFIC.350 Senator John Kerry, Chairman 
of the Committee, stated that “[p]oaching is not just a security 
threat . . . [i]t’s also a menace . . . thriv[ing] where government is 
weakest. Poachers . . . are a danger to . . . rangers and civilians as well 
as the animals they target.”351 U.S. Federal Agents have also actively 
reduced the rhino horn trade in the U.S.352 in cooperation with South 
African wildlife authorities.353 In an unprecedented event on illegal 
wildlife trafficking held on November 8, 2012, U.S. Secretary of State 
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U.S. Dep’t of Justice Env’t & Natural Res. Div., Federal Officials Announce Nationwide 
Crackdown on Black Market Rhino Trade, US FED NEWS, Feb. 23, 2012. 
353 See Rondganger, supra note 352. 
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Hillary Clinton also recognized the problem, stating that “wildlife 
trafficking has serious implications for the security and prosperity of 
people around the world.”354 
The United Nations has also taken an interest, calling for its 
member nations to “step-up” and combat the illegal rhino trade.355 
Working together on an international level will be the best way, and 
maybe the only way, to end the illegal trade of white rhinoceros 
horns. 
CONCLUSION 
There is still more to be done to combat rhinoceros poaching 
and the illegal trade in rhino horns. People around the world are 
campaigning,356 protesting,357 and petitioning358 their governments to 
pay more attention to poaching and to work to stop it. Conservation 
                                                 
354 See Secretary of State Clinton Calls for End to Illegal Wildlife Trafficking, 
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND (Nov. 8, 2012), http://worldwildlife.org/stories/ 
secretary-of-state-clinton-calls-for-end-to-illegal-wildlife-trafficking. 
355 See Head of UN-Backed Convention Urges Greater Effort to Combat Illegal 
Rhino Trade, supra note 127. 
356 See Kenya: New Campaign to Stop Rhino Poaching in Country, supra note 
342. 
357 See Maregele, supra note 28 (describing the scene outside South 
Africa’s Parliament on National Rhino Day: protestors drew a chalk outline of a 
rhino horn and splattered the pavement with red paint. In protest of the South 
African government’s lax on anti-poaching enforcement. Signs were seen saying 
“will your children get to see a rhino?” and protestors were chanting “no bail, 
straight to jail.” The protestors hope the government will take harsher actions 
against poachers and greater strides to protect the endangered species). 
358 See Edward West, Zuma to Get Ultimatum to End Rhino Poaching, BUS. 
DAY (S. Afr.), Dec. 29, 2011, http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2011/12/29/zuma-
to-get-ultimatum-to-end-rhino-poaching;jsessionid=A13531D3681882AB56345432 
A5D5FF96.present2.bdfm (animal conservationists have put together a “Rhino 
Ultimatum” to present to South African President Zuma and several other South 
African government officials to urge greater government action against poachers. 
The ultimatum will call for new laws on sales of state-owned rhinoceros, a census 
of the rhinoceros population, a moratorium on rhino-hunting trophy permits, a lift 
of the media “gag” so officers can comment on the situation to the media, to 
engage more actively with demand countries like Vietnam, and to exhibit greater 
compliance with CITES. The petition already has over 7,000 signatures and hopes 
to get upwards of 250,000). 
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groups have created plans to stop poaching.359 However, poaching 
will continue despite South African efforts to curb supply as long as 
the demand in Asian countries like Vietnam remains. Therefore, it is 
of the utmost importance to educate people that rhinoceros horns do 
not cure cancer and other ailments. Unfortunately, convincing the 
Vietnamese citizens may be easier said than done. If they abandon 
this myth, the demand for rhino horns will fall off drastically, thereby 
eliminating the poachers’ financial incentives. 
Additionally, a continued international effort against poaching 
will be important. Cooperation and shared intelligence will make 
breaking trade routes and law enforcement efforts easier, placing 
more pressure on poachers and traffickers themselves. Eventually, 
poaching risks will begin to outweigh the benefits. This will be 
especially true if nations increase statutory penalties for illegal 
poaching and trading of rhinoceros horn. 
Finally, it is important for each country, individually, to 
continue efforts to stop rhino poaching and trading. While South 
Africa has taken great strides, there is still more that it can do, 
including cracking down on so called “khaki-colored” crimes. More 
importantly, Vietnam, which has slowly begun to take action, must 
implement and enforce a stricter regulatory system. With these 
recommendations, as well as continued education and support from 
activists around the world, the white rhinos can grow and flourish for 
future generations instead of ending up like the Javan and Black 
rhino—extinct.  One can only hope. 
                                                 
359 See, e.g., Tony Carnie, Legal Rhino Horn Sales Plan Mooted, STAR (S. Afr.), 
July 13, 2012, at 5, http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/legal-rhino-horn-sales-plan-
mooted-1.1340555#.UUyFR4VpfC4 (one conservation group proposed a plan to 
sell horns legally directly to Asian pharmaceutical companies and to use the money 
to fund rhinoceros protection); Rhino Summit in Nairobi Develops Action Plan, 
ETURBO NEWS (Uganda), Apr. 7, 2012, http://www.eturbonews.com/ 
28680/rhino-summit-nairobi-develops-action-plan (conservation group African 
Wildlife Foundation met with wildlife authorities, private rhino reserve owners, and 
other conservation groups to outline an action plan. The plan consisted mainly of 
expanding support for surveillance to officials and lobbying for amendments to 
change financial penalties and prison terms). 
